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The intent of this thesis is to provide those interested
with a compendium of the quintessential elements of the Sino-
Soviet territorial conflict from its origin through March of
1975. An attempt has been made to use the most up-to-date
and authoritative source materials available with the majority
of the citations dated since 1974. The conflict is examined
in depth and its expected future course is projected as are
its strategic implications for American national security
planners and naval strategists.
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I. HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT
A. INTRODUCTION
The main purposes of this thesis have been to instruct
the author on national security aspects of the Sino-Soviet
territorial conflict and to attempt to project the future
of that conflict. The main hypothesis is that Peking will
increasingly emphasize international negotiations with Moscow
as the People's Republic of China improves its nuclear capa-
bility, defensive preparations, and logistical capabilities
vis a vis the Soviet Union. An alternative hypothesis to be
tested is that the People's Republic of China will use all
means short of general war to regain "lost territories"
from the Soviet Union. Both hypotheses are evident in the
writings of many of the Sinologists and Russophiles cited
in the list of references. An intent of the thesis is to
provide the reader with a compendium of the quintessential
elements of the conflict from its beginning to the present
with emphasis on the events of the past quarter of a century.
An attempt has been made to select the most authoritative
and up-to-date primary and secondary source materials from
among the myriad of data available on China and Russia. A
popular definition of the term "conflict" is: "1. A prolonged
battle; a struggle; clash. 2. A controversy; disagreement;
opposition. 3. Psychology . The opposition or simultaneous
functioning of mutually exclusive impulses, desires, or

tendencies. 4. A crashing together; collision." [The
American Heritage Dictionary of the American Language 1973
p. 279] In the strategic sense, John M. Collins defines
"conflict spectrum" as "A continuum of hostilities that ranges
from subcrisis maneuvering in cold-war situations to the most
violent form of general war , " [Collins 1973 p. 265] and it
is this definition that applies throughout this study. For
a more in-depth definition of conflict, see Thomas C.
Schelling's Strategy of Conflict (London: Oxford University
Press, 1960) or any issue of the Journal of Conflict
Resolution since its inception in March of 1957.
The author agrees with former Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, General Nathan Twining, who once said "Nobody is an
expert on Russia. There are just varying degrees of ignor-
ance" [Schurman 1957 p. vii] , and believes that the sentiment
is even more apropos to China today. Professor John K.
Fairbank offers two valid reasons for Americans to study
China: the pragmatic — based upon the fact that our last
three wars have involved us with Chinese culture and that
modern Communist-nationalism has militant potential (China's
tradition of profound isolationism notwithstanding, missiles
know no boundaries); and the academic — because China's
history represents perhaps a third of organized human experi-
ence, it is simply very interesting [Fairbank 1974 p. 218]
.
The author agrees with both reasons and will attempt to show
the first reason as being of increasing long-range signifi-
cance to the naval strategic planner. Thomas Robinson has
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observed that "At present, the Soviet Union is reported to
have the most powerful concentration of military force of
the face of the earth deployed adjacent to China's northern
borders ..." [Robinson "Soviet Policy in Eastern Asia" Problems
in Communism November-December 1973] and Professor William
Ebenstein has stated that "Today, the Sino-Soviet conflict
is viewed everywhere as posing the most important potential
threat of nuclear war between any two major powers in the
world, possibly engulfing all continents." [Ebenstein 1973
p. 106]
In the center of Eastern Asia is the world's oldest extant
civilization, the Chinese, whose continuing stability and
ethnic unity, until recently, was unmatched by any society.
Today, however, the People's Republic of China is among the
least stable or predictable actors on the international stage.
Professors Clyde and Beers predict that: "...it may well be
that the political and social history of the world in the
century ahead will be determined as much by the temper of
China as by the behavior of any major state." [Clyde and
Beers 1971 p. 2] Others, distinguished in the fields of
political science and international journalism, echo similar
sentiments by such commentaries as: "...the great cleavage
between Peking and Moscow is likely to be recorded as one
of the two or three most significant events of the twen-
tieth century." [Professor Robert Scalapino "How Peking
Views the World" Monterey Peninsula College Lecture Series
18 October 1963] "When historians in the year 2000 look back
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on the final quarter of this century, they will see that it
was the present Sino-Soviet relationship that shaped their
world." [Sulzberger 1974 p. 6]
The term "China," not a native Chinese name, was originally
found in Sanskrit about the Christian era and later in various
modified forms employed by other Asiatic peoples. The origin
of the term is still a matter of debate [Oxford English Dic-
tionary 1971 p. 351] . One of the obvious and most common
opinions is that it is from the Chinese Ch ' in dynasty of
225-204 B.C. "Sino" indicates something Chinese and is from
Late Latin Sinae, the Chinese, from Greek Sinai , from Arabic
Sin , China, from Chinese (Mandarin) Ch ' in , the dynastic name
of the country previously cited. The archaic and poetic
form of China is the word "Cathay" from Medieval Latin Cataya
,
Kitai, from Old Turkic Qitay, Qitan , name of an Altaic Tur-
kic tribe that ruled China as the Liao Dynasty (A.D. 907-
1101) . The Chinese themselves call their land Chung-kuo , the
central country, or as the name often appears in Western
literature, The Middle Kingdom [American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 1973 pp. 234, 209, 212]. For an
occidental observer to gain insight into how the Chinese
perceive the world around them, he must remember that they
have been developing an integrated oriental cultural heritage
for more than 3,000 years, whereas both the United States
and Russia are multinational in origin and have existed for
only about 200 and 1100 years respectively.
12

The Russian State emerged on the east European plain
after years of invasion, conquest, and sporadic attempts at
settlement by Central Asian nomads, Scythians, Goths, Huns,
Avars, and other tribal groups during the period 1000 B.C. to
A.D. 800. As Kirchner notes the origin of the Slavs is not
clear, but they emerged in the area of the Ukraine during the
eighth century where a Scandinavian prince named Rurik or-
ganized the first Slavic state in 856 in Novgorod on Lake
Ilmen. In 882 Rurik' s successor, Oleg, consolidated the
northern Novgorod dominion with the commercial dominion to
the south at Kiev and is regarded as the founder of Russia.
These Scandinavians who settled Russia were also known as
Varangians or Russ (meaning rowers) . By the tenth century
they had loosely organized their principalities at Novgorod,
Turov, Polotsk, and Kiev into a great state. Because of
their small size, the Varangians were soon assimilated into
the Slavic culture and only their form of local government
was retained. Their influence on the future destiny of the
country was negligible [Kirchner 1955 pp. 8-9] . Thus one
can observe the derivation of the name "Russia." "Russia




Norsemen, the Norse founders of the Russian
principalities, from Old Norse Rothsmenn , seafarers, from
rothr
, to row [The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1973 p. 1137]. It is interesting to note that "Russia,"
traditionally thought of as a land power (at least until the
1970's), has a nautical origin.
13

For the next three centuries Russia's main tasks con-
sisted of internal consolidation/ trade, and territorial
expansion. The Varangian Grand Prince established a lively
commerce with Constantinople by trading the furs, grain,
honey, and slaves he received in tribute from his provinces.
As a result, the Byzantine culture and religion spread
throughout Russia. By the end of the tenth century, Grand
Prince Vladimir of Kiev was converted to the Byzantine or
Greek orthodox form of Christianity. Vladimir thus made
Christianity the religion of Imperial Russia. Byzantine
artists erected and decorated churches in a style which
established the style of later Russian art.
B,. WESTWARD EXPANSION BY THE MONGOLS
Reither asserts that the Narangian state began to crumble
with the invasion of the steppes by an Asiatic horde called
the Polovtzy who had been forced westward by drought in the
Gobi during the twelfth century. The Polovtzy severed the
trade routes between Russia and the Black Sea and pushed the
Russians north into Poland, Lithuania, and the Moscow and
Novgorod areas. The monarchy was abandoned and a republic
established in its place. Novgorod developed a prosperous
commerce in the Baltic area [Reither 1952 p. 206].
In the thirteenth century, Kirchner notes, the Mongul
nomads of the steppes of central Asia were united under the
leadership of Genghis Khan who set out to conquer the world.
They seized Turkestan from the kingdom of North China and
14

conquered the Turkish empire of Kharezm. They menaced first
the Polovtzy, who, despite their frequent invasions of Russia,
served as an important buffer state against Genghis Khan's
Tarters and therefore, received Russian support. In 122 3,
at the Battle of the River Kalka, the combined armies of
Russia and the Polovtzy were routed, but in spite of their
victory the Tarters retreated. After the death of Genghis,
the Russian lands were granted by his successor to Batu
Khan, a grandson of Genghis. The Tarters then resumed their
invasion of Russia. Vladimir, Pereslavl, and Chernigov were
captured in 12 38, and Kiev in 1240. Of all the important
Russian centers, Novgorod alone was temporarily spared be-
cause the thick forests and dense swamps impeded the advance
of the equestrian Tarters. Alexander, the Duke of Novgorod
successfully defended his province against the Swedes in
1240 and the Teutonic Knights in 1242, but finally recognized
Tarter sovereignty in 1245 after exhausting his resources
against invading Lithuanian armies from the west. The Tarters
maintained sovereignty in Russia for almost two hundred and
fifty years. In 1380, the Muscovite ruler Dimitri made the
first effective attempt to throw off the Tarter yoke by
scoring a politically useful, but militarily useless, victory
over the Tarters on the Don. Dimitri, called "Donskoy" for
this victory on the Don, thus seriously damaged Tarter pres-
tige but could not break Tarter dominance because of the rise
of another great conqueror, Tamerlane; nevertheless, Dimitri
15

further promoted the growth of Muscovy by establishing the
law of primogeniture, thus eliminating the system of dividing
the country between heirs of the leader [Kirchner 1955
pp. 25-26, 30]. This law initiated stability in the house
of the princes of Muscovy. For almost two hundred years,
from 1389 to 1584, Moscow was ruled by only five princes.
This continuity coupled with the improving economic position
of Moscow due to its strategic location and growing taxable
population caused the city to persistently rise in relative
power. The introduction of the latest artillery during this
period, ever since a weapon of great importance to the Russian
army, did much to swing the balance of power vis-a-vis the
Tarters in Moscow's favor.
As Clubb has observed, final victory over the Mongol
yoke was delayed until the time of Ivan III (1462-1505)
,
known later as Ivan the Great, who ranks as the founder of
the Russian empire. At his wife Sophia's insistence, he
claimed the title of "Tsar" (believed to be derived from
Ceasar ) which implied supreme wordly and spiritual power.
The Russian empire, thus, began to take the form of a nation
which, in its claim to devine legitimacy and orthodoxy, bore
a resemblance to that Oriental Middle Kingdom which assumed
that the occupant of the Dragon Throne at Peking was the
legitimate ruler of all mankind [Clubb 1971 p. 8] . There
is a consensus that the formal political sovereignty of the
Tarters was ended in 1480 at the so-called battle of the
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River Ugra. Although Russian and Tarter armies faced each
other on the Ugra, no battle was fought; so the confrontation
resulted in a stalemate. Ivan had previously undermined
Tarter power by negotiations with unruly elements within the
Golden Horde and, with the onset of winter, the Tarters
retreated. No longer was tribute paid to the Golden Horde.
The Turks then seized the Crimea and the Golden Horde
disappeared in less than twenty years. Some Tarters remained,
however, as a danger to the Russian state for another century
[Kirchner 1955 p. 35, Lydolph 1970 p. 7, Mellor 1964 pp. 85-86,
and Reither 1952 p. 208].
Clubb notes that with the help of the Don Cossacks (from
the Russian kazak meaning freebooter or adventurer) , Ivan IV
(1547-1584) , "The Terrible," defeated and annexed the Kazan
Tarters in 1552, followed by the annexation of the Astrakhan
khanate in 1556. The Russian people were thus able to
populate the lower Volga region, enabling the Russians to
safely open the route to Siberia. But the Crimean khanate
continued to exist and in 1571 it captured and destroyed all
of Moscow except for the Kremlin. The Russian struggle with
Ottoman Turks, who ruled the Crimean Khan, would continue
for centuries. Having little success in expanding his
empire westwards because of strong opposition by Sweden and
Poland, Ivan turned to expansion in the Inner Asian border-
lands. Coincidental with Ivan's rule was the rise of the
specter of the "foreign menace" which combined with threats
to internal order to make Russian rule more despotic [Clubb
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1971 p. 9]. Kirchner records that Ivan created a special
private police force, the Oprichnina, which was not identi-
fied with the state, but with the will of the sovereign.
The Oprichnina became the chief tool of autocracy; its
illegality, ruthlessness , and irresponsibility caused it to
be feared and hated by the people and the regular administra-
tion. It was a historical precursor of the Soviet Secret
Police or K.G.B. [Kirchner 1955 p. 9].
C. EASTWARD EXPANSION BY RUSSIA
In 1558, Tsar Ivan made a land grant on the Upper Kama
River, west of the Urals, to an ambitious merchant named
Grigore A. Stroganov and his brothers. According to Russian
legend the name Stroganov (from the Russian strogat , "to
shave off") originated when a distant ancestor of the
Stroganovs by the name of Spiridon (who, incidentally, was
the first to introduce the abacus to Russia) for some unknown
reason was sentenced by his fellow Tarter tribesmen to having
his flesh shaved off layer by layer with a sharp knife until
he died [Shinkarev 1973 p. 37] . The Stroganovs built a
strong commercial base and petitioned the tsar in 1574 for
a grant of land east of the Urals as far as the Tura and
Tobol Rivers (tributaries of the Ob) . Even though the area
actually consituted the western half of the domain ruled by
the Tatar khan Kuchum, Ivan gave them title to these lands
and more. The Stroganovs had thus to win from Kuchum the
domain they had been granted. They succeeded by enlisting
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aid from the Don Cossacks. In 1579, one Yermak Tunofeevich
and his band of Cossacks, all of whom were being pursued by
tsarist forces, were enlisted by the Stroganovs to push
Kuchum westward in return for a promise of rich fields for
cultivation. In 1582, Yermak occupied Sibir (from which
Siberia got its name) . Yermak then requested a pardon and
military support from the tsar. Ivan IV was so pleased that
he sent a detachment of 50 men and a richly ornamented
cuirass to Yermak. In 1585 Yermak was attacked and in an
effort to escape, plunged into the Irtysh where, according
to Russian legend, he drowned as a result of the tsar's
present, the cuirass, that he wore. Ivan the Terrible died
in 1584 and, because he had killed his able eldest son Ivan
in 1580, succession was passed to his weak offspring Fedor.
But the real power behind the Throne was in the person of
the tsar's brother-in-law, Boris Godunov, under whose strong
influence Moscow continued its eastward expansion into
Siberia so that by 1586 Tyumen was founded on the Tura River.
Kuchum was finally defeated and killed in 1598 and, in that
same year, Tsar Fedor died without a legal heir ending the
Rurik dynasty. Godunov then ruled as "Tsar Boris" until his
death in 1605 which ushered in the "Time of Troubles" marked
by a struggle for succession and by revolts of the distressed
peasantry [Clubb 1971 pp. 11-12].
In 1613 the yemski sobor (territorial assembly) elected
the weak-willed Mikhail Romanov as tsar. Nevertheless, he
reconstructed the army, established peaceful relations with
19

Sweden, and continued Russian expansion into Siberia. Along
the way into Siberia the Russians constructed ostrogs
(fortified strongpoints) at Mangazeya, on the lower reaches
of the Taz River (a tributary of the Ob) and at Yenisei in
1619 while encountering only minor resistance from such
petty forest tribes as the Nentsy, Khanty, and Kets. The
Buryal Mongols, however, offered stiffer resistance to the
Russian advance, but by 162 8 the Cossack sotnik (commander
of a hundred) Petr Beketov succeeded in making the Buryats
pay tribute. The Cossacks also encountered the Turkic
Yakuts to the east, but Beketov succeeded in founding, in
1632, the ostrog Lensk (later named Yakutsk) on the middle
of the Lena. By 1636 the Russians discovered the Amur River
and in 1639 arrived at the Sea of Okbotsh on the* Pacific
[Clubb 1971 pp. 12-13, 21].
Up to this point the Russian government had taken no part
in these explorations. Its interests were confined to
strategic considerations of security from new nomad invasions
Consequently, the initiative remained in the hands of lawless
bands who followed the explorers and who had little honor and
no love of country. The farther they were from Russia, the
greater their lawlessness. Excessive taxes, torture,
abduction, murder, and cannibalism were among the crimes
these Cossacks perpetrated upon the natives. Not only were
the Cossack soldiers feared but also the traders who arrived
after them to speculate in land, provisions, and saltmines.
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In 1637 a Siberian Department was founded in Moscow with
various administrative units spread throughout Siberia, but
it was centralized in 1670 at Tobolsk. The officers of
these units, however, were notoriously corrupt and robbed
both the natives and the government they represented. Their
harsh treatment of local peoples resulted in the flight of
many natives to China [Kirchner 1955 p. 49], A Russian
description of this same period parallels Kirchner' s recol-
lection of Russian brutality by the Tsar's military governors
and adds that: "The collectors frequently tried to collect
from the local people more furs than were legally required
under the yasak (tax) , and merchants — often with the help
of alcohol — shamelessly cheated the locals and violated
their national traditions and rights." Shinkarev goes on to
describe how the Russian government finally placed sanctions
of death and torture (for example, tearing off nostrils) on
those officials who sought illegal self-enrichment [Shinkarov
1973 pp. 47-51].
In 1635, Abahai (1592-1643), the leader of 400,000
Jurchen people who occupied the borderlands separating the
Chinese and Russian empires, changed the name of his people
from Jurchen or Chienchon Jurchens, as was the Chinese usage,
to "Manchus," the rationale of which is unknown. Then, in
May, 1636, with forty-nine Inner Mongolian princes in
attendance, Abahai declared himself emperor of the Ch'ing
(pure) dynasty. Abahai died in 164 3 and succession passed
21

to his ninth son, Fu~lin, then only five years of age.
Fu-lin's uncle, Dorgon , occupied Peking in 1644, and Fu-lin
ascended the Dragon Throne as emperor Shun-chich, signaling
the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Manchu dynasty
which was to last until 1912. Consequently, an automatic
addition to the Chinese empire was the Manchu 1 s homeland,
the Northeast (the Chinese term it Manchuria) [Clubb 1971
p. 20].
In 1648, the Cossack staman Semyon Dezhnev, starting
from the mouth of the Kolyma River, made his way around the
Chukotsh Peninsula south through the Bering Straight which
was named eighty years later upon the arrival of Vitus Bering
In 1649, Erofei P. Khabarov headed an expedition which ran
into settlements of Daurs along the Amur River who were
subjects of the Manchu emperor. He wisely withdrew leaving
behind a small garrison. Returning the following summer
with reinforcements, he found his garrison under seige by
the Daurs. An evening clash with Khabarov' s force resulted
in the Daur prince fleeing and Khabarov occupying the town.
When Moscow heard of the richness of this area months later,
a force of 3,000 troops under the command of Prince Lobanov-
Rostovski was dispatched to the Amur sector. .Meanwhile
Khabarov was consolidating his position and in September,
1651, occupied a village belonging to the Olchei tribe. The
Olchei, oppressed and pressured to pay yasak and supply the
Russian detachment, appealed to the Manchus for help. In
22

March, 1652, a Manchu detachment of 2,000 men attacked the
Russian ostrog but were repulsed. This clash is significant
because it is the first major battle between Russian and
Chinese forces. Additional Sino-Soviet battles occurred in
1654 with the Russians winning again, 1658 in which the
Manchus won, and in the 16 80's with no clear victor [Clubb
1971 pp. 22-23]
.
D. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
As early as 1650, Tsar Mikhail had attempted to establish
diplomatic contact with Peking by sending Erofei Zabolotski
to China for the purpose of regularization of relations
between the two countries, but he and his party were murdered
by their Buryat escort. Similarly, a second mission in 1653,
led by the Cossack Tetyak E. Chichigin was wiped out by
Dyucher guides. A third mission in 1654 headed by Fedor I.
Baikov succeeded in reaching Peking but failed because of
Baikov's refusal to follow the kowtow as prescribed by Manchu
officials. A fourth mission in 1658, headed by the merchant
Seitku Ablin, succeeded in exchanging gifts, but he received
no audience with the emperor. They returned with 360 pounds
of Chinese brick tea which was to become one of the most
prized of Russian imports from China. In 1670 a fifth Russian
mission, that of Ignati Milovanov, was made to China, which
resulted from an approach from the Manchu side to return a
renegade Evenki prince named Gantimur (who had fled to the
Russian side in 1667) as a quid pro quo for engaging in
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Chinese trade. A letter from this mission to Kang-hsi
proposed that the emperor submit to the tsar; needless to
say, this approach failed. Russia did not turn over Gantimur,
conditions for trade remained inauspicious, but Moscow
relieved the originator of the letter, Daniel Arshinski, of
his post as the voevoda of Nerchinsk. In May, 1676, Russian
Ambassador Spathar-Milescu arrived in Peking and agreed
finally to perform the kowtow, gaining the first official
audience with the emperor. The issue of Gantimur, however,
was still critical in the mind of Kang-hsi. Spathar-Milescu
was informed by a local Jesuit that, if Gantimur were not
handed over, China would make war on Russia. On September 1,
1677, the Russian ambassador and his mission were ordered to
depart Pskin^ immediately ^Clubb 1971 pp. 19-2 7^
Meanwhile, by 1673 a mongul leader named Galdan had won
authority over most chieftains of the Dzungarian khanate and
had decided to unify Mongolia in order to form a buffer state
in Inner Asia between China and Russia. He planned to
confront both Manchu and Russian imperialism from a position
of strength and then play them against each other. In the
final analysis he failed because he poisoned himself in May,
1697, after his army had suffered a devastating defeat by
the Manchus . However, he succeeded in playing a key role
in Russo-Manchu relations in two ways: first, a pattern
was established that when the Monguls were quiet, Peking
tended to be arrogant toward the Russians, but when the
Monguls threatened China, the Manchu Court assumed a
24

conciliatory stance; second, the fact that the Russians
could align themselves with Galdan was the one bargaining
lever they had in negotiating at the Russo-Manchu conference
at Nerchinsk (also, Nipchu) in August, 1689 [Clubb 1971
pp. 27-33].
Finally, on 27 August 1689, Russia and the Manchu Kingdom
signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk after an exchange of
embassies and after two weeks. of negotiations/ It was
significant as the first international agreement made by a
Chinese emperor with a European power on the basis of formal
sovereign equality and as the first formally established
common frontier between China and Russia. Although Russia
had negotiated from a position of military inferiority (it
was the time of a century and a half of Manchu Dynasty
power ascendancy)
,
she managed to acquire some 93,000 square
miles of Chinese territory. This Chinese-Russian border
along the Amur basin was to remain unchanged for almost 170
years when on 2 8 May 1858, the Treaty of Aigun was signed
[Tai 1973 p. 30]
.
The Bur Treaty was signed on 2 August 172 7 between the
Chinese, and Russian empires. Two additional protocols
(12 October at Abagatuy and 27 October on the Bur River) were
exchanged which superseded it. Also on 27 October 1727
Tsarist Russia and Manchu China signed the Treaty of Kiakhta.
The above mentioned protocols and the Treaty of Kiakhta
defined a large portion of the border, most of which is now
the boundary between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia.
25

By way of the two agreements of 1127, Manchu China lost
almost 40^000 square miles between the upper Irtysh and the
Sayan Mountains, as well as south and southwest of Lake
Baikal. The delimitation remained valid for over 125 years
[Tai 1973 p. 32]. Following the Opium War (1840-1842),
which verified declining Manchu power, China was infested
with internal disorders and foreign intervention. Russia
took advantage of this by gradually repenetrating the Amur
valley in violation of the treaty of Nerchinsk.
In search of an ice-free port on the Sea of Okhotsh,
Tsar Nicholas I sent a Captain Nevelskoi to explore the
coast of Siberia. Tai observes that, on his own initiative
and without instructions, he built a post on the Amur which
he named Nikolaevsk i.n clear viola.tion of tb^ Tre?t v of
Nerchinsk. By the end of 1853 Nevelskoi and his expedition
occupied the most important harbors in the Gulf of Tartary
and established posts in Sakhalin, this time with the
blessing of Nicholas I [Tai 1973 p. 33]. By 1856, the
Russians were entrenched along the entire course of the Amur
and the Manchus had to recognize this de facto military
occupation because they were hard-pressed to put down the
Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) [Clyde and Beers 1971 pp. 85-87]
The Russians took advantage of the Manchu problems with the
Taiping and Nienfei (1853-68) rebels by negotiating the
Treaty of Aigun on 2 8 May 1858 which gained for Russia the
northern part of the Amur River valley, an area of 185,000
square miles [Tai 1973 p. 36].
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In June, 1858, another Russo-Chinese treaty was signed
in Tientsin. By this treaty the Russian negotiator, Admiral
Evfimi Putyatin gained commercial rights similar to those
enjoyed by England and other Western powers as a result of
the "most- favored nation" clauses of Chinese treaties in
which Russia had not participated, such as the Treaty of
Nanking in 1842. Russia could now trade with China by land
and sea using the same ports open to Western powers such as
Shanghai, Canton, Amoy, et al
.
Russia also gained the right
to send envoys to Peking and establish consuls in the open
ports. The consuls were given extraterritorial jurisdiction
over Russian citizens violating Chinese laws. A new Russian
envoy, General Nikolai Ignatiev, attempted to get the Aigun
Treaty ratified but when China became obstinate., he effec-
tively broke diplomatic relations with Peking in May, 1860.
But at this point, history played into Russia's hands.
Peking was weak and in disorder because of British and French
incursions and the Taiping rebellion. While China quickly
ratified the Treaty of Tientsin with Russia, ratification of
similar treaties with Britain, France, and the United States
was delayed. This resulted in an Anglo-French attack in
1860 in which Tientsin and Peking were captured and the
emperor's beautiful Summer Palace destroyed. As Swartz
observes, this is when General Ignatiev returned to Peking
to accomplish "one of the most skillful feats of diplomatic
double-dealing in history." Following Admiral Putyatin 's
suggestion that he gain Russian advantage of China's military
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weakness vis-a-vis the British and French, Ignatiev both
showed the British Commander a detailed map of Peking high-
lighting the north gate as the weakest spot in its defenses
and offered his good offices to the Peking government to
serve as mediator. For his services his price was that
Peking ratify the Treaty of Aigun, allow new Russian
consulates in many cities, and extend the Russian-Chinese
boundary line along the Ussuri River to Korea. After the
Chinese paid this price, Ignatiev persuaded the British to
withdraw because Peking was "unsafe in the winter." Once
allied troops had left, he was free to deal with the Chinese
on his terms and succeeded in getting the Treaty of Peking
signed on 14 November 1860. This treaty nullified both the
Treaty of Nerchinsk and the Treaty of Kiakhta and added an
additional 133,000 square miles of Chinese territory east
of the Ussuri to Russia. It also established the basic
boundary in existence today between Manchuria and the Soviet
Far East in which China surrendered claim to almost 350,000
square miles of territory by agreeing that the boundary
between Sinkiang and Russian Central Asia be set along the
line of permanent pasture markers which the Chinese had set
up to limit pasture use by the Kazakh nomads [Swartz 1973
pp. 49-51].
On 7 October 1864, The Tarbagatai Protocol, hastily
concluded because of a Moslem revolt in Sinkiang, deliminated
the new Chinese-Russian boundary in Central Asia. After the
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Taiping Rebellion in the east was crushed, the Manchus
turned against Yakub Beg and the revolting Moslems in the
west, crushing them by 1878 and reestablishing firm adminis-
trative control of Sinkiang. The Chinese then demanded that
the Russians leave the Hi River valley but were not strong
enough to force their removal. This resulted in the Treaty
of Livadia of September 1879. In return for a Russian
promise to withdraw from the Hi area, China agreed to cede
about 30 percent of the Hi territory to Russia, including
most of the strategic area between Dzhingaria and the Tien
Shane. This treaty cost Sinkiang a substantial part of its
most fertile valley. The Chinese envoy who negotiated this
treaty, Ch'sing-hou, was thrown into prison and sentenced to
be decapitated by the Manchu court in Peking for his stupidity
in this matter. He was later pardoned and another treaty,
the treaty of St. Petersburg (or Hi) , was signed on 14
February 1881 after the Manchu court refused to ratify the
Treaty of Livadia. As a result Russia was ceded only a
small area of Sinkiang (15,000 square miles) but China did
agree to pay Tsarist Russia nine million rubles "occupation
costs" [Tai 1973 p. 41].
Tai notes that because the Treaty of St. Petersburg was
vague in delineating specific boundaries in Sinkiang, addi-
tional protocols were signed between 1882 and 1893 — at Hi
in August 1882; at Goulimton in October 1882; at Kashgar in
November 1882; at Tarbagatai in September 1883; at Novi-
Margelan in May 1884; at Kashgar in May 18 85; and at
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Tarbagatai in December 1893. The result was that China never
quite lost Sinkiang to the Russians, but it never eliminated
Russian influence in the area either. The Chinese-Russian
boundary today in Sinkiang has remained the same as that
negotiated from 1882 to 1893 [Tai 1973 p. 44].
During the late nineteenth century Russia launched a
drive for political, military, and economic influence in
Manchuria and Korea in competition with Japan. In 1896,
the Russians got a weak China to enter into a defensive
alliance against Japan and to agree that Russia could build
the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria as a shortcut link
between Russia proper and the Soviet Maritime Province
(Vladivostok) ; in 1898 they obtained additional concessions
to extend this railroad into southern Manchuria and to give
Russia a territorial lease on the warm water port of Dairen,
on the naval base of Port Arthur, and on the Liotung Penin-
sula — the same strategic areas denied Japan by the Russian-
led Western intervention as one of the most significant
prizes in defeating China three years earlier. As a result
of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905 following
the defeat of Russia by Japan, Russia was compelled to cede
to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin Island, the Liaotung
Peninsula, the South Manchurian Railway, the naval complex'
of Port Arthur and Dairen and, generally, its predominant




With the collapse of Manchu China on 1 December 1911,
the Mongols declared Outer Mongolian independence and asked
for Russian support and protection. The Russo-Mongolian
Treaty of 3 November 1912 recognized the "autonomy" of Outer
Mongolia. This agreement was followed by a secret military
agreement in 1913. Later, in 1921 the Soviet Union declared
Outer Mongolia "independent/ 1 quietly annexing it on 13
Obtober 1944 as part of its territory under the name of an
autonomous region of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic. Russian interference in Outer Mongolia almost
caused war with the new (1911) Chinese Republic, but this
was averted in an accord of 5 November 1913 in which the
Russians admitted Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia.
Later, this was formalized in the tripartite Russo-Chinese-
Mongolian treaty of June 1915 at Kiakhta [Tai 1973 p. 46]
.
•The following quotation from the "Foreign Relations 1917"
section of the Soviet Year-Book 1928 evinces an apparent
change in Russian foreign policy as a result of the revolution
On November 22, 1917, a manifesto to all the
Moslems of Russia and of the East was published,
in which Soviet Russia declared its renunciation
of the Colonial policy of the previous Russian
Governments.
In order to do away with secret treaties and
base its international relations on the principle
of open diplomacy , the Soviet Government began on
November 10, 1917, the publication of all secret
treaties entered upon by previous Russian
Governments. [Santalov and Segal, ed. 1928 p. 29]
In a moment of revolutionary zeal, the Deputy Commissar for
Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Union, L. M. Karakhan, issued
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a declaration on 25 July 1919 repudiating all "unequal"
treaties and renouncing all Soviet claims to territories
"ravenously" taken from China by the tsars. It said in
part:
We are marching to free the people from the yoke
of military force, of foreign money, which is crushing
the life and the people of the East, and principally
of the people of China... The Soviet Government has
renounced all the conquests made by the Tsarist
Government which took away from China Manchuria and
other territories. The population of these terri-
tories shall decide for themselves to which country
they would like to belong. [Tai 1973 p. 47]
China thought then she would have her lost-territories returned,
This belief was reinforced when the Soviet government issued
the Karakhan Manifesto to Peking. It declared:
The Government of the Russian Socialist Repub-
lics declares null and void all treaties concluded
with China by the former Government of Russia, re-
nounces all seizures of Chinese territory and all
Russian concessions in China, and restores to China,
without compensation and forever, all that had been
predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government
and the Russian bourgeoisie. [Tai 1973 p. 50]
The Soviet regime never followed through on these pledges.
Under General Hsu Shu-tseng, the Chinese tried to reestablish
their control over Outer Mongolia in 1919 while the Russians
were preoccupied with both World War I and their own revolu-
tion. He was opposed in 1921 by the last remnants of the
White Russian Army under Baron Roman Nikolaus von Ungern-
Sternberg who invaded Outer Mongolia and seized the capital
of Urga . This was used as a pretext for the invasion of
Mongolia by the Soviet Red Army which expelled the White
Russians and recognized Mongolian independence. In effect
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Outer Mongolia became the first Soviet satellite (the capital
of Urga was changed to Ulan Bator meaning "Red Hero")
.
In the early 1920' s the new republic of China was deeply
divided between the Peking government (North) ruled by reac-
tionary warloads and the revolutionary Kuomintang (Nationalist)
regime in Canton (South) , led by Sun Yat-sen while Manchuria
was in the hands of Marshall and Warload Chang Tso-lin. Soviet
leaders decided to deal with them all separately in a divide-
and-rule strategy. Not until 1928 did Chiang Kai-shek,
successor to Sun Yat-sen, succeed in unifying China under
one government. In the Sun-Joffe Declaration of 2 6 January
192 3 the Soviets agreed to lend support and advice to the
Kuomintang in its efforts for national unification (not
revolution), although; only two years before, the Soviet
Union had organized a revolutionary Chinese Communist move-
ment. On 31 May 192 4 a new agreement between the Soviet
Union and Peking was signed which declared null and void
all previous Chinese agreements with Tsarist Russia (at least
on paper) , which agreed on a new delimitation of the Sino-
Soviet boundary (this was never implemented) , and which
recognized Outer Mongolia as a "component of the Chinese
Republic" under Chinese sovereignty, while the Chinese
acknowledged Moscow's de facto dominance there. On 15 March
1925 the Chinese government ratified the Mukden agreement
which reiterated the substance of the 31 May 1924 agreement
[Tai 1973 pp. 51-52]. THe 1928 edition of the Soviet Union
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yearbook lists only two Sino-Soviet "Treaties, Agreements
and Conventions concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Foreign
States, which came into force prior to January 1, 192 8, and
which are still valid," namely: on 31 May 1924 at Peking
"A Treaty on the General Principles for Regulating Questions
between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Republic" and also on
31 May 192 4 at Peking "An Agreement Concerning the Temporary
Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway." [Santalov
and Segal, ed. 1928 p. 43]
To avoid confrontation with Japan in 1935, the Soviet
Union sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Japanese puppet
state of Manchuko. However, as a result of the Yalta agree-
ment of 11 February 1945, Stalin succeeded in getting this
back as well as: a guarantee of the status quo of Outer
Mongolia; the cession of the southern half of Sakhalin and
the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union; and the restoration
of Russia's former rights in Manchuria before the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-1905. Nationalist China later confirmed
the Yalta stipulations on Outer Mongolia and Manchuria through
the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14
August 1945 [Tai 1973 pp. 54-55] . For a visual depiction of
Russian Expansion into Asia through 194 5 see Map 1. For the
Chinese view of disputed borders see Map 2
.
E. COMMUNIST CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INTERACTIONS
When the People's Republic of China was established on










































Chinese borderlands ceased as a result of Communist China's
forceful territorial consolidation and accompanying strong
countermeasures against them. This determined resistance
to Soviet expansionism was the basis for the covert dissen-
sion between the two brotherly Communist giants between
1949 and 1954 which was cited earlier. One day after the
People's Republic of China was formally inaugurated on 1
October 1949, it was officially recognized by the Soviet
Union. During the following year negotiations between these
communist states were cordial and resulted on 14 February 19 50
in the signing of: (1) a treaty of friendship, alliance,
and mutual assistance; (2) an agreement providing that after
the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, and in any case
net later than the end of 1952, the Soviet Union would trans-
fer free of charge to the Chinese Government all its rights
in the joint administration of the Manchurian (Changchun)
Railway, together with the property belonging to the railway,
and would withdraw its troops from the Port Arthur naval base,
whose installations would be handed over to China; and
(3) an agreement on the granting of long-term credits to the
amount of $300,000,000 by the U.S.S.R. to China, to enable
China to obtain industrial, mining, and railway equipment
from the U.S.S.R. From 1950 through 1953, Russia supplied
China with military aid amounting to $2,000,000 by U.S.
estimates. The modernization of Chinese armed forces with
Soviet aid included about 1,000 MIG-15 aircraft plus the
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technology to produce additional aircraft, heavy artillery,
tanks, and submarines. This spirit of cooperation continued
into 1955 culminating in the Atomic Cooperation Agreement
of May, 1955 in which the U.S.S.R. agreed to provide Soviet
nuclear scientists and technology until China was able to
keep its atomic piles working without further Soviet aid
[Keesing 1969 pp. vii-6]
.
In 1955 China embarged on a program to assert is influ-
ence in Asia. Peking sponsored the Bandung Conference of
Asian Powers and made clear to Moscow, which did not par-
ticipate, China's view that Russia was not an Asian power.
This was the first time China had advanced this idea. Public
polemics over China's Asia-for-the-Asians policy were to
occur ten years later [Salisbury 1969 p. 115] . After the
2 0th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February of
1956, the two countries commenced drifting apart ostensibly
as a result of their differences on foreign policy. At this
congress, without consulting Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev departed
from the previous Soviet party line under Stalin by expounding
the theory of "peaceful coexistence" between communist and
non-communist nations, rejecting Lenin's theory of the inevi-
tability of war with capitalism and by holding that there
were several roads to socialism other than merely war. Although
these positions were not publicly criticized by the Chinese
at the Congress, they were to become points of bitter contro-
versy between the Sino-Soviet Communist Parties and marked
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the beginning of what is probably the most important conflict
within international communism today.
In 1957 Mao launched the "Hundred Flowers" campaign.
The name comes from the ancient Chinese saying, "Let a
hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought
contend." It represented a momentary relaxation of Chinese
Communist thought control. Intellectuals spoke out on all
phases of the Communist transformation of China. Once the
relevance of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution was
challenged and anti-Communist demonstrations occurred at
several universities, the criticism was again forbidden and
those who had spoken it were punished. 19 58 saw still
another ambitious program launched by Mao — the attempt to
create a modern industrial state in an extraordinarily short
time frame known as the "Great Leap Forward." It was a crash
program of intensive exploitation of Chinese labor by re-
vising production goals upward drastically and stretching
the workday to fourteen hours or longer. One announced goal
was to surpass Britain's industrial production in 15 years.
In their spare time workers would operate "backyard furnaces"
smelting scrap iron, plant trees, and build water control
projects. People were organized into large 10,000 acre,
5,000 household agricultural communes. For a time this regi-
mentation resulted in a fury of human activity having few
parallels. By 1959 it was evident that the program had
failed to meet its spectacular goals. Wheat had to be
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imported from Canada and Australia by 1960 and by 1962
peasants were given private plots to farm as they wished.
This resulted in a partial economic recovery. Thereafter
Peking moved cautiously and more conservatively in further
economic development [Clyde and Beers 1971 pp. 449, 451-
453] .
From 1956 to 1960 Sino-Soviet verbal blasts increased
with China referring to the Soviets as "revisionists fright-
ened out of their wits by imperialist blackmail of nuclear
war" and the Soviets calling the Chinese "sectarian dogma-
tists." Then, on 16 July I960, the Soviet Government de-
cided to withdraw all Soviet technicians working in China.
This unilateral decision aroused greater resentment in China
than any other single action of the Soviet Government, with
the possible exception of the repudiation of the agreement
on nuclear weapons. It struck a crushing blow at China's
economy at a time when the country was suffering from the
effects of the Great Leap Forward and from a series of natural
disasters described by Peking Radio as "without parallel in
the past century, including drought, typhoons, floods, and
plagues of locusts and other insects" [Keesing 1969 pp. vii-
63.
F. RECENT SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASHES
The 4,150 mile Sino-Soviet boundary has been shown to
be an area of severe friction since the seventeenth century.
It is the loncTest two-nation border and will be shown to
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be one of the most probable areas for war in the world
today. The Sino-Soviet ideological dispute which began
covertly in the early fifties has degenerated into a nation-
alistic clash based upon territorial issues. The dispute
came into the open on 8 March 1963 when the overt controversy
over the Sino-Soviet border was actually an unforeseen by-
product of the Cuban missile Crises of October 1962. Briefly,
the Chinese criticized the Soviets on two points: stationing
the missiles in Cuba in the first place ("adventurism") and
removing the missiles to avert a possible nuclear collision
with the United States ("capitulationism" ) . Khrushchev ad-
dressed himself to these charges in a report to the Supreme
Soviet on 12 December 19 62. He argued for pragmatic action
rather than that dictated by ideological absolutes (e.g., that
China had not "liberated" Hong Kong or Macao was not "capi-
tulationism" on China's part but rather simple common sense.
Thus it had been with Cuba) . Soon thereafter the Communist
Party of the United States (CPUSA) in an open letter to the
Chinese Communist Party also took issue with the Chinese
position on the Cuban crisis: "Our Chinese comrads . . .are
even today, correctly, not following the adventurous policy
in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao that they advocate for
others. Why this double-standard approach?" [Doolin 1965
p. 19]. Chinese Communist leaders reacted sharply to these




Inasmuch as some persons have mentioned Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Macao, we are obliged to discuss a
little of the history of imperialist aggression
against China.
In the hundred years or so prior to the victory
of the Chinese revolution, the imperialist and
colonial powers — the United States, Britain,
France, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Aus-
tria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portu-
gal — carried out unbridled aggression against
China. They compelled the governments of old
China to sign a large number of unequal treaties —
the Treaty of Nankiang of 1842, the Treaty of Aigun
of 1858, the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, the Treaty
of Peking of 1860, the Treaty of Hi of 1881, the
Protocol of Lisbon on 1887, the Treaty of Shimonoseki
of 1895, the convention for the Extension of Hong Kong
of 1898, the International Protocol of 1901, etc.
By virtue of these unequal treaties, they annexed
Chinese territory in the north, south, east, and west
and held leased territories on the seaboard and in
the hinterland of China. Some seized Taiwan and
the P'eng-hu Archipelago (Pescadores Islands), some
occupied Hong Kong and forcibly leased Kowloon,
soom put Macao under perpetual occupation, and so
forth.
. . .You are .not unaware that such questions as
those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to the category
of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties
which the imperialists imposed on China. It may
be asked: In raising questions of this kind, do
you intend to raise all the questions of unequal
treaties and have a general settlement? Has it ever-
entered your heads what the consequences will be?
Can you seriously believe that this will do you
any good?" [Doolin 1965 pp. 30-31]
Tai notes that territorial claims against the Soviet
Union were based on the premise that Imperial Russia had
stolen about 600,000 square miles of land in Siberia and
Central Asia from a weak Manchu China by unbridled aggression
in the nineteenth century under unequal treaties . The
Soviet Union has often replied to China's territorial de-
mands with hawkish indignation and denounced it as "merely
the Hitler-type raving of the Mao clique" in Peking. At
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the same time, Moscow has warned Peking that "very dangerous
conseuqences could arise from any attempt to recarve the
map of the world" [Tai 1973 p. 75] . During the Sino-Indian
War in 1962, the Soviet Union again caused great offense in
China by agreeing to provide the Indian Air Force with MIG
fighters and a plant to produce more aircraft. Polemics
became increasingly hostile through 1964 with Moscow Radio
broadcasting propaganda into China seventy hours a week and
Peking Radio broadcasting anti-Soviet propaganda into Russia
sixty-three hours a week [Keesing 1969 p. 75]. For a se-
lected list of current Sino-Soviet polemics the reader is
invited to Appendix A.
At first the Sino-Soviet split was low-key and by proxy
with Peking attacking Tito's "revisionism" (meaning Moscow)
and Moscow condemning China's ally, Stalinist Albania; each
side by implication condemning the deviation of the other.
During the subsequent build-up of Sino-Soviet hostility, Mao
found himself facing an internal crisis indirectly related
to the Moscow versus Peking conflict. His failure to bypass
the Soviet Union on the way to communism caused dissension
among the Chinese Communist Party leadership. This dissen-
sion was aggravated in 1965 when the United States intervened
in Vietnam causing the Soviets to call for a united Communist
front in the war. This tack appealed to dissident leaders
in the Chinese party but posed a direct conflict to Mao's
opposition to Moscow. Thus, Mao triggered an all-out attack
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against the Soviet Union and against party opposition in
Communist China in the form of the Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution of 1966-1968. Using the Red Guards as
shock troops, he commenced an effective purge of all oppo-
sition party leaders throughout China [Clyde and Beers 1971
pp. 445-448] . Clashes along the Sino-Soviet frontier in-
creased during the years of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution with its Chinese claim to Communist primacy and
its ideological attacks on "revisionist" Russia. Mao's posi-
tion is that his radical type of communism is superior to
Moscow's more moderate, "revisionist," and less violent
brand. When Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964
there was a temporary improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.
But, by 1966 Pravda openly accused Chinese leaders of attemp-
ting to promote war between the Soviet Union and the United
States. On the other hand, China's Marshal Chen Yi suggested
in an interview published in a Brazilian paper that the
Soviet Union had thirteen divisions on the Chinese frontier
which had been moved from Eastern Europe and was planning to
attack China in alliance with the United States. The inten-
sity of hostilities increased with the mutual expulsion of
students and journalists in 1966 and the mutual expulsion
of Soviet and Chinese diplomats in 1967 [Keesing 1969
P. 75].
China's irredentist claims to its lost territories is
one of the chief irritants in Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese
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textbook maps now show the territory before and after Russian
territorial gains. China desires the return of this land
for its expanding population, but the Soviets have shown no
recent propensity to return tsarist conquests. This dilemma
resulted in the massing of nearly forty Soviet divisions and
about fifty-five Chinese divisions along the border and
numerous armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese frontier
guards. Military incidents along the Sino-Soviet border
commenced as early as 1959 and steadily grew in intensity
as political relations between the two nations deteriorated.
Although blame for these incidents was a constant topic of
verbal polemics on the part of both countries, Robinson
holds that the evidence suggests that the PLA was not always
to blame for the border flare-ups prior to 1969, nor was it
following any preconceived plan dictated from Peking. Des-
pite Russian protests of complete innocence, they are believed
to have caused at least some of the incidents [Robinson, T.
W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development,
and March 1969 Clashes" The American Political Science Review
December 1972 p. 1178]. By the end of 1969, the two nations
were on the brink of all-out war.
On the morning of 2 March and again on 15 March 1969
armed clashes took place on the usually uninhabited Daman-
sky (or, Chenpao) Island between units of the Russian Army
and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the People's
Republic of China. Russia admitted dozens of its troops were
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killed and China said it sustained a large (but unspecified)
number of casualties.
According to the Institute for Strategic Studies 1 The
Military Balance , 1960-1969, the normal, long-term disposi-
tion of Soviet and Chinese forces along the border up until
1969 was approximately equal in total numbers of troops.
Logistically , the Russians were in a better military posi-
tion because the Trans-Siberian Railway has spurs all along
the border. Except in the Northeast, China has no comparable
rail line. While the Chinese have a larger population, the
Russians have better hardware, training, and mobility of
forces; consequently, they can quickly transport and con-
centrate more firepower at a given spot than the Chinese
who depend mainly on transportation by foot. Given full
mobilization and the transfer of military resources from
Western Russia, the Soviets could probably field as many
fully trained and equipped soldiers as the Chinese.
According to Pravda , border incidents usually involved
incroachments by Chinese soldiers and civilian fishermen
who would cross into Soviet territory to fish, farm, dig
canals, put up buildings, and interfere with the navigation
of Soviet ships and boats. On the other hand, China felt
it had a right to free action in the area. In a Peking
interview with Japanese Socialist Party members on 10 July
1963, Mao stated: "About a hundred years ago the area to
the East of Baikal became Russian territory and since then
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Vladivostak, Khabarovsh, Kamchatka, and other areas have
been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account
for this list" [Doolin 1965 p. 44].
As stated earlier, communist China has always thought
that this border territory had been bargained away from
China by the tsars of Russia in the 1800 's, so it refuses
to recognize the validity of this territorial loss. Although
border talks between the two powers took place in 1964, no
concrete results occurred. China would demand return of
real estate but Russia would defend the status quo. From
the breakdown of border negotiations on 15 October 19 64
until March, 1969, the Chinese charged that the Soviets
"provoked" a total of 4,189 border incidents. Most of these
probably refer to routine border patrol, reconnaissance, and
efforts to evict Chinese from "Soviet areas without killing."
The following description in Pravda, 12 March 1967, gives
the Russian view of a typical incident:
This is the situation (quoting Vitaly Bubenin,
commander of the border guards at Damansky) : A
fisherman comes, sticks a pole with Mao's portrait
on it in the snow and begins to dig a hole. We
explain that it is forbidden to cross the border.
We escort him back. The next day 2 fishermen come.
Three have nets and each one has a booklet of quota-
tions. They wave them around so that the fishing
will be better. We escort them back to the border.
They organize a rally and beat drums. They are
loaded on trucks and head for the Soviet shore. Our
fellows stand in a chain. The trucks race at them,
intending to frighten them. Nothing happens and away
they go. They come with streamers. Quotations are
attached to sticks and there are iron pipes on top
of the sticks. Again our men form a wall. Their
people put the quotations in their pocket and start
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swinging the sticks. Never mind/ we drove them
away. Pvt. Lavrov was sent to the hospital...
[Robinson, T.W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute:
Background, Development, and March 1969 Clashes"
The American Political Science Review December 1972
p. 1183]
.
To accurately determine exactly what happended during
the 2 March 1969 clash is difficult because no observers
were present, and most of the participants are dead, but,
Robinson pieces together the following scenario (edited
for brevity) from a large number of Soviet sources such as
Pravda , TASS , Izvestia , etc.:
Damansky Island is situated on the Ussuri
River, which forms the boundary between the Soviet
Union and China. The nearest Soviet settlement is
Nizhae Mikhailovskiy , about 5 miles south, and the
nearest Chinese settlement is Kungszu, just south
of the island. The Chinese claim the island was
once a part of the Chinese bank, became separated by
erosion of the river, and during low water in late
summer can be reached on foot from the Chinese shore.
The island itself is, by testimony of both sides,
uninhabited, although Chinese fishermen apparently
do some logging on it. About one mile in length,
about one-third mile wide, it is flooded during
the spring thaw.
The Soviets maintain two border outposts in the
area, one just south of the island, which until
March 2 was commanded by Senior Lieutenant Ivan
Ivanovich Strelnikov, and the other just to the
north, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Vitaliv
Dmitrivevich Bubenin. The Chinese border post,
named Kungszu after the local Chinese settlement,
appears to be located on a hillock directly across,
but not on the Chinese, side of the river in winter
forcing vehicles to detour about two miles before
they can move onto the ice toward the island. In
March the river is frozen nearly solid so it is
possible to drive multi-ton vehicles over the ice.
Because no factual reports are available from
the Chinese, this analysis is likely to be slanted
toward the Soviet side. Despite these limitations,





On the night of March 1-2 , about 300 Chinese troops
(a mixed group of frontier guards and regular PLA
soldiers) dressed in white camouflage crossed the
ice from the Chinese bank to Damansky Island, dug
foxholes in a wooded area overlooking the southern-
most extremity, laid telephone wire to the command
post on the Chinese bank, and lay down for the night
on straw mats. Sometime early in the morning the
man on duty at Strelnikiv's output reported activity
on the Chinese bank. Around 11:00 a.m., a group of
20 or 30 Chinese began moving toward the island,
shouting Maoist slogans as they came. Seeing them
Strelnikov and an undetermined number of his subor-
dinates climbed into two armored personnel carriers,
a truck, and a command car, and set off for the
southern extremity of the island to meet the Chinese.
Arriving on the island (or perhaps remaining on the
ice covering the river-arm to the west of the island)
a few minutes later, Strelnikov and seven or eight
others, including his deputy, Senior Lieutenant
Buinevich, dismounted and moved out to warn the on-
coming Chinese, as they had several times previously.
Following a procedure developed for such occasions,
the Russians strapped their automatic rifles to their
chests (reports differ; some say they left their wea-
pons behind) . The time was now about 11:15 a.m. The
Russians linked arms to prevent the Chinese from
passing. Chinese reports imply that an altercation
took place. The Chinese now arrayed themselves in rows
and appeared to be unarmed. But when the Chinese
had advanced to about 20 feet from the Russian group,
the first row suddenly scattered to the side, exposing
the second line of Chinese, who quickly pulled sub-
machine guns from under their coats and opened fire on
the Russian group. Strelnikov and six of his compan-
ions were killed outright. Simultaneously, from an
ambush to the Russians' right, the 300 Chinese in fox-
holes also opened fire, catching the entire Russian
unit by surprise. Mortar, machine gun, and anti-tank
gunfire also commenced at that moment (it was now between
11:17 and 11:20 a.m.) from the Chinese side. The
Chinese apparently then charged the Soviets, and hand-
to-hand fighting ensued. The Soviet unit was apparently
overrun, and the Chinese (according to Soviet charges)
took 19 prisoners and killed them on the spot. They
also carried away Soviet equipment, which they later
put on display. Evidently the Russian survivors were
able to fight back, however, now under the command of
Junior Sergeant Yuri Babnski.
Seeing the battle, Senior Lieutenant Bubenin and
nearly his entire border post north of Damansky set
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out for the scene. Racing up in an armored car,
he succeeded in gaining the right flank of the Chinese
and thus forced them to divide their fire. But he
also found himself in the middle of the island and
in the middle of the ambush that the Chinese had pre-
pared for Strelnikov (the latter had not proceeded that
far). Bubnin's vehicle was hit and disabled, and he
himself was wounded and shell-shocked. He managed to
get into another armored car and direct the battle
from it. A series of melees ensured, with charges by
both sides. Finally, the Russians state, they pinned
down, for a time surrounded, and then forced the
remaining 50 to 60 Chinese to retreat to their side
of the bank. The Chinese took all their wounded with
them, although they left behind some equipment. The
entire battle lasted about two hours, and the Russians
were so short-handed that civilians had to be pressed
into service as ammunition bearers. Although both
sides claimed victory, neither Russian nor Chinese
forces remained permanently on the island after the
battle was over, although the Soviets periodically
moved off and on at will. [Robinson, T.W. "The Sino-
Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and
March 1969 Clashes" The American Political Science
Review December 1972 pp. 1187-1189]
.
Robinson notes that the 15 March 1969 clash was different
in many respects. There was no element of surprise, it
involved larger numbers of toops, and it lasted much longer.
The Chinese used more than a regiment of 2 000 men in the
battle. The outnumbered Russians used the tactics of the
American Army in the Korean War, allowing the Chinese to
advance and then counterattacking with large numbers of tanks,
armored cars, and infantry in armored personnel carriers.
After over nine hours of fighting the battle was over with
the Russians losing about 60 men and the Chinese 800. The
disparity is attributed to better Soviet tactics and arma-
ment. Whereas, the Chinese probably ambushed the Russians
on 2 March, the Russians either fired first or led the
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Chinese into a trap during the 15 March clash. At least
one of their reasons must have been revenge. Robinson draws
the following conclusions regarding the clashes: (1) Border
problems were not significant to either Russia or China until
political relations began to deteriorate for other reasons;
(2) the Chinese thwarted the success of the 1964 Border
Talks deliberately for reasons not connected with the border
itself; and (3) the controversy may have been a spin-off
from the "active phase" of the Cultural Revolution and merely
a tool to unify the Chinese people behind Mao against Russia
[Robinson, T.W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background,
Development, and March 1969 Clashes" The American Political
Review December 1972 pp. 1178-1189]
.
Additional, but less severe, Sino-Soviet clashes took
place on 8 July 1969 near Khabarovski and on 13 August 1969
near the western border of Sinkiang. On 10 September 1969,
TASS charged China with 488 border violations between June
and mid-August 1969.
A sampling of recent American editorial opinion shows
grave concern that the split between Russia and China is
greater than ever. Indeed, a preemptive strike on China
by Russia is cited as distinctly possible. For example,
Joseph Alsop concludes that China is deadly serious about
the danger of Soviet attack. He cites usually conservative
British intelligence sources as taking the position that
the Soviets will attack probably by 1975 and that Soviet
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military leaders have urged the unrestrained use of atomic,
chemical, biological, and any other sort of warfare against
China. Alsop also states that during mid-1973 war prepara-
tions by Soviet divisions have been brought to an extra-
ordinary state of readiness, and that the CIA had recently
revised upward its estimates of Soviet spending on military
preparations on China's northern border from six billion to
forty billion dollars to include construction of thirty new
Soviet jet airfields, all built within range of the Chinese
border on former cow-pastures and mainly in areas presenting
grave logistical difficulties [Alsop "Russia's Militant
Military" San Jose Mercury 2 4 September 1973 p. 33] . In
addition, C. L. Sulzberger notes the Chinese fear of Soviet
attack. In an October 19 7 3 editorial he wrote:
...Peking today distinguishes greatly between
American and Soviet 'imperialism.' As the Chinese
confided to the French this year: 'The first is
defensive; the second is offensive.' What this of
course means is that there is no longer fear of an
American attack but great worry about a Soviet
attack. [Sulzberger "Whither China" San Jose Mercury
14 November 1973 p. 33]
In November of the same year he wrote: "Should Russia
attack while the present government rules, it risks major
defeat unless it just stands off and atomizes Chinese cities,
In that case it stands to lost some of its own towns, inter-
national respect, and possibly touch off global war." In
the same article he "guesses" that the Kremlin will try to
reassert its influence in China during the next few years,
not by military invasion, but by secret supporters planted
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in the People's Republic and committed to the installation
of a pro-Soviet regime in Peking after the natural demise of
the Peking gerontocracy (at the time Chou was over 75, Mao
was soon to be 81, and three of the five party vice chairmen
were in their seventies) [Sulzberger, "Whither China" San
Jose Mercury 14 November 1973 p. 33]. He later reiterates
this theme throughout his book, The Coldest War Russia's
Game in China .
Soviet leader Leonid I. Breznev's visit to India in
November of 1973 was widely touted in Soviet media as a
step toward closer relations between Russia and India and
as a move toward Moscow's concept of Asian collective secur-
ity which was unveiled at a world Communist meeting in Moscow
in 1969. This is contrary to China's Asia-for-Asians concept
expressed at the Bandung Conference and is regarded by Peking
as a Soviet stratagem aimed at isolating and encircling China,
Dispatches from New Delhi indicate India wants large new
Soviet credits for the new Indian five-year economic plan
as well as advanced Soviet missiles and fighter aircraft
in return for making available permanent port facilities
for the Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean [Smith,
H. "Brezhnev to Test Soviet Strategy on India Visit" Sunday
Peninsula Herald 25 November 1973 p. 2A]
.
Russia is also exploring warmer ties with the Taiwan
regime much to the chagrin of Peking. Paul Wohl notes that
an article in the Novosti press information bulletin number
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forty- four of October, 1973, admits the de facto existence
of Taiwan and states:
The effects of the stepped-up activity of
Peking on the international plain... have been
largely upset by Taiwan's economic offensive...
the volume of Taiwan's foreign trade in 1972
exceeded the volume of the foreign trade of the
Chinese People's Republic by $800 million. All
this shows conclusively the stability of the
economic and political situation of Taiwan in
today's world. This state of affairs could become
one of the most important factors in the future
diplomatic struggle about the status of the
island [Wohl "Moscow Jabs Peking with Taipei
Praise" Christian Science Monitor 10 December
1973 p. IT.
In the United Nations Communist China's presence is
marked largely by fierce verbal warfare with Russia. While
hitting hardest at the Russians, they content that Washington
is conspiring with Moscow for world dominion ["Chinese,
Russians at U.N. Fend Unceasingly" Monterey Peninsula Herald
6 November 1973 p. 14] . Contrary to the expectations of
most western diplomats, however, Red China's behavior in the
U.N. since they replaced the Nationalist Chinese on 25 October
1971 has been marked by conservative, pragmatic, and cautious
restraint. As of October, 1974, the People's Republic has
used their veto only twice — against Bangladesh U.N. member-
ship (August, 1972) and against reference to the Palestinians
in an anti-terrorist admendment (September, 1972). Christian
Science Monitor correspondent David Anable maintains that
more than half the point of Peking's membership was in simply
arriving — in defeating United State's opposition and
ousting Taiwan. Thereafter the need to work with other U.N.
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members has forced Peking to soften tough doctrinal posi-
tions evolved during the height of the Cultural Revolution.
The Russians regard China's incessant attacks on them with
lofty distaste. At first, according to one Moscow diplomat,
the Soviet delegation responded in kind. Now they shrug
off Chinese onslaughts with comments such as "When the dog
barks, the wind carries the sound away." China's verbal
championship of developing nations has not aligned these
nations solidly behind Peking. David Anable quotes a
Western diplomat as saying "The common belief was that China
and Russia were competing for the leadership of the third
world. But the reality is that they are competing for the
affection of the third world" [Anable "China at the U.N.
:
A Smiling, Silken Dragon" Christian Science Monitor 16
October 1974 p. 4]
.
Monitor correspondent Joseph C. Harsch holds that the
Sino-Soviet rift adds to the stability of these third world
nations. Writing about Russian-Chinese relations he stated:
...But their partnership broke down four years
after the signing of the SEATO Pact (September, 1954)
.
The decisive year was probably 1958 when the Chinese
wanted Russian military help in an attack on Matsu
and Quemoy islands.
. . .The Asian scene today is dominated not by the
American military presence around the rim of Asia,
but by the fact of Moscow-Peking rivalry and their
conflict of interest. Thanks to that condition,
Washington has been able to pull its armed forces
back from Southeast Asia, reduce its forces in Korea,
and largely fall back to offshore islands. That
in turn has been reflected in reduced Chinese encour-
agement to Hanoi. Peking, it is to be presumed,
would rather have Vietnam remain divided than to
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risk having a united Vietnam come under dominant
Soviet influence. [Harsh "Soviet-China Rift Keeps
Southeast Asia Stable" Christian Science Monitor
6 September 1974 p. 1]
.
Until his death in a Trident jet crash in Mongolia in
1971 while fleeing the country in the wake of an abortive
coup, General Lin Piao was a top contender for power in
Peking and was Mao's chosen successor. He echoed the Maoist
concept (circa 1960) of a simultaneous political and, if
necessary, military, struggle with both the U.S. and Russia.
However, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
and their continuous military buildup along the Chinese
border, both Mao and Chou favored establishing a viable
relationship with the U.S. as a hedge against Russia. Having
now gained a. permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council and
having been visited by the President of the U.S., China pre-
sumably feels less threat of attack by the Soviet Union, no
matter how serious Moscow's concern over both Peking's poli-
cies and its growing nuclear power. In the fall of 1973,
an extensive propaganda campaign was launched by virtually
all Chinese publications to criticize Lin Piao and Confucious,
The campaign seems to be aimed at demonstrating how reac-
tionaries throughout Chinese history from the Mandarins at
the Manchu court down to the Communists' own disgraced
Defense Minister, Lin Piao, combined the worship of the
ancient sage Confucious with the advocacy of foreign influ-
ences. Monitor correspondent John Burns believes that
despite the themes of Chinese nationalism and self-initiative
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/which underscore the campaign, Peking will opt to continue
international trade (especially technology) and benign
diplomatic relations with the West so long as the enmity
with Moscow continues [Burns "China's Links with West Stir
Internal Contention" Christian Science Monitor 15 August
1974 p. 2]
.
Two incidents in early 1974 underline Peking's concern
about Russian subversion within China which has been the
theme of several discussions later that same year between
high-ranking officials of the Peking regime and foreign
(Canadian) correspondents. First, in April of 1974, five
Soviet embassy staff members were expelled after allegedly
being caught with a Soviet-trained Chinese spy and second
when a Soviet military Mi-4 (NATO code name "Hound") heli-
copter with a crew of three was captured in the northern tip
of China's Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region near where the
Chinese, Russian, and Western Mongolian borders meet. Moscow
claimed the helicopter became lost while on a mercy mission
over Soviet territory, but the Chinese said it was carrying
arms, ammunition, reconnaissance equipment, and documents
which prove that it was on an espionage mission. The Soviets
have repeatedly demanded the release of the crew, but the
Chinese have defiantly stated that the crew members will be
dealt with under "Chinese law" citing the precedent of
American airmen captured in China during the Korean War who
were tried and given long prison sentences. In previous
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cases of Russians accused of espionage in China the Soviets
were expelled and never brought to trial. From early 1969,
Peking's public position has been that China faces the danger
of sudden attack by the Soviet Union and must take all neces-
sary precautions against it. The first hint of a significant
departure from this position came at the Tenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China in August of 1973
when Chou En-lai spoke of the Soviet Union making a feint
in the east by massing troops along the Chinese frontier
while preparing for an attack in the west against NATO
forces in Europe. By October of 1974 high government offi-
cials in Peking were telling Canadian journalists that Peking
no longer believes that China is in imminent danger of Soviet
attack. They admit that border clashes are still likely but
not full-scale war. They also stress that the Soviet troop
buildup on their borders poses a bigger threat to the United
States and Japan than to China [Burns "Peking Sees Risks
Fading" Christian Science Monitor 7 October 1974 p. 2].
In a Chinese message of Revolution Day greetings cabled
to Moscow on 7 November 1974, Peking offered to negotiate a
non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, settle territor-
ial differences, and pull back their military forces from
along the frontier. Elizabeth Pond observes that the message
was published in Pravda on 9 November but the following
diplomatic overture was deleted:
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Above all, mutual understanding achieved in
September, 1969, at the meeting of the premiers
of the two states — that an agreement should be
signed on nonaggressicn , non-use of force, main-
tenance of the status quo on the frontiers, the
prevention of military conflicts and clashes, the
separation of forces in disputed regions, and the
solution of all frontier questions through talks —
should be adhered to." (The meeting referred to
was between Soviet Premier Kosygin and Chinese
Premier Chou En-lai at the Peking airport after the
1969 border clashes.) [Pond "Thaw in Sino-Soviet
Relations" Christian Science Monitor 12 November
1974p. 4]
A similar non-aggression-pact ploy has been tried by the
Soviets in 19 73, but the Chinese turned it down flat. The
significance of the new Chinese offer was that its usual
demand that the Russians publicly renounce their nineteenth-
century "unequal treaties" was absent. The quandry the
Russians faced was: If thev refused China's package, they
would appear to be uninterested in working for peace, but
if they accepted it, they would have to withdraw their mili-
tary forces from the tense border. In the past Moscow has
refused to withdraw its troops from any territory regarded
as legally Russian ["Diplomacy: Alphonse and Gaston" Newsweek
18 November 1974 p. 55].
Another straw in the wind of change in "the Middle King-
dom" came in late 1974 when Peking's second most important
daily newspaper, The Kwangming Daily
,
published an article
entitled "The Lesson of the Fall of the Chin Dynasty."
It represents the most candid revelations in a decade re-
garding both Mao Tse-tung's illness and dissent within the
Communist leadership. The article warned that harsh and
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repressive measures were required against internal enemies
lest the "socialist" system in China perish. It criticized
the "inherent limitations" of the present leadership as being
too great for them to take the proper action of purging and
executing the large numbers of counter-revolutionaries. The
virulent attack was directed not only against Mao, but also
Chou En-lai who had been hospitalized for months and Chou's
heir apparent, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. The article
confirms that the 8 year-old Mao is suffering from Parkin-
son's disease and states he has lost his clarity of mind
and alertness toward his enemies. The article uses histori-
cal analogy to identify Mao with Chin Shih Huang-ti, the
"first emperor" who unified China in the third century B.C.;
Chou as Li Ssu, the emperor's great prime minister; and
Vice Premier Teng as Chao Kao, a high-ranking courtier who
was banished by the emperor and then restored to power — just
as Teng was discredited by the Cultural Revolution and later
rehabilitated. The article further states that just as Li
Ssu concealed the death of the first emperor, Chou has kept
Mao's incapacity a secret [Elegant "China Paper Says Mao
Incapacitated" Monterey Peninsula Herald 2 November 1974
P. 1].
Covering key events and clashes in Sino-Soviet relations
from antiquity to the present, the preceding study and data
are designed to provide a general historiographic basis and
paradigm upon which to develop the stated hypotheses of this
thesis. Reprise will be made to significant data.
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• II. CHINESE SECURITY POLICY AND THE
SINO-SQVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT
The term "security" instead of "foreign" policy in this
chapter is based upon the premise that the first priority of
virtually any nation's policy, whether national, international,
or "foreign," is survival. As security is basic to survival,
security policy seems a more descriptive term to apply to
the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China as
it aspires to a more dominant, if not the dominant role in
the international movement toward communist-dominated world-
socialism.
A. CHINESE SECURITY POLICY GOALS
Professor Ojha cites three common frameworks which are
used by scholars to study Chinese security policy, namely:
historical continuity , or the traditional perception of a
Chinese World Order; ideology , or that of the Marxist
dialectic, either to seek insatiable expansionism or, the
opposite extreme, inability to maintain a permanent state or
crisis, combined with economic development, will emasculate
ideology thus permitting China to behave more responsibly in
world affairs (this latter theme is very close to the main
hypothesis of this thesis); and finally, China's psycho-
cultural attributes and/or Mao's own psychological make-up
which would explain China's international relations in terms
of reaction to Western exploitation during the nineteenth
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century or that Mao, as many other revolutionary leaders,
began by rebelling against his father. While the above
approaches are helpful, Ojha holds that they lead to static
analysis which might explain present behavior but makes
deviate behavior inexplicable by definition. Thus, his book
seeks to explain change in Chinese perceptions of the world
beginning with the failure of Chinese syncretism to meet the
nineteenth-century challenge of the West [Ojha 1971 pp. ix ff.]
This chapter will touch on each of these four approaches
particularly as they relate to Chinese security policy and
the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict.
1 . Traditional Chinese World Order
The traditional Chinese view of the world order was
Sinocentric with China or Chung-kuo (Central State or Middle
Kingdom) being the center of the universal empire and there-
fore culturally superior to the outer concentric zones of
barbarians. This Chinese superiority was based upon the
Confucian emphasis on the power of example and upon cultural
vice material power. Thus, the Chinese emperor, in the unique
position as the "Son of Heaven," ruled all mankind with
benevolence and generosity as long as proper respect was shown
to him and he retained the "Mandate of Heaven." This respect
and the acceptance of Chinese suzerainty took the forms of
paying "tribute" (usually native produce) and by performing
the "kowtow," a symbol of submission consisting of three
kneelings each involving three prostrations before the Son
of Heaven. The emperor himself performed the kowtow to his
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parents and at the altar of Heaven. Thus, in dynastic China,
the rituals of the kowtow and tribute served the emperor as
evidence that he did hold the "Mandate of Heaven" and as a
medium of diplomacy in which China maintained contact with
the outside world. As for the barbarians, these rituals
became the instruments and prerequisites for conducting com-
merce with China until the 1800 's when the concept of equality
among states, the lure of profits in trading with China, and
superior military and naval force caused China to submit to
the Treaty System of the occidental states [Clyde and Beers
1971 p. 67]
.
Various scholars have conceptualized geo-political
models of the traditional Chinese World Order. Among these
are John K. Fiarbank, The Chinese World Order (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968); 0. E. Clubb,
Twentieth Century China (New York: Columbia University Press,
1964); and C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place
in the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). One
of the most concise descriptions is contained in Norton
Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order" [Tsou,
ed. vol. II 1968 pp. 73-91]. Professor Ginsburg describes a
four zonal model consisting of Zone I or China Proper; Zone
II or the Inner Asian Zone consisting of Manchuria, Mongolia,
Chinese Turkestan, both eastern Tibet and Tibet Proper, Korea,
Indo-China, plus the "Periphery" regions of the Trans-Amur
territories in eastern Siberia, the eastern parts of Soviet
Middle Asia, and other tribute-bearing states extending from
63

Afghanistan to the Ryukus ; Zone III or the Outer Asian Zone
ranging from Persia on the west through India, Indonesia,
most of the Philippines to Japan on the east; and Zone IV or
the Outer Zone which comprised the "Great Beyond" (see Map 3)
2 . Communist Chinese World Order
Ginsburg suggests that the traditional Chinese World
Order cited above still has relevance to what Communist
Chinese leaders perceive as their objectives in security
policy but that the course of history has made a return to
the traditional spacial system impossible. Therefore, he
suggests a "current" Communist Chinese World Order which is
normative and which might represent the Chinese perception
of what a world order today ought to be like. Ginsburg is
aware that this approach requires more speculation than
scholarship, but believes it should be pursued nonetheless,
given the importance of the issues at stake. His "current"
model would combine Zone I and the Periphery of Zone II in
the traditional model to form the modern Chinese state. The
new Zone II would now include Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, the Himalayan states, and possibly
Afghanistan, as well as the northern irredentist territories
which lie within the Soviet Union. Zone III would include
the rest of South Asia, and possibly Malaya and Japan. Zone
IV would be divided into two parts: the developed capitalist
and (retrograde) socialist areas and the underdeveloped and
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3. Options for the Future Chinese World Order
Based upon his model of a Communist Chinese World
Order, Professor Ginsburg reaches the following conclusions:
a. Because not all of China's boundaries have been
delimited (that is marked or mapped) , let alone demarcated
(that is marked out on the ground, where possible) , "a
continuing problem in China's foreign policy will be border
disputes, whatever other relations may exist between China
and contiguous countries."
b. "Another continuing force in China's foreign
policy would derive from attempts to restore Chinese hegemony
not over Southeast Asia, but over those territories of Outer
Mongolia and the Soviet Union which formerly were part of
ui.au^uxunax <->0.ij.<_ — -j- .
c. "The restoration of Taiwan to China is an essen-
tial and particularly sensitive issue of China's foreign
policy, but it is strategic-spacial in nature, not ideological."
d. "One of the major objectives of China's recent
foreign policy appears to be a clarification of these rela-
tionships and the aligning of these countries (that is,
countries in both the Inner and Outer Asian Zones of the
traditional model such as Burma, Pakistan, Japan, etc., that
have been drawn out of China's orbit) in accordance with the
Chinese perception of their place in a Sinocentric, Asian-
oriented power system; thus, the policy of establishing
detentes with them whenever possible."
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e. "Rooted in historical relationships, the Japanese
enigma continues to be a crucial problem in China's foreign
policy."
f. "The objectives of China's foreign policy might
be attained, at least minimally, by a divided Vietnam in
which the South need not be communist but would be free from
foreign troops and foreign interference in internal affairs."
[Ginsburg in Tsou, ed. vol. II 1968 pp. 73-91].
Ginsburg goes on to amplify paragraph f above by
explaining that the failure of the Chinese to provide more
tangible support to North Vietnam and the Vietcong, even at
the risk of loss of face in Asia, was predicated not only
upon the facts that China's supply lines in Southeast Asia
were much more dangerously extended than in Korea and that.
the U.S. might conduct reprisals on the Chinese mainland,
but also because a strong and unified Communist Vietnam
located on the edge of China might create further difficulties
for China in her dispute with the Soviet Union. This theory
also explains the Chinese attitude toward wars of national
liberation, that is, to encourage them everywhere by all means
possible except in those Asian areas where Chinese domination
is desired. Thus, intervention by foreign troops in the
Middle East, Africa, or Latin America would pose no direct
threat to China but might serve to distract and weaken the




Ginsburg's purpose, just as Ojha's, is to suggest
alternative explanations of Chinese security policy other
than the traditional approaches of ideology, economics, or
factors exogenous to China. His position is that strategic-
political imagery and objectives, based in part upon
historical circumstances and tradition, warrant additional
investigation. Others echo this view (see Philip R. Winters,
"Policy and the Political Geographer," Naval Institute
Proceedings , December, 1969, pp. 57-62, and John K. Fairbank,
China Perceived . New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, pp. 205 ff.)
Professor Fairbank' s brief essay "China's Foreign
Policy in Historical Perspective" ( Foreign Affairs , April,
1969, pp. 449-463) warns that ignorance of traditional Chinese
security policy can cause U.S 5 policy makers to impute
occidental values upon oriental culture with, sometimes,
disastrous results, to wit: Vietnam. He begins by noting
that although China has had two millennia of foreign relations,
the longest of any state in history, Imperial China had no
foreign office per se but split foreign relations into such
topics as border control, frontier trade, tribute, etc.
Fairbank acknowledges that tradition is but one element of
modern Chinese foreign policy, but believes it is the missing
element in American understanding of that policy. He identi-
fies three major traditions of Imperial Chinese foreign
policy, the first two of which are of particular interest to
the naval strategist: the strategic primacy of Inner Asia,




The first tradition evolves from the dichotomy in
ways of life between the agrarian Chinese within the Great
Wall and the Mongolian tribal nomads who pastured their flocks
beyond it. While China's maritime frontier was occasionally
penetrated by sea-raiders, no major invasion every came by
sea. However, Inner Asia, encompassing the arc running from
Tibet and Sinkiang around to Mongolia and Manchuria, has been
conquered and ruled by non-Chinese emperors for more than
half of the last thousand years. This explains Communist
China's present-day preoccupation with her land frontier in
the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict.
As for the second tradition, the disesteem of sea
power, Fairbank cites its roots in Confucian philosophy which
held that merchants, and especially nomad maritime traders,
ranked lowest of the four social classes (scholar-officials,
farmers, artisans, and merchants) because they did not labor
with their minds or muscle, but only moved things about.
Due to the loss of revenue from barbarian conquests in North
China, the Southern Sung dynasty (1127-1279) helped to develop
the first great oceanic commerce in world history between the
Near East and Far East through South and Southeast Asian
waters. Chinese merchant junks and warships (some as big as
400 feet in length, with four decks, a dozen watertight
compartments, crews of 400 men, and equipped with compass and
grenades and rockets made from gunpowder, both of which were
Chinese inventions) in fleets as large as 28,000 men in 62
vessels, went to India, Aden, Africa, and the Persian Gulf
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up until the 1430' s and all before the European explorations
of Columbus, deGama, and Albuquerque. Yet, after the 1430' s,
Chinese maritime expansion ceased due in part because China
had reached the zenith of a stabilized economic state, but
more because of the threat of Mongol expansion on her land
frontiers of inner Asia. This overriding demand for land
power in the fifteenth century eclipsed China's opportunity
for additional maritime expansion. The trend for rapid
increase in Chinese sea-power can be expected to accelerate
again in the future if China can resolve her border differ-
ences with the Soviet Union.
Finally, the tradition of China's cultural superiority,
while suffering setbacks as a result of the Mongol's use of
naked power, has survived down to present Communist leadership.
Fairbank suggests a new term for it as it applies to China
today — "national culturism" which he equates to an amalgam
of philosophical-religious ethnocentrism, the classical
tradition, individualism, and nationalism, all combined.
His study of historical Chinese security policy leads
Fairbank to the following conclusions:
a. Policies designed to bring China into the "inter-
national order" may be a long time in getting results because
of her size, self-sufficiency, and implacable self-esteem
combined with a new political awareness of the past century's
humiliations and revolutionary euphoria.
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.b. Nuclear missiles have taken the place of the
aborted tradition of Chinese sea power as the decisive weapon
of China's arsenal today.
c. Because of the sheer mass and growing complexity
of the Chinese body politic, a heavy emphasis upon some kind
of traditional Chinese bureaucracy will remain, notwithstanding
Mao's efforts to instill "permanent revolution" against any
ruling class.
d. Fears that the overseas Chinese would serve as a
Maoist fifth column movement have not proved valid because
internal nationalism in numerous countries of Southeast Asia,
North Vietnam included, has proved itself a barrier to Chinese
expansion.
e. Because China has traditionally been land-based
and bureaucratic, not maritime and commercial, her expansion
can be expected to be roughly equal to the degree that she
is provoked.
Professor Morgenthau reinforces this last theme with
the conclusions he reaches regarding future U.S. Chinese
policy:
First, the policy of peripheral military containment
on the Asian mainland ought to be gradually liquidated.
This policy is not only irrelevant to the interests of
the United States but actually runs counter to them.
Second, both the policy of isolating China and the
policy of ending that isolation are essentially irrel-
evant to the issue at hand. One may aggravate, and
the other ameliorate, the international climate; but
they have no relevance, one way or the other, to the
basic issue of containment.
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Third, since the expansion of Chinese power and
influence, threatening the Asian and world balance
of power, proceeds by political rather than by
military means, it must be contained primarily by
political means. To that purpose, it is necessary
to strengthen politically, socially, and economically
the nations of Asia that are within China's reach,
especially Japan, without exacting in return
political and military alignments directed against
China. We ought to pursue a similar policy with
regard to the uncommitted nations outside Asia in
which China in the recent past has attempted to gain
a foothold.
Fourth, we ought to be clear in our minds that if
we continue the present policy of the peripheral
military containment of China, we will find ourselves
in all likelihood, sooner or later, at war with China.
If we want to avoid such a war, we must change our
policy. If we do not want to change our policy, we
must be ready to go to war. That is to say, either
we bring the means we are willing to employ into line
with our objectives, or we cut down our objectives to
the measure of the means we are willing to employ.
Fifth, the ultimate instrument for containing
China is the same that has contained the Soviet Union:
the retaliatory nuclear capability of the United
States. It must be brought home to China, as it was
brought home to the Soviet Union, that in the unlikely
event it should embark upon a policy of Asian or world
conquest, it is bound to be at war with the United
States" [Morgenthau 1969 pp. 205-206].
B. CHINESE APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATION
In 1961 W. Cleon Skousen outlined the dangers involved
in seeking rapprochement or detente with either Russia or
Communist China in his book The Naked Communist . He ended
a chapter devoted to tracing the high probability that
communist states will commit their military power in pursuit
of their goals whenever they are convinced that they oppose
a weaker force with the following prophetic quotation from
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Dimitry Z. Manuilsky, the Soviet Representative who presided
over the security council of the United Nations in 1949:
War to the hilt between communism and capitalism
is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong
enough to attack... To win we shall need the element
of surprise. The bourgeoisie will have to be put to
sleep. So we shall begin by launching the most
spectacular peace movements on record. There will
be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions.
The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will
rejoice to cooperate in their own destruction. They
will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon
as their guard is down, we* shall smash them with our
clenched fist!" [Skousen 1961 p. 208].
A more up-to-date version of detente by the Russian dissident,
Aliksandr I. Solzhenitsyn , is:
There seems to be little doubt, as many now realize,
that what is going on in the U.S.S.R. is not simply
something happening in one country, but a foreboding
of the future of man, and therefore deserving the
fullest attention of Western observers.
No, it is not any difficulties of perception that
the West is suffering, but a desire not to know, an
emotional preference for the pleasant over the
unpleasant. Such an attitude is governed by the spirit
of Munich, the spirit of complaisance and concession,
and by the cowardly self-deception of comfortable
societies and people who have lost the will to live a
life of deprivation, sacrifice and firmness.
Although this approach has never helped preserve
peace and justice and those who have followed it have
always been crushed and abused, human emotions have
proved stronger than the most obvious lessons, and
again and again, an enfeebled world draws sentimental
pictures of how violence will deign to assume a gentler
nature and will readily abandon its superior strength,
so that meanwhile everyone can continue to live a
carefree existence [ Strategic Review Winter, 1973 ibc]
.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the
Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, also reinforces and updates




...the old well known formula — 'the battle for the
first salvo' — is taking on a special meaning in naval
battle under present-day conditions (conditions
including the possible employment of combat means of
colossal power) . Delay in the employment of weapons
in a naval battle of operations inevitably will be
fraught with the most serious and even fatal
consequences, regardless of where the fleet is located,
at sea or in port [Gorshkov 1974 pp. 131-132]
.
1 . Imperial China's Approach to Negotiations
China established their first foreign ministry in
1861. Before that foreign relations were conducted by an
Office for Barbarian Affairs. [Taylor, "Envoys to the Great
Within," Peking's Approach to Negotiation 1969 p. 44].
Traditional Chinese diplomatic practice was based upon
maintaining a rigid boundary between the "Middle Kingdom"
and everything outside of it. The ritual of tribute was
reserved for foreign princes only and not Chinese officials
from provinces in the Middle Kingdom. This had the effect of
demonstrating the subordinate nature of all foreign princes
to the "Son of Heaven." When foreign countries failed to
send tribute, force was not used to reinstate it as the
failure did not represent an overt challenge to the system.
John E. Wills, Jr., holds that Chinese diplomatic tradition
was, in its more practical aspect, oriented toward the
prevention of conflict, toward the maintenance of the status
quo, and toward bureaucratic boundary maintenance [Wills in
Fairbank, ed. 1968 p. 252].
Because foreigners were considered inferior beings
who did not understand the "correct" (Chinese) human relation-
ships, they were not to be allowed to corrupt internal Chinese
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order. The ploy of playing one barbarian against the other
and diplomatic efforts to prevent foreign states near China's
borders from uniting to form a threat to the Middle Kingdom
were common techniques used for barbarian control. Chinese
emperors preferred excluding potential foreign troublemakers
thereby preventing an internal crisis vice reacting to or
suppressing it after it had begun. Many Chinese rulers
showed little interest in military conquest and expansion
but preferred the status quo on their boundaries, bureau-
cratic structure, and superior culture.
Fairbank states that "China entered the modern world
not by abandoning her imperial tradition but by adapting it
to meet the problems of the mid-nineteenth century. This
adaption made the 'treaty system' in its early stages an
outgrowth of the 'tribute system.'" [Fairbank, ed. 1968
p. 257]. Thus, from the Chinese viewpoint, the treaty
system of the mid-1800's was not merely a foreign imposition
to bring China into the Western world but a means of accom-
modating the V7est and giving it a proper relationship in the
Middle Kingdom.
In his analysis of the Chinese perception of the
world order, past and present, Benjamin I. Schwartz asks
the question — to what extent will such a perception continue
to affect Chinese political behavior in the future? He holds
that China's ability to syncretize all its conquerors with
the sinocentric Chinese perception of a world order is open
to question. He notes the objections of those who believe
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that the ultimate fact is the fact of power, that is, when
Chinese power prevailed, it could impose its will on sur-
rounding peoples but when it was weak, the Chinese perception
of the world had little effect upon these peoples. This same
trend of thought is often used to explain North American
intervention in Latin American affairs, that is, when the
United States is relatively strong vis a vis other world
powers, it can afford a "big stick" foreign policy, but when
it is weakened by say the depression of the 1930' s, it shifts
to a "good neighbor" policy. For a detailed discussion of
this theme as well as intervention in general see Edward J.
Williams, The Political Themes of Inter-American Relations
,
(Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1971), pp. 69-101.
Nevertheless, Schwartz concludes that the Chinese perception
of the world order existed with remarkable strength and
persistency through the nineteenth century. He states that
the Chinese perception of world order was fundamentally
undermined in the twentieth century and that we should be
skeptical of assertions that it is the causal factor of
present or future Chinese policy, for example, that Mao's
vision of a world communist movement centered at Peking is'
merely the latest version of the barbarian world being
transformed by Chinese culture. He dates this concept
precisely at the time of the overt outbreak of the Sino-Soviet
conflict which caused a resurfacing of the old Chinese
perception of world order with Mao now acting as the Son of
Heaven. Swartz concludes that the Western multistate system
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of world order conforms more closely to the realities of
world politics today than anything derived from Chinese
history and that Peking, in championing intense nationalistic
fervor within the communist bloc against Soviet hegemony, is
likewise destroying the very transnational authority of the
world communist movement to which she aspires [Schwartz in
Fairbank, ed. 1968 pp. 276-288].
2 . Communist China's Approach to Negotiations
Admiral C. Turner Joy, as the Senior Delegate and
Chief of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Korean
Armistice Conference of July 1951 to May 1952, was one of
the first Americans to experience the phenomenon of formal
negotiations with the Communist Chinese. The following brief
quotation from chapter three of his beck How Communists
Negotiate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955) succinctly
explains his view of Peking's approach to negotiations:
Among men who adhere to logic, an agenda is under-
stood to be only a list of topics to be discussed,
concerning which agreed conclusions are later required.
For example, Americans meeting to discuss arrangements
for a baseball game might adopt an agenda as follows:
1. Place the game is to be played.
2. Time the game is to start.
3. Selection of umpires.
Communists, however, would submit an agenda like this:
1. Agreement that game is to be played in Shanghai.
2. Agreement that game be played at night.
3. Agreement that umpires be Chinese officials.
Admiral Joy's observation underlines two fundamental
goals of Chinese negotiating technique — to "load" the agenda
with a set of conclusions and to "stack" the agenda by
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listing these conclusions in the order most beneficial to
the Chinese position. Arthur H. Dean, Representative of the
United States as Special Ambassador and chief negotiator at
the post-armistice Panmunjom meetings reinforces Admiral
Joy's view with the following observations:
The battle of the agenda is fundamental to Communist
negotiators because they believe they can humuliate the
other side and win or lose a conference in this first
battle over the order of discussion of items... if you
once agree to the Communist order you cannot go on to
the next item until you have yielded to the Communist
wishes on the first [Dean in Peking's Approach to
Negotiations 1969 pp. 16-17].
Robert B. Ekvall, U.S. Interpreter at the 1955 Geneva
Ambassadorial Talks, cites another peculiarity of Chinese
negotiators, namely, a compulsion to have the last word. He
notes that they are never willing to accept an offer by the
other side, even if it conforms to their wishes, but insist
upon rephrasing the offer so that it represents their
distinctive interpretation [Ekvall in Peking's Approach to
Negotiations 1969 p. 29].
The Deputy U.S. Representative at the post-armistice
Panmunjom meetings, Kenneth T. Young, describes Communist
Chinese negotiating style as being permeated with the static
ideology of Mao which arms the Chinese with a complete
strategy or Tao. He holds that the " 'immutable' Maoist
theory of contradictions and practice of struggle determine
the world outlook, objectives, and tactics" of Chinese
negotiators. Also, because of his discipline, reliance upon
Maoist dogma, and belief in his own infallibility, the Chinese
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negotiator can be expected to rely upon doctrinal precon-
ceptions and ideological behavior patterns of a closed mind
that "knows all the answers" rather than to demonstrate any
degree of conceptual thinking, logical analysis, or willingness
to use the diplomatic concepts of mutual confidence, truthful
exchange, or fair dealing. Young maintains that Peking is
willing to negotiate with the United States, even though its
capitalist system is viewed as the mortal enemy of socialism,
because of the necessity of reconciling ideology with national
interest. As will be shown in the next chapter, the national
interests of both Russia and Communist China are served by
their importing of advanced technology and agricultural methods
and produce from the West. Also, uncertainty as to the
reaction of the United Gtates in the Event of a Sino-Soviet
war tends to ameliorate the chances for such a war and thus
serve the national interests of all involved. Young agrees
with Professor Franz Schurmann that periods of peace and
possibly collaboration with China are possible and comparable
to its united front with the Kuomintang between 1936 and 1946.
Even Mao says that the Chinese Communists conducted negotia-
tions with the Kuomintang many times during the revolutionary
civil wars and that they did not refuse to negotiate even on
the eve of nationwide liberation. Young also agrees with
A. M. Halpern, an authority on Chinese security policy, that
Communist Chinese diplomacy is formed with long-range
objectives in mind such as the complete destruction of
imperialism, rather than to accrue any short-term immediate
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advantage. Within the framework of long-range goals Young
concludes that Chinese Communist security policy sanctions
limited negotiations and temporary coexistence to gain
specific tactical targets, namely:
1. To facilitate diplomatic undertakings which
extract concessions from the 'enemy,' thus enhancing
the position of the Chinese People's Republic and the
socialist camp, while weakening and hastening the
defeat of 'imperialism.'
2. To promote commercial, financial, technological
and cultural exchange which will assist the internal
development and international standing of the People's
Republic of China.
3. To disengage from some situations which are
embarrassing or untenable for Peking because of the
counteractions or initiatives of Washington and other
Western governments
.
4. To promote dissension among the 'imperialists'
or weaken their flank by negotiating arrangements with
the allies of the United States or other countries in
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even Europe [Young in
Peking's Approach to Negotiation 1969 pp. 51-56].
Arthur Lall, the Chief Indian Negotiator at the Laos
Conference of 16 May 1961 to 23 July 1962, makes the following
observations concerning Peking's approach to negotiations:
a. Peking prefers large delegations for important
negotiations. For example, at the Laos Conference the Chinese
delegation numbered some fifty men and women. Also, at Geneva
in 1954 and Bandung in 1955, they were represented by
"enormous" delegations.




c. All Chinese negotiators proudly proclaim them-
selves as Communist Party members and "cadres" (the 1954
edition of the New Phrases Dictionary published in Shanghai
defines a cadre as: "...a worker in a state institution.
Persons who work in state institutions or a department of
production, capable of unifying and leading the masses to
carry out Party and government policies and directives, to
implement duties and programs promptly under the leadership
of the Party and higher-level government institutions are
cadres. ") .
d. Training of Chinese Communist cadres is impres-
sively thorough and includes professional, political, cultural,
and theoretical education.
e. Most of the leaders of the Chinese delegation were
members of the Chinese intelligentsia and had attended
Western schools. For example, Marshall Ch'en Yi, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, was educated in Paris. Chang Hau-fu, the
senior vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, studied at the
Tsinghua University in Peking and at Columbia in the United
States. Huan Hsiang, then Charge d' Affaires in London, had
been a student at the London School of Economics and the two
interpreters, Ch'en and Chi, were both graduates of Harvard.
f
.
The Chinese delegates seemed preoccupied more
with China's internal affairs than foreign affairs. Lall
believes this is due to the fact that all senior officials
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking are required to
spend four months of each year doing manual work in the
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countryside. He also thinks this explains why the Western
press often mistakes the absence of a Chinese dignitary from
Peking as meaning that he has fallen from power.
g. China carefully cultivates cooperative relations
with the smaller states in her neighborhood such as Burma,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan but her
relations with the bigger powers in her area, such as the
Soviet Union, Japan, and India, have worsened because they
are regarded as real or potential rivals.
h. Peking has developed a faculty for using the same
words to cover a long spectrum of meanings which helps to
maintain flexibility in negotiations but makes meaningful
negotiations more difficult for others. As one example,
he cites Mao's misuse of the word "annihilation" in the
following quote: "...Only complete annihilation (of the
enemy) can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible
extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and
ammunition but also an important source of our man-power."
[Lall 1968 pp. 1-39]
Lall ascribes the following basic characteristics to
the Chinese negotiator:
He is well educated and highly trained to analyze
situations and events in terms of practical Chinese
Marxism, and in this sense he is a staunch Communist.
He also is generally prone to analyze whenever
confronted with an issue; he is highly China-oriented —
often jingoistically so — and is fundamentally more
concerned about the needs and aspirations of China
than anything else. Since he has not yet developed
a realistic world perspective, it is easier for him,
drawing on his brand of revolutionary Marxism, to
prescribe the course which he believes the world
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should and ultimately will follow. Some of these
characteristics will alter when China comes fully
into contact with the world through all the channels
that now exist, including primarily the large complex
of international organizations which has come into
being in our era [Lall 1968 p. 15]
.
Lall's opinion implies that greater interdependence
in foreign affairs by China can be expected and tends to
support the main hypothesis of this thesis.
C. NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS OF
SINO-SOVIET SECURITY RELATIONS
This section will use the paradigm originated by Thomas
W. Robinson in his study A National Interest Analysis of
Sino-Soviet Relations (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,
March 1966, pp. 7-15; see Appendix B) and attempt to update
it to 1975 based in part upon the Sino-Soviet polemics
previously cited in Appendix A. Robinson divides Sino-Soviet
national interests into five time frames, namely: "1949-19 53:
Soviet Dominance and Chinese Submission"; "1954-1959: Era
of Good Feelings"; 1956: Destalinization , Revolt, and
Chinese Mediation"; "1957-1959: Secret Agreements, Shifts
in the Wind, and Intra-Bloc Competitions"; and "1960-1964
(November): Open Polemics and Beginnigs of Direct Opposition."
In general, his listing describes how Soviet and Chinese
identical and complementary interests have dwindled while
their conflicting interests have grown. For the sake of
brevity, Robinson's second (1954-1955), third (1956), and




The following model represents the author's opinion
only, based upon the selection of Sino-Soviet polemics
contained in Appendix A, a review of other polemics ranging
over the period of from 1965 until 1975, and Robinson's
original model. It does not purport to represent an extension
of Robinson's thinking but does represent the author's
interpretation of the present national security interests of
Russia and China.
a. 1965-1975 (March): Increasingly Hostile
Polemics and Occasional Armed Clashes
t
I. Identical Interests
1. Defense against attack from the United States.
2. Against neocolonialism and for conversion of newly
independent countries to socialism.
3. For developing military, naval, and nuclear superiority
over the West.
4. Against American military intervention in "wars of
national liberation" in the Far East.
II. Complementary Interests
Soviet Union China
1. Protection from attack from the rear along the Sino-Soviet
Border so as not to be engaged in a two- front war.
2. Against thermonuclear war 2. Against thermonuclear war
between United States and between United States and
Soviet Union. China.
3. Increased trade with the West, especially the United
States, to speed up heavy industrialization, update computer
technology (see case study, Chapter III), improve aerospace
research, and maintain a source for additional agricultural
products and fertilizers when needed.
4. Increased exchange of intercultural representatives and
greater export of communist propaganda to the West, especially
the United States.
5. Use of foreign aid and 5. Use of foreign aid and
military assistance primarily military assistance to
when a high probability of increase Peking's stature
economic return or military as the leader of the "third"





1. Against overseas American
troops and bases.
2. Against thermonuclear war
with the United States.
3. Against limited war with
United States for fear of
nuclear escalation.
4. Opposition to transfer of
territory to China.
5. No support of violent
"national liberation
movements" if United States
involved.
6. Differences on how to overcome United States strategic
superiority.
1. For some American presence
overseas, especially as a
buffer against Soviet forces
in the Far East.
2. For thermonuclear war
between Russia and the
United States.
3. For limited war as long
as China is not involved.
4. Recovery of at least some
of Chinese territorial
irredenta essential.
5. Support for violent
"national liberation movements"
even if United States is
involved.






9. Against domination of
North Korea by China.
10. Against domination of
North Vietnam by China.
11. Reassert Soviet ideology
as the true road to world
communism.
12. Settle world crises with
or without Chinese presence.
7. Advance rate of military,
economic, and industrial
development by all means
possible.
8. Reincorporation of Mongolia




North Korea by Russia.
10. Against domination of
North Vietnam by Russia.
11. Replace Soviet "social
imperialism" with the thought
of Mao as the legitimate way
to world communism.
12 . Insistence that world
crises cannot be solved without
Chinese presence.
13. Use of Soviet power to13. Unwillingness to use
Soviet power in a confrontation assist in settling Taiwan
issue required.
14. Emplanting regimes abroad
whose domestic institutions,
political philosophy and
societal organizations are as
similar as possible to the
Soviet Union's own.
15. Support India as a block
to China.
14. Emplanting regimes abroad
whose domestic institutions,
political philosophy and
societal organizations are as
similar as possible to China's
own
.
15. Discredit India as a
worthy rival for "third" world





16. Continued interest in
"welfare" of brother Central
Asian nationalities across
Chinese border.
17. For expansion of peaceful
means of communist influence
throughout the world,
especially the "third" world.
18. Desire for a negotiated
settlement of the Sino-Soviet
territorial dispute with
little or no loss of Soviet
territory.
19. Support "open sea" and
limited (12 nautical mile)
territorial sea concept in
international maritime law.
20. For a collective Asian
security pact.
21. For reduction of NATO
force levels.
22. For increased "blue
water" presence of Soviet
fleet throughout the world.
23. Continued emphasis on
detente and ease of tension
with the West.
24. Continued emphasis on
SALT.
25. For a divided Germany
26. War can be avoided by
peaceful coexistence.
16. Protection of Chinese
border nationalities from
Soviet subversion.
17. For expansion by peaceful
and violent means of communist
influence throughout the world,
especially the "third" world.
18. Settlement of the Sino-
Soviet territorial dispute,
probable only after Mao dies,
with open recognition by Soviet
Union that Chinese territory
was taken by "unequal treaties."
19. Favors restricted passage
of warships through straits
and 200 nautical mile
territorial seas.
20. Against a collective Asian
security pact.
21. For increase in NATO force
levels to draw Russian forces
away from the Sino-Soviet
border.
22. For keeping the Soviet
fleet out of the Mediterranean
and Indian Oceans.
23. Detente is a superficial
gambit therefore vigilance
and preparations for war must
continue
.
24. SALT is no more effective
in preventing war than
restrictions on naval tonnages
were in 1921 and 1930.
25. For a united Germany.
26. War is inevitable so long




The comparison presented above suggests that the Sino-
Soviet conflict has continued to intensify during the last
decade. Although occasional diplomatic balloons have been
sent up by each side, neither China nor Russia has demonstrated
any bonifide willingness to settle their differences to date.
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It can be expected that the present diplomatic stalemate
will continue at least until the death of Mao Tse-tung and
probably until the early or mid-1980' s.
D. SINO-SOVIET INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY POLICY
The eighth of "August is a revolutionary date noted and
celebrated in Communist China for a reason which might
surprise many Black Americans. On that day in 1963 Chairman
Mao Tse-tung issued a major statement supporting American
Negroes and their struggle against racial discrimination.
The statement was made, according to Mao, at the repeated
request of a Mr. Robert Williams, the former President of
the Monroe, North Carolina, Chapter of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People. Although this
particular statement has not yet become one of the most
widely known sayings of Chairman Mao, it is often bannered
to black visitors in Peking and marks the beginning of an
apparent attempt to win-over the loyalties of discouraged
minorities worldwide to the view that the leadership in
Peking is their friend and champion. On the other hand, the
Soviet Union too professes to be the brother of all mankind
but is having a difficult time selling the idea in view of
world-wide publicity given to their persecution of Jewish
people and the increasing number of more vocal dissidents.
The largest and most populous nations on earth, Russia
and Red China respectively, both actively seek their announced
communist goal of world domination. They differ, not in the
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goal itself, but in who reaches it first.. The ideological
honeymoon between Soviet Russia and the People's Republic
of China, which commenced in 1949, lasted only until their
traditional concepts of territorial rights and spheres of
influence came into conflict. Both seek to attract uncom-
mitted governments of Third World nations to their cause
by traditional diplomatic relations while simultaneously
using the most elaborate techniques of internal subversion
yet developed by man to win political control over these
same governments. One prevalent theme of overt communist
doctrine is the so-called lack of racial prejudice. This
section will examine that theme from the vantage points of
a few of the growing number of communist dissidents and
defectors as well as from the literature of Sino-Soviet
specialists
.
A. Doak Barnett has noted that:
In almost every nation in South and Southeast Asia
there is sensitivity to race prejudice. In subtle ways
feelings about race and racial discrimination have
influenced the assessments which their leaders have made
of the motives and aims of both Communist China and the
United States. In recent years appeals for "Asian
Solidarity" against the West and propaganda stressing
racial discrimination in the United States have evoked
a fairly wide and sympathetic response [Barnett 1960
p. 298].
An example of propaganda stressing racial discrimination
in the United States is Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung's
statement of 8 August 1963 which said in part:
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...I call on the workers, peasants, revolutionary
intellectuals, enlightened elements of the bourgeoisie
and other enlightened persons of all colours in the
world, whether white, black, yellow or brown, to unite
to oppose the racial discrimination practised by U.S.
imperialism and support the American Negroes in their
struggle against racial discrimination. In the final
analysis, national struggle is a matter of class
struggle. Among the whites in the United States it
is only the reactionary ruling circles who oppress the
Negro people. They can in no way represent the workers,
farmers, revolutionary intellectuals and other
enlightened persons who comprise the overwhelming
majority of the white people [from Jen-min Jih-pao 12
August 1963 as quoted in Chai, ed. 1972 pp. 113-114].
The Chinese also resorted to racist appeals to undermine
the Russians. As the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified,
Peking succeeded in forcing Russian delegates out of Afro-
Asian gatherings on the grounds that (to cite Peking)
"...the political center of the Soviet Union... has always
been in Europe and therefore it has traditionally been
acknowledged as a European country." [Lasky 19 65 p. 55]
Also in 1963, an open letter from the Chinese charged
that Moscow, while professing to champion an end to racial
discrimination, was actually pursuing a policy of "preserving
the hegemony of the so-called 'superior race' over oppressed
nations." Later they accused the Russians of renewing fears
about the "Yellow Peril" and of "inciting racial hatred
among white people." (A charge that was valid as will be
seen later.) The Russians countered with "Mao Tse-tung
endeavors to stir up racial currents in the struggle of the
world peoples against colonialism." They also claimed that
the Chinese were using the filthiest and most dispicable





The contrast between the policies overtly supported on
the floor of the United Nations by the entire Communist bloc
vote and the policies actually carried out can be shown by
the following example. Russia, Red China, and virtually all
communist nations have consistently voted unanimously in
the United Nations for trade sanctions against the apartheid
government of South Africa. However, in 196 3 Red China
tripled its trade with South Africa. In August of 1964
Pravda concentrated on exposing this Chinese "hypocrisy" by
printing that Peking had sent "great quantities of dynamite
to South Africa to be used against Africans," but said nothing
of increasing trade with South Africa by its own satellites
of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. On
January 21, 1965, Kenya told its fellow African nations that
"the principal result of the boycott has been to impose great
economoic hardships on Afro-Asian countries which put it in
force, to the profit of other countries — especially in the
Eastern and Western blocs and some in South America — which
have replaced them and increased commerce with South Africa."
The Kenya delegation went on to cite statistics showing that
the communist countries — particularly Red China and East
Germany — were increasing their trade with South Africa far
faster than the V7est [Lasky 1965 pp. 56-57].
One of the chapters in Mr. Lasky's book is entitled
"Apartheid U." which is the nickname given to Friendship
University (later renamed Patrice Lumumba University) in
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Moscow. The chapter discusses at length the disenchantment
with Russia which develops among the majority of foreign
students because of the racial discrimination they encounter
in Moscow.
Emmanuel John Hevi ' s book, An African Student in China
,
(New York — Praeger, 19 6 3) , maintains that the Peking regime,
while posing as the defender of the persecuted races against
the whites, including the Russians, actually seeks to make
the African accept once and for all the idea of superiority
of Yellow over Black.
In late 1963, Red China's Premier, Chou En-lai took a
fifty-day trek through darkest Africa that covered ten African
countries. At the conclusion of his trip he noted that
"revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African
continent" [Lasky 1965 p. 173]. After this trip the Chinese
decided that Africa was ripe for a full-scale anti-white cam-
paign. Russia had already bungled their initial attempt to
subvert the continent in Guinea and in the Congo. However,
the Chinese, because of their skin color, stressed that only
they could be the real champions of the downtrodden dark-
skinned races. The Russians reacted by denouncing the Chinese
as racists. Early in 19 64 French President Charles de Gaulle
recognized Peking. Six of fifteen former French colonies
followed suit and suddenly, Paris became the headquarters
for Red China's infiltration of Africa.
On May 26, 1964, a Red Chinese Cultural Attache by the
name of Tung Chi-ping walked into the United States Embassy
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in the tiny African Kingdom of Burundi and asked for poli-
tical asylum. He was the second Chinese Communist official
ever to seek sanctuary with Americans. He explained to the
Americans that the Red Chinese Embassy was little concerned
with diplomacy and that "actually, Communist China does not
care about Burundi. "What Peking really cares about is the
Congo." And he quoted a statement Mao Tse-tung had made
earlier in Peking: "When we grab the Congo, we can proceed
to grab the whole of Africa. Burundi is the stepping-stone
for reaching the Congo" [Lasky 1965 p. 187].
In the final chapter of his book Lasky cites both Russian
and Chinese polemics against each other and implies that the
Sino-Soviet dispute has gone past the point of no return
because of the deep national, racial, and economic rivalries
involved. He also mentions that of the forty nations who
have received Soviet aid, none has been won over to full-
fledged Communism and although the post-Khrushchev leadership
has accelerated an unannounced Soviet policy of reducing
foreign aid commitments, they are finding it difficult because
of Red Chinese pressure. Just as nations in the past found
it easy to play the United States against Russia in foreign
aid, they have now begun playing Russia against Red China.
In June of 1959, a twenty-seven-year-old Soviet diplo-
mat at the Russian Embassy in Rangoon, Burma, by the name of
Aleksandr Kaznacheev, quietly went to the American Embassy
there, admitted his disillusionment with communism, and asked
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for sanctuary. His book, Inside a Soviet Embassy (Phila-
delphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1962) offers a rare look
into the actual workings of Soviet political intelligence,
subversion, and racism. While the gathering of information
in the military, economic, and — above all — political field
is a vital task for the Soviet diplomatic corps, it is only
a subsidiary task of Soviet Intelligence. The primary objec-
tive of Soviet Intelligence in foreign policy is the direct
subversion of existing political systems. Soviet diplomatic
representatives are trained in the elite and exclusive Inter-
national Relations Institute in Moscow for a period of six
years. The student body, about 2,000 at any given time, is
selected from exclusive groups. First, children of the
social elite or "Soviet New Class" of ministers, generals,
and high-ranking diplomats. Second, operationally experienced
intelligence officers of the State Security Police. The
third group is from among young communists who have excelled
in Konsomal work. Students never apply for the Institute
themselves but are recommended by Party District Committees
and selected by an admission committee consisting of members
of the Foreign Ministry, KGB, Party Central Committee, and
the staff of the Institute itself. Additionally, there are
about 2 00 foreign students from other communist countries
at the Institute. In the early 1960 's, the largest number
came from Communist China, but North Korea, North Vietnam,
Outer Mongolia, and seven European satellites of the Soviet
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Union were also represented. Students specialize in a par-
ticular area of the world (e.g., the Eastern Division) during
the six-year curriculum and must be completely fluent in at
least two foreign languages by graduation because of the
Soviet belief that "there can be no good cold-war fighter
without a thorough knowledge of foreign languages." Only
the top 30 per cent of the graduates actually go abroad while
the remaining 70 per cent remain in the Soviet Union's "ice-
box" of overseas specialists which can be sent into the
diplomatic battle overseas on short notice.
Soviet Embassy personnel overseas function as a closed
society and remain mostly within the confines of their em-
bassy with the exception of their intelligence operatives
who are free to live outside on the local economy.
Kaznacheev states that long before the open Sino-Soviet
split the KGB in the mid-fifties spread fears of China through-
out the Soviet population so that by 19 56 the ordinary Soviet
Citizen was more apprehensive about zheltaya opasnost (yellow
peril) than about Western war preparations. JThis fear took
three main forms. First, open conflict between China and the
Soviet Union is inevitable because of China's alarming rate
of economic and military growth supported by fanatical
nationalistic drive. Second, the growing awareness that the
Chinese Communist regime is even more totalitarian than the
Soviet. The third fear is the aggressive spirit of the
Chinese and their attitude toward a general war. For example,
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in early 1957 some Chinese leaders publicly stated that in a
worldwide nuclear holocaust "...if 300 million of us die,
300 million will live, and the whole world will be Chinese"
[Kaznacheev 1962 p. 124].
Regarding the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute Kaznacheev
states:
Now, to any Russian, the idea that an ideology
can cause a rift between two major Communist powers
is an utter naivete, for nobody knows better than
the Russians that the Communist ideology does not
play an important role in the present Communist system,
whatever the Soviet leaders have persuaded Westerners
to believe. The Russians know well that it is not
the construction of the prosperous and classless
Communist society which is the final goal of the
Soviet rulers, but the perpetuation forever of their
political power and their dictatorship. Everything
else, including Marx's controversial theories,
Soviet internal and external policies, the very Soviet
system, are all pat into service tov/ard this goal.
The Communist ideology is not the beginning and the
end of the Soviet society, is not its driving force,
as many Westerners believe, but a mere weapon, one of
many, with the help of which the Soviet government
carries on the thought-control and the massive
indoctrination inside the country, and camouflages
its expansionist aims abroad [Kaznacheev 19G2 p. 125]
.
Not all Westerners have been 'persuaded" of the key role
of ideology as the following statement by an eminent American
political scientist shows:
The most important conflict within communism is,
of course, between the Soviet Union and Red China.
This is, first and ofremost, a struggle over power
between two major states
, not just between Communist
parties differing over interpretation of doctrine.
The ideological barrage hurled by each side against
the other is only camouflage, under whose cover the
real power struggle between the two countries is
fought relentlessly and with increasing hostility...
Another powerful force behind the Sino-Soviet
conflict concerns nationalism, both territorial and
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cultural. The Chinese-Russian border stretches for
four thousand miles through Central and Eastern Asia.
For three centuries, Russia helped herself to vast
Chinese territories, probably more territory than
any one nation has ever taken from another. Chinese
maps now indicate the area of the country both before
and after foreign imperialist territorial gains, and
as it happens these maps show that Russia has been the
chief imperialist power in China's history...
However, the force of nationalism in the Sino-
Soviet conflict goes deeper than disputes over square
miles and population densities. Marx or no Marx,
over 700 million Chinese will not accept the idea that
225 million motely peoples of the Soviet Union are to
be their overlords. From the traditional Chinese
viewpoint, China's civilization is not only the
oldest in the world but also the most accomplished.
Politically, the Chinese are proud of the fact that
for twenty-one centuries they have been able to unite
a large part of the human race under one government.
In this traditional Chinese view, the Russians are
meddlesome troublemakers, imperialist intruders, and




But despite the conflict between Red China and the
Soviet Union the free nations must always keep in mind
that basically -these two leading Communist states do
not disagree over whether to bury the non-Communist
nations, but how to bury them — and over who will be
in charge after the funeral. The Sino-Soviet conflict
will not, by itself, solve the world-wide problem of
Communist expansion [Ebenstein 1965 pp. 319-322].
Kaznacheev holds that whereas internal police control,
repressions, purges, ideological brainwashing, and indoc-
trination were successful weapons in the past to ensure
regime stability, today the Soviets rely more and more on
the "external factor" (e.g., mounting international tensions,
the cold war, atomic hysteria, and the "yellow peril)
.
He also notes that the Soviet Union is composed of
several completely different nations and races and that
the Great Russian nation only represents about 50 per cent
of the total Soviet population. The U.S.S.R. is so vast
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that not even half of its land area has been explored.
Therefore, the Soviet goal is expansion of political con-
trol only, not territorial colonization, which is unnecessary
and almost impossible.
On the other-hand, China recently reported a population
of almost 800 million (as compared to 210 million in the
United States and 250 million in the Soviet Union) [Monterey
Peninsula Herald 22 August 1974 p. 3] . Almost entirely of
one national origin, China's nationalism has been sharpened
by more than a century of foreign domination and humiliation.
Because of this, Communist China can be expected to pursue
not only political expansion, as the Soviet Rulers do, but
also territorial.
A final observation by Kaznacheev is believed to be
worth quoting at length:
With this expansion — territorially limited to
solve China's main problem, and politically unlimited
to establish Chinese world supremacy — they hope to
retain forever their dictatorship in China. Extreme
nationalism is the main feature of Chinese Communism
and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Chinese style,
is merely a clever device used for keeping control
internally and covering Chinese nationalistic expansion
externally.
Thus, the growing dependence of both the Soviet and
the Chinese Communist regimes upon the external factor
and, as a result, their growing aggressiveness are
the keys to understanding of all Communist policies.
No doubt, there is clear realization on both sides
that their far-reaching interests, ambitions, and
goals are irreconciliable . First, there is not enough
space in the present world for two empires, and one
can be established only over the corpse of the other.
Second, the very existence of an independent major
power would destroy the stability of any empire,
especially one which is based on political control;
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therefore the struggle to death between them is
inevitable.
It is this dependence of both Communist brothers
upon the external factor and their final realization
that an open conflict between them is inevitable
that constitutes the real reason of the Soviet-
Chinese breach, in whatever form it may appear to
the world at any given moment.
Although their present rivalry is already
conducted on a pretty wide font and covers such
important global issues as supremacy in the Communist
bloc, control over the entire world Communist move-
ment/ penetration into the Asian, African, Latin
American continents, and division of strategic
regions into spheres of influence, it is very improb-
able that they will actually break their alliance
before they finish with their common and still more
dangerous enemy — the Free World. Only if the West
is weakened still further, or one of the "brothers"
decides that the other side represents now the main
threat, will they bring the breach into the open.
Until then, Cina and the Soviet Union will keep up
the appearance of unity, while subtly preparing the
ground for the future struggle [Kaznacheev 1962
P. 3] .
In view of the fact that the open breach between Soviet
Russia and Communist China is now known world-wide and that
the logic of this ex-Soviet intelligence officer could
well be valid, a clear and present warning is evident that




III. THE GROWTH OF CHINESE POWER AND THE
SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT
The communist regime has been in power in the People's
Republic of China for over a quarter of a century. During
this period tremendous changes have taken place within
China as the communist leadership seeks to rapidly trans-
form an agrarian society into a modern and industrialized
nation. Perhaps of more long-range significance to policy-
makers in other nations is the rate-of-change of Chinese
power rather than any singular milestone such as the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons. This chapter will be a comparative
survey of the growth rate of various forms of Chinese power
vis-a-vis other nations with particular emphasis on China's
self-declared main adversary, the Soviet Union.
In his book Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 1970)
Alvin Toffler decries the unnecessary strain placed upon
the populaces of highly-industrialized nations by a failure
to orient technological advancement to carefully develop
long-range national goals:
. .
.Yet systems of goal formation based on
elitist premises are simply no longer 'efficient.'
In the struggle to capture control of the forces
of change, they are increasingly counter-productive.
For under super-industrialism, democracy becomes
not a political luxury, but a primal necessity
[Toffler 1970 pp. 475 passim].
If Toffler 's theme applies to communist power elites in
general and to Chinese Communist power elites in particular,
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it then begs the questions — to what extent can communist
regimes continue their present rate of growth and techno-
logical change without introducing more liberal and demo-
cratic reforms both within their societies and in their
relations with other nation states; also, can the present
rate of development be sustained in China without a collapse
of the societal infrastructure brought on as a consequence
of a Chinese "future shock" perhaps even more severe than
that which might be experienced by the present superindus-
trialized nations? The ultimate answers to such questions
are speculative at best but some insight into them can be
gained by the comparative study of the growth of national
power in China which follows. The following sections will
identify, compare, and analyze key factors in this growth;
namely, factors of Chinese and Soviet political leadership,
culture and geo-politics , economics, science and technology,
and strategy.
A. LEADERSHIP FACTORS
The Chinese Communist Party is the largest communist
party in the world with a membership of 28 million, as
reported by the Tenth Party Congress in August 19 73. In
comparison, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had a
membership of 14,330,52 5 as of 1 January 1973 as reported
by the Secretariat, or only about one-half the Chinese
membership [Staar, ed. 1974 pp. 69 and 418]. This massive
Chinese party is ruled by an elite group known as the Central
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Committee. Within the Central Committee is the Political
Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee; and within the
Politburo, is the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The
incumbents within the Party structure serve in the key
executive positions of the Party itself , the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) , and the go.vernmental bureaucracy.
Thomas J. Weiss has noted that the ruling elite of the
Communist Party in China has remained remarkably stable for
the past forty years as contrasted with the Soviet Union in
which Stalin's purges of the 19 30's eliminated most of the
"Old Bolsheviks" of the October Revolution of 1917. The
purges have resulted in second generation leaders such as
Brezhnev and Kosygin rising to power. Weiss states that
one of the most striking manifestations of the unique con-
tinuity of Communist Chinese leadership is that since 1935
the average age of the top-level elite has tended to rise
almost as rapidly as time has passed. The average age of
the party Politburo in January, 19 34, was approximately
thirty-five. In 19 69, thirty-five years later, the average
of the ten active members of the Politburo of the Eighth
Central Committee was about sixty-eight [Weiss in Yuan-li
Wu, ed. 1973 pp. 241-243].
The age factor alone makes a relatively rapid turnover
of the ruling elites a certainty, probably within the next
decade. Possible outcomes of succession among China's
rulers will be addressed in the next chapter. It is
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sufficient to note here that the massive changes which have
taken place in Chinese society during the past quarter of a
century were managed by a ruling gerontocracy which is
about to pass from the scene.
B. GEO-POLITICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS
1. Population
The official 1974 estimate of the population of
mainland China published by the Communist Chinese govern-
ment is "almost 800 million" [The World Almanac 1975 p. 520]
Various western estimates range from 680 million [Chiao-min
Hsieh 1973 p. 61] to 900 million [ The Military Balance 1974 -
1975 1974 p. 49] . Projections for the year 1990 range
between 1,301,260,000 and 1,233,128,000 people [ People's
Republic of China: An Economic Assessment 1972 pp. 328-329]
Until only a few years ago the birth rate in China was es-
timated to be one of the highest in the world (35 per 1000)
.
As the death rate at this time had fallen to about 12 per
1000, the annual population increase was at least 13 million
In other words, the population of China increases more in a
matter of four years than the entire population of France
[Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide China 1973 p. 54]. In 1949,
Mao Tse-tung made this optimistic statement concerning
China's population in response to a statement by Dean




It is a very good thing that China has a big
population. Even if China's population multiplies
many times, she is fully capable of finding a
solution; the solution is production...
Of all things in the world, people are the
most precious. Under the leadership of the
Communist Party, as long as there are people,
every kind of miracle can be performed. We
are refuters of Acheson's counter-revolutionary
theory. We belive that revolution can change
everything, and that before long there will
arise a new China with a big population and a
great wealth of products, where life will be
abundant and culture will flourish. All pessi-
mistic views are utterly groundless [Mao Tse-tung
volume IV 1969 pp. 453-454].
Today, over twenty-five years after the above statement,
Mao's forecast of a "big population" has proved valid but
the "great wealth of products" part has yet to be realized.
Moreover, the withdrawal of Soviet technological advi.sors
coupled with the famine of 1959-1962 apparently caused the
Peking regime to institute several methods of birth control.
Rafael Salas, executive director of the United
Nations Fund for Population Activities, has stated that
China has the largest and most extensive family-planning
program anywhere in the world today and that it is being
conducted by the Chinese alone with no outside assistance
from the United Nations Fund ["Red China Pushing Vast Popu-
lation Control Program" San Jose Mercury News 16 December
1973 p. 22] . A Stanford chemistry professor by the name
of Carl Djerassi lauds Chinese expertise in birth control
and believes that their techniques could be used in other
developing nations to keep the global birthrate problem within
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limits. He cites an ingenious oral contraceptive in the
form of water-soluable paper squares each about one-third
the size of a postage stamp which serves as a "paper pill"
and which is the most common form of birth control in China.
Other techniques used are late marriages, the virtual absence
of pre-marital intercourse, and abortions after the second
child ["Chinese Expertise in Birth Control Boon for the
World" San Jose Mercury News 7 April 1974 p. 16]
.
According to Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide China the
Chinese population is extremely young with two out of every
five Chinese under the age of eighteen. In a huge and
developing nation such as China this alone could tend to
cause the standard of living to lag population growth in
the future thus compounding problems of population control,
governmental authority, and regime stability. If this proves
to be the case, Acheson's observation may again prove valid,
notwithstanding Mao's critique.
Population density variance in Communist China is
pronounced with less than five percent of the population
living in the western half of China where the terrain is
either high mountains or arrid basins. In the eastern half
of China the population density exceeds 52 persons per
square mile in areas of high agricultural production. Areas
of lower population in eastern China are usually indicative
of nonagricultural land [ Rand McNally Illustrated Atlas of
China 1972 p. 36]. Seventy-five percent of China's population
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are Han Chinese with ethnic minorities amounting to less
than forty million or five percent of the total. Still
these minority groups, who retain non-Chinese customs, reli-
gions, and languages, occupy almost two-thirds of the surface
area of China mostly in the western mountains, deserts, and
steppes [Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide China 1973 p. 57]. In
addition to the mainland, over eighteen million "overseas
Chinese" now reside in almost every country of the world.
A ninety-six percent majority of these live in Asia [Yean-
li Wu 1973 p. 415]
.
The Soviet government population estimate for 1974
was 250,900,000 [The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1975
p. 574] . As in China, more than forty percent of the total
is under the age of eighteen. The 19 73 birthrate was about
21 per 1000 and the death rate less than 8. In absolute
terms, these data represent an annual increase of 3.5 million
people [Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide U.S.S.R. 1973 pp. 36-41].
About eighty percent of the population consists of Great
Russians, the remainder consists of many ethnic minorities,
of which the most numerous are the Tatars, Ukrainians,
Chuvash, Bashkiss, and Mordvinians [Encyclopedia Americana
volume 24 1973 p. 43]. There is evidence of Chinese influence,
growing dissent, and unrest among these minorities [for
example, see "The Ukraine — Russia's Thorn in the Side"
Christian Science Monitor 27 June 1974 p. 2] . According to
the Monitor the Soviet birthrate is declining as a result of
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a climbing divorce rate (30 percent in 1972) , increased
abortions (the most common form of birth control in the
Soviet Union) , and a desire by the populace for a rising
standard of living. The Monitor notes that by the end of
the 1970* s the working proportion of the Soviet population
will have fallen to 54 percent of the total and that by
1990, the burden of financing pensions and maintaining a
high national income will fall upon an even smaller propor-
tion. By the end of the century computers predict that the
Soviet population will grow to between 32 and 34 million
while the Chinese population is expected to be well over one
billion ["Kremlin Keeps Quiet on Declining Soviet Birthrate"
Christian Science Monitor 13 May 1974 p. 5C]
.
In search of new sources of minerals and oil, the
Soviet Union is committed to a cohesive 15-year plan beginning
in 1976 to relocate a large portion of the 34-million-strong
Young Communist organization (Komsomol) to Siberia. The
goals include a million new Siberian settlers in the next
five years but at the present, scientists in Moscow admit
that more people are leaving Siberia than going there ["Go
East, Young Man, Soviet Leaders Urge" Christian Science
Monitor 17 June 1974 p. 3C; see also, "Wanted: Residents
for Siberia" Christian Science Monitor 28 June 1974 p. 5C]
.
In addition to prospecting, an important part of the program
is to complete the 2,000 mile Baikal-Amur rail line which
will run approximately 300 miles north of the existing
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Trans-Siberian railroad thus providing a higher degree of
security to Russian military logistics in the event of war
with China.
2. Territory
With an area of about 3.7 million square miles,
China ranks third in size in the world following Russia
(8.65 million square miles) and Canada (3.85 million square
miles). China shares approximately 13,210 miles of land
borders with twelve neighbors and has a coastline of
approximately 3,500 miles [Area Handbook for the People's
Republic of China 1972 p. vii]. Thomas Robinson maintains
that Soviet military planners must contend with a 9,700 mile
common border with China. His reasoning is as follows:
The Sino-Soviet border comprises three sectors:
the Inner Asian sector (2,000 miles), the Mongolian
sector (2,700 miles), and the Far Eastern sector
(2,000 miles). The Sino-Mongolian boundary is
included as part of the Sino-Soviet boundary not
only because of the limited sovereignty of the
Mongolian People's Republic but also because
Soviet and Chinese military forces are ranged
against each other across that border and because
the Soviet Union is, for all intents and purposes,
in charge of the defense of Mongolia [Thomas Robinson
"Soviet Policy in East Asia" Problems in Communism
November-December 1973 p. 40].
In addition to the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict,
both Nationalist and Communist China have territorial dif-
ferences with several countries such as Japan, Vietnam, and
the Philippines over the ownership of several island groups
located near China such as the Paracel Islands, Spratley
Islands, Pratas Islands, Senkaku Islands, Taiping Island,
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and Chungsha Island. On 19 January 1974 these differences
resulted in a naval battle between South Vietnam and Com-
munist China and the occupation of the Paracels by China.
Various U.S. newspapers attributed the occupation to China's
desire for oil exploration and development which is probably
accurate but other strategic uses of these islands might
include naval bases, radar air defense, and naval intelli-
gence observation posts. For a concise review of the battle
and the history of territorial claims to these islands see
the 4-10 March 1974 issue of Keesing's Contemporary Archives
,
pages 26388-26389. Also, for a detailed analysis of the
international law aspects of the Sino-Japanese dispute see
"The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-Yu-Tai (Senkaku)
Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition" in the
Virginia Journal of International Law , winter 1974, pages
221-266.
3. Agriculture and Climate
Agriculture represents the most important part of
the Chinese economy, engaging up to 8 5 percent of the labor
force, providing a substantial part of foreign exchange
earnings, and contributing approximately one-third to the
gross national product. China is the world's foremost pro-
ducer of rice, sweet potatoes, sorghum, soybeans, millet,
barley, peanuts, and tea. Her main industrial crops are
cotton, other fibers, and various oilseeds [Commander '
s
Digest 29 November 1973 p. 15]. Fisheries, forestry, and
grazing are less important. State farms represent 10
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percent and communes 90 percent of agricultural activity.
Agence France-Presse reported that there are more than
50,000 people's communes in China in which three quarters
of the Chinese or more than 60 million people live. This
gives an average of about 12,000 per commune with some
communes having over 50,000. Only 10 percent or 300 million
acres of China is arable land, the rest being mountains or
desert. This means the average commune consists of 5,200
acres. The communes are designed for military as well as
agricultural work in that they are honeycombed with deep
shelters in which foodstuffs are stored in case of enemy
attack. The goal is that they be capable of living isolated
for months on end ["Chinese Communes May Have Over 30,000
Residents" Monterey Peninsula Herald 1 November 19 74 p. 22]
.
An interesting agricultural development in Siberia
is that Soviet scientists have reported that they have pro-
duced frost-resistant wild Artie grasses in dry Siberian lake
bottoms and are feeding cattle with it. They believe it
to be a significant step in providing food for the new
Soviet settlers who intend to develop the rich resources in
Siberia ["Cattle Grass in Artie Soviets Claim" Christian
Science Monitor 23 August 1974 p. 1]
.
4. Terrain and Transportation
China's landforms are also quite varied ranging from
the 8,880-meter peak of Mt. Chomolungma (Everest) to the
Turfan Depression, which is 154 meters below sea level.
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Virtually all types of geological laridforms are found between
these extremes. The three most basic characteristics of
China's topography are: (1) decrease in land elevation from
west to east, (2) most mountain ranges run from west to east,
and (3) widely varied landforms (see Map 5) . Map 5 also
depicts some of the most common invasion routes traditionally
used by invading armies. China's landmass can be divided
into five general patterns: (1) plains, 11 percent, (2) basins,
16 percent, (3) plateaus, 34 percent, (4) hills, 9 percent,
and (5) mountains, 30 percent [Chiao-min Hsieh 1973 pp. 13-
21].
Lack of adequate internal communications and trans-
portation has been a problem throughout Chinese history.
The communist government is aware of the problem as evinced
by the fact that the development of modern transportation
networks has been a major part of each successive five-year
plan. The primary means of transportation in China in terms
of volume carried, passengers moved, and distance traveled
is railroads with water and road transport as secondary means.
Only in Tibet does a highway replace the railroad as the
chief means of transportation. Recently the Chinese have
built a new "Konka" bridge across the River Bramaputra
capable of carrying two-way heavy vehicular traffic, only
eight miles from the Indian border of the Northeast Frontier
Agency territory of Assam. The bridge overcomes the biggest
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The PLA is believed to have over 300,000 troops in Tibet
and the bridge makes it possible to move large numbers of
these troops from the interior of Tibet to the Indian fron-
tier in a matter of hours ["Chinese Upgrade Their Military
Power, Mobility in Tibet" The Sunday Peninsula Herald 17
February 1974 p. 11A]. The Peking Review claims that China
opened nine new trunk highways in 1974 in addition to the
construction of over 10,000 kilometers (6,214 miles) of
motor roads in mountain areas. The Communist Chinese maga-
zine also claims that the total length of asphalt-surface
roads at the end of 19 74 was more than ten times that of
1965 and that roads constructed in Yunnan Province in 1974
alone exceeded the total mileage laid from 1949 to 1973
["Motor Roads Built in 1974" Peking Review 21 February 1975
pp. 22-23]. Regarding purely military logistics, the Chinese
are known to have constructed all-weather roads in areas of
strategic importance such as along the coastline of the
Taiwan Strait and near the borders of North Vietnam, Laos,
and Burma. Since 1969 Peking has completed several new roads
in northeastern and northwe stern China in order to provide
better military access to the Sino-Soviet border [ People '
s
Republic of China: An Economic Assessment 1972 p. 173]
.
Airroutes are too expensive for routine transport and are





According to the French writer, Jan Deleyne, China
is poorly endowed with natural resources in comparison with
the United States or the Soviet Union. Still, known Chinese
reserves of the main raw materials are sufficient with the
exceptions of nickel, platinum, copper, and chrome and an
ambitious prospecting program is underway to discover new
sources of these key minerals. Deleyne also notes that raw
materials and semi-finished products constitute the main
items of import. China's growing armament industries re-
quire these materials, especially platinum, industrial
diamonds, ruthenium, irridium, chrome, copper, nickel, and
iron and steel [Deleyne 1973 pp. 18 and 150]
.
Total oil output for China in 19 7 3 was reported by
Chou En-lai to have been 5 million tons which represented
a big increase over estimates from previous years. The
Christian Science Monitor believes China's sudden oil riches
are mainly from increased production at the main oil facility
at Taching, plus the field at Shengli in Shantung Province
and a new field at Takang which was announced in early 19 74
["Oil - China Has Plenty, Sells Little" Christian Science
Monitor 12 July 1974 p. 4]. David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador
to China has stated that China will soon become an important
oil exporter, and could soon make $100 billion per year from
oil supplies on its continental shelf and in the Yellow Sea
["New Oil Finds Bubbling in Many Parts of World" Christian
Science Monitor 16 October 1974 p. 8] . A more optimistic
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estimate made in the December 19 74 issue of the Hong Kong
magazine Current Scene is that China should have easily
earned $350 million U.S. dollars in 1974 from exporting
petroleum to Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines.
Despite the huge growth of China's oil industry,
coal still provides 80 percent of China's energy. Along
with the United States and Russia, China is among the three
richest countries in the world in terms of coal with reserves
estimated at 9,000 trillion tons. Coal production jumped
from 240 million tons in 1966 to 300 million in 1970. During
the past several years China has implemented plans to scatter
her industrial centers widely over China instead of only in
the north and east for strategic reasons. In conjunction
with this plan she has commenced producing modern industrial
facilities in every province ["China Speeds Plans for Wide
Expansion of Coal-producing Operations" Christian Science
Monitor 23 April 1974 p. 5D]
.
The Financial Times Service in Hong Kong notes that
in the late 1950' s Chinese economists predicted that she
would surpass Britain in steel production and, although it
has taken longer than they expected, they are believed to
have now accomplished that milestone. Although no steel sta-
tistics have been released by China since 1972, they had
turned out 23 million metric tons that year, an increase of
2 million tons over the previous year. In comparison, Bri-
tish steel production for 1973 was 26.6 metric tons. The
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best estimates of current Chinese steel production is in
excess of 26 million tons. Plans for further increases in
steel production are evidenced by the recent purchase of a
one-million-ton cold-rolling steel mill from Germany and the
fact that negotiations have been underway with a Japanese
firm for steel plants three or four times as large as that
["China on Verge of Matching British Steel Production"
Christian Science Monitor 15 May 1974 p. 5B]
.
The Financial Times Service also reports that sophis-
ticated equipment purchases from foreign suppliers along
with increasing skill by Chinese engineers have also resulted
in an electric power generating capacity in 1973 30 percent
above the total in 19 72 with a total capacity of twice that
of 1965. This figure would be in excess of 100 billion
kilowatt hours. Thermal power plants have been purchased
from Hitachi of Japan, John Brown Engineering in Britain,
and various West German firms. The Chinese claim to have
built their own 125,000 kilowatt steam turbine plant in
1969 and a 300,000 kilowatt hydroturbine plant which was
installed on the upper reaches of the Yellow River. Smaller
hydroelectric plants numbering 50,000 with a combined genera-
ting capacity of eight times the 1965 figure have been in-
stalled in rural areas all over China according to Communist
Chinese sources. The power thus generated is expected to
spur economic growth by furnishing energy for milling machinery
and irrigation pumps ["Chinese Step Up Electric Generating
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Capacity" Christian Science Monitor 29 May 1974 p. 3A]
.
Figure 1 represents China's growth rate in the development
of these resources.
C. ECONOMIC FACTORS
The data presented in this section are based in part
upon an unclassified Central Intelligence Agency source
which was originally prepared for former President Nixon's
visit to China and later published by Rand McNally. They
are designed to give a reliable indication of relative rankings
and possible future trends but it should be noted that "the
incompatability of reporting systems preclude exact repre-
sentations without extensive footnoting" [ Rand McNally
Illustrated Atlas of China 1972 pp. 72 passim].
1. Gross National Product
As depicted in Figure 2 the Chinese gross national
product is continuing to rise but the rate of
increase of the gross national product per capita (at
$140.00 in 1970) has not kept pace probably due to the popu-
lation increases cited earlier. Also, in comparison with the
United States, Russia, Japan, and India, the Chinese figure
compares favorably only with the latter (at $80.00) and both
China and India trail the superindustrialized states by a
significant margin. It seems intuitively obvious from the
above data that Peking's national interest would best be
served by policies designed to decrease the threat of war
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increase the rate of industrialization and production, an
observation which again reinforces the main hypothesis of
this thesis. For a more complete picture of China's economic
performance from 1952 through 1973 see Figure 3.
2 . Merchant Marine
There is a distinct lack of data on the Chinese
merchant marine and shipbuilding industries. In 1970 the
Chinese merchant fleet was composed of 24 8 ships with a total
tonnage of 867,9 94 deadweight tons. Compared with a
registered tonnage of 402,000 in I960, this shows a growth
rate of over 100 percent in one decade. Additionally, there
was an unspecified number of foreign ships under charter.
The Chinese government has reported that its shipyards are
producing 10,000-15,000 displacement ton vessels and advanced
diesel engines of 8,800 horsepower to propel them. Japanese
sources estimate that nine such vessels had been launched
during the late 1960s and early 1970s [Area Handbook for the
People's Republic of China 1972 pp. 447 and 532]. The Far
Eastern Economic Review's Asia 1973 Yearbook notes on page 110
that the Chinese shipbuilding industry was slated for rapid
expansion in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) and that
purchase orders were placed in Rijeka, Yugoslavia, for four
15,000 ton diesel freighters and ten 12,000 horsepower engines
to be installed in ships built in Chinese yards. John R.
Dewenter states that China's own shipbuilding industry




[Source: Asia 1975 Yearbook Far Eastern Economic Review
1975 p. 165J
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to 15,000 tons in 1970, to 20,000 and 25,000 tons in 1971
[Dewenter '"China Afloat" Foreign Affairs July 1972 p. 749].
Ninety-five percent of China's international trade is handled
by the ports of Da lian, Qin haung dao , Xin gang, Lian yun
gang, Shang hai, Huang pu, and Zhan jiang [Nagel's Encyclo-
pedia-Guide China 1973 p. 287].
3. International Trade
The most noticeable trend in China's international
trade is the growing amount of trade with non-communist
countries as compared with decreasing trade with communist
countries. As Figure 4 depicts, the reverse occurred at
about the same time as the Sino-Soviet dispute. While China
exports over time have shown a gradual increase, especially
with the free world, Figure 5 shows her imports have remained
relatively stable compared to the industrialized nations.
The short-term outlook for China's international trade can
be extrapolated with reasonable accuracy from the data above.
Imports will be limited chiefly to items required for further
industrialization with little demand for consumer items,
other than possibly food, in order to avoid foreign indebted-
ness. In the long-term, she could greatly expand international
trade and her financial reserves by aggressively developing
export markets for industrial raw materials in demand in
developed countries, especially oil, certain metals, and
coking coal. A decision to pursue such a course will most
likely be presaged and signaled by a massive program to build
up China's fledgling merchant marine.
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Russia has already begun a rapid expansion of her
merchant marine which is presently ranked as fifth in the
world in terms of gross tonnage with a total of 17 million
tons. Timofei Guzhenko, Soviet Minister for the Merchant
Marine, announced Soviet plans for revolutionary expansion
in an interview in the weekly Nedelya which was picked up by
the London Observer Service ["Russ to Expand Merchant Marine"
San Jose Mercury 12 January 1974 p. 22] . Also, the Soviet
Union's second atomic icebreaker was launched in 1973 and is
expected to complete outfitting at a Leningrad shipyard in
1975 ["Russ Launch Atomic Icebreaker" San Jose Mercury
4 November 1973 p. 41].
Numerous economists in the United States have gone on
record in support of increased tradinq between the United
States and the People's Republic of China as well as projects
such as a joint investment program between the two nations.
An example is Dr. Harded Pettus Hoose who served as a non-
governmental advisor to former President Nixon during his
1971 visit to China. Dr. Harned sees such joint ventures as
a move toward solving the world's economic problems ["U.S.-
China Trade, Investment Seen As Economic Solution" Monterey
Peninsula Herald 3 October 1974 p. 13]. In a talk before
invited students and staff at the Naval Postgraduate School
Professor Harry Schaeffer of the University of Kansas Depart-
ment of Economics observed that the centralized economic
planning germaine to communist governments has produced
remarkable results in Russia when it was in an underdeveloped
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stage and that this economic system works well in producing
homogeneous products such as electric power or interconti-
nental ballistic missiles. However, the system has proven
ineffective in the production of consumer products such as
automobiles and television sets because of improper incentives.
The Soviet regime has recognized this and has begun using the
profit motive more at a time when the United States (under
former President Nixon) was utilizing more governmental control
of the economy than at any time in its history. He noted that
it took Soviet Russia until 192 8 to equal the production level
of 1917. His conclusion was that increased international
trade and negotiation with both Russia and China is a
preferable common ground on which to interact than that of
the battlefield [Schaeffer "Are the U.S. and Soviet Economies
Converging?" Talk given at the Naval Postgraduate School 26
April 1974] .
4 . Narcotics
A Nationalist Chinese writer, Ch'en Shen-wen, has
published numerous recent pamphlets for the World Anti-
Communist League (for example, see "Communist China and Drug
Traffic" Taiwan: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter,
volume XX, number 176, 1974) and English-language Taiwan
periodicals concerning Communist China and drug traffic.
His main theme is that while Peking pretends to oppose the
use of hard drugs, it is secretly using them as both an
economic weapon and as a tool to gain control over the will
of free men and states. Ch'en builds his case against Peking's
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exportation of hard drugs with select quotations from both
communist and non-communist sources including defectors,
Pravda, TASS , Japan Times , The Stars and Stripes , various
U.S. Congressmen, U.S. Congressional reports, United Nations
reports, and so on. He quotes Chou En-lai as having told
Nassir:
...U.S. servicemen are experimenting with opium
eating and we are helping them in this respect. We
have grown the best quality opium especially for them.
Do you remember those days when the Westerners forced
sales of opium on us? Today we will pay them in their
•own coin... [Ch'en Shen-wen Free China Review February
1974 p. 21]
.
He also quotes a former engineer in China, Tsou Kuang-han,
as testifying before a U.S. Senate seminar on 16 November
1972 that:
...On Lhe mainland I remember Mao saying: 'The
American imperialists used bacteriological warfare in
the Korean War and are now using chemical warfare in
Vietnam. We are going to use indigenous chemical
warfare to paralyze the American forces on the Vietnam
battlefields. 1 [Ch'en Shen-wen Free China Review
February 19 74 pp. 2 7-2 8]
.
Ch'en also produces a map which purports to show
opium growing areas, collection points, and exit routes in
Mainland China (see Figure 6)
.
An opposing position is expressed by Alfred W. McCoy
in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972) in which he maintains that
China's narcotics supply dried up in 1949 and that she is no
longer a factor in the international narcotics traffic. He
holds that the source of Asian heroin is refineries in Hong
Kong and the "Golden Triangle" of northeastern Burma,
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Map shows the opium growing area on the Chinese mainland. Communists are using drugs as a weapon
[Sources: Ch'en 3hen-v:en "Narcotics Offensive" Free





northern Thailand, and northern Laos where approximately one
thousand tons of raw opium (70 percent of the world's illicit
supply) is harvested. McCoy's book is well documented with
over ninety pages of footnotes.
As to which position is correct, in view of the
conflicting evidence, the writer concludes that neither has
been proved. However, it seems most unlikely that the People's
Republic of China would forgo the opportunity to make high
profits from the current demand for illicit drugs. Moreover,
it is within the realm of possibility that drug sales
assisted Peking in neutralizing her foreign debts.
5. Foreign Aid
In 1970 the People's Republic of China overtook the
Soviet Union as the main communist doner of economic aid to
developing countries (see Figure 7; in 1970 the Chinese
amount was $709 million as compared with a Soviet figure of
$204 million) . According to the Foreign Policy Association
China's main political objectives in her increasing program
of foreign aid are to undermine Soviet influence among both
non-communist governments as well as world revolutionary
movements and to establish itself as the leading spokesman
for the world's underprivileged, nonwhite majority [ Great
Decisions 1973 pp. 8-9] . Sino-Soviet polemics concerning
foreign aid are listed in Appendix A. It suffices to note
here that a trend has begun toward reduced foreign aid on





increased its support of less developed countries. The
unanswerable question is not if, but when she will reduce
this aid.
D. FOREIGN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FACTORS
This section will probe the role played by foreign science
and technology in increasing the rate of economic development
in communist countries. Included as a case study is a state-
of-the-art survey of Sino-Soviet computer technology. While
military applications of this technology are sometimes obvious
or can be extrapolated from the factual data contained in this
section, there is a distinct lack of locally available source
data on the specific military applications of Communist
computer technology. However, Russian and Chinese computers,
computer characteristics, and related technology will be
covered in sufficient detail that the reader can easily draw
his own conclusions regarding the military implications.
1
. Background
According to Kurt Stehling the growth of military and
space technology since 1945 has been responsible for starting
the computer age. The mechanical calculators used in World
Wars I and II and the electronic computers developed since
then are a culmination of the historical process of unceasing
warfare, mechanization, and reliance upon machines and
mathematical aids. For example, the most widely used and
familiar calculator, the slide rule, was originally conceived
in the middle of the nineteenth century by a French artillery
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officer, Amedee Mannheim, in order to improve artillery
accuracy by more rapid and precise ballistic calculations.
Mechanical calculators were added during World War I to
further improve artillery and naval gunfire accuracy. These
were improved and refined through World War II not only for
the original purposes, but also for the development of new
weapons systems such as the atom bomb, bombs ights, radar,
jet engines, and German V-2 rockets which carried their own
mechanical computers for long-range trajectory computations
[Stehling 1972 pp. 128-129].
The Korean war and the "Cold War" caused a major
boost in U.S. military preparedness expenditures which
resulted in the development of new rocket engines, missile
guidance, and missile control systems. All of these depended
upon an increasingly sophisticated family of first generation
electronic computers to handle increasing amounts of data.
The United States Air Force's Semi-Automatic Ground Environ-
ment (SAGE) early-warning radar air defense system of the
1950 ! s and 1960's was the first large-scale development and
application of first generation vacuum-tube computers in the
United States. The first large-scale business application
of computers was the American Airlines "SABRE" reservations
system designed to help solve the critical "no-show" problem
of large airlines.
On 4 October 19 57 the Russian Sputnik I was launched
which resulted in the great U.S . -U.S. S. R. space race, not to
mention a significant shift in emphasis toward the study of
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hard science in American schools and universities. In 1960,
President Kennedy announced the program to send a man to the
moon as a national goal. One spin-off of this highly success-
ful program has been the rapid development of transisterized
second and integrated-circuit third generation computers in
the United States. This case study will examine the state-
of-the-art of communist computer technology today.
2. Soviet Computer Development and Foreign Technology
A review of computer literature, including Russian
translations and the analysis of American experts who have
visited Russia, seems to indicate that the Russians lag the
United States by several years but have the raw technical
potential to achieve near parity in the early 19 80's. Lack
of centralized planning (normally omnipresent in communist
nations) in Moscow has resulted in a failure to establish
systematic programming and support services for business and
commercial applications of computers. For such fields as
missile warfare and space exploration, however, the Russians
seem far less behind the United States than formerly
[Stehling 1972 p. 236]
.
Another source of the Soviet lag is the lack of time-
sharing systems in the Soviet Union according to N. Moiseyev,
deputy director of the Computing Center of the Academy of
Sciences in Moscow. Writing in Pravda , he has urged that his
center be used as an experimental base for the time-sharing
technique. The Center is located in southwest Moscow and is
one of the few places in the Soviet Union known to have
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Besm-6 machines, the largest Soviet computers. Time-sharing
systems, long used in the United States, are designed to make
maximum use of precious computer time of the powerful central
processor by linking it with hundreds or even thousands of
users over high-speed communication lines. Moiseyev decried
what he described as the present tendency of each major
industrial plant, research institute, design bureau, or
university to have its own computing center. The practice
results in inefficient use of computing capacity and the
dissemination of many small machines among users tends to
discourage the use of powerful computers needed for some
problems. He also urged the introduction of American-styled
software or program developing organizations that would sell
their services to the user and thereby simultaneously enable
the use of machines for many different problems. American
experts have found the time-sharing programs proposed for the
Siberian Department of the Academy of Science in Novosibirsh
to be outdated by American standards and dependent upon the
introduction of the new third-generation Ryad computers
[Shabad "Soviet Lag Cited in Computer Use" New York Times
6 January 1974 p. 16]
.
Perry warns that an a priori assumption that the
Soviet military research and development process is ineffi-
cient may be invalid and that in several respects U.S.
practices may be inferior in the long run. One distinction
he makes is that the Soviet military research and development
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(R&D) system is markedly more efficient than its civil-sector
equivalent, which may be the reverse of the present situation
in the United States. Another is that the Soviet Union
generally favors a pattern of continuing design and develop-
ment, with evolutionary models succeeding one another at
regular intervals, and with a pronounced dependence on proto-
typing as an aid to production decisions. The U.S. emphasis
is on production rather than research and development, and
more benefits accrue to producers than to developers.
Customers for military research and development in the Soviet
Union have an evident aversion to high-risk technology whereas
U.S. military customers have been willing to accept risk for
large advances in technology and are willing to pay the high
costs involved. The dependence of the U.S. R&D process on
continued production programs is in marked contrast to a
Soviet reliance on central, stable funding that allows the
persistence of a relatively steady-state R&D process. If
American R&D budgets continue to be subject to attrition, as
seems likely, the United States may be obliged to accept
major changes in its acquisiton policies and practices;
otherwise, the Soviets may be able to overcome whatever
technological advantage the United States has acquired by
reason of its relatively higher investment in military R&D
during the 1950's and 1960's [Perry 1973 pp. v-vii]
.
According to the Area Handbook for the Soviet Union ,
the fields of automation and computerization are the clearest
examples of Russian technological lag behind five to ten
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years behind the U.S. Soviet computers are slower, have
less memory capacity, and are less varied and adaptable to
different tasks than U.S. computers. First generation
Soviet computers, the M-2 and Ural 1, were not produced
until 1959. Second generation machines in the Ural series
appeared after 19 61 but are known to be infamously ineffi-
cient, particularly the Ural 4. Large computers in the
Minsk and Besm series have been subsequently developed. The
Besm-6 is the most advanced model now in general use, handling
a million operations a second. Seventy percent of the
medium and small computers have been developed at the Kiev
Cybernetics Research Institute, a center for research into
mass production of computers. These include the Mir series
for scientific computations and the Dnepr series for control
of production processes. The new Ryad series to be produced
at the Minsk plant is to be the heart of a nationwide computer
network linking 800 regional data-processing centers. Despite
the traditional Soviet emphasis on the practical application
of science, the fact is that more resources are devoted to
research than to development. Research scientists enjoy
greater prestige and financial rewards than their counter-
parts in industry. The technological lag in the computer
and other Soviet industries does not appear to be caused by
lack of funding, trained personnel, or any inherent weakness
in research and development sectors. Rather, the lag seems
to result from a failure to translate the innovative findings
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of basic research into the development of new computers,
products, and manufacturing processes [Keefe 1971 pp. 369-
370].
A flood of articles in recent issues of the Current
Digest of the Soviet Press clearly demonstrates that the
Soviet government, scientists, academicians, and journalists
are well aware of the weaknesses noted above and are taking
action to correct them. The following series of brief
quotes excised from lengthy articles demonstrate this:
In our country, the production of electronic machines
and their external devices and elements is dispersed
among various ministries and departments. In none of
them are computers the main type of output. Hence,
the lack of coordination between computer developers
and industry, the irrational utilization of cadres
of mathematicians specializing in this field and
designers, and the difficulties with plans for mater-
ial supply and ;the development and production of
these machines.
The fact that the computer producers have no
single boss to carry out a uniform technical policy
fully accounts for even such phenomena as the produc-
tion of different types of electronic computers that
have incompatible programs and operate with different
machine languages. Incompatibility and 'polyglotism'
are very appreciable phenomena from an economic
standpoint [Mkrtchyan Curent Digest of the Soviet
Press 2 October 1974 pp. 8-9]
.
The second and no less important question is
that of the difficulties connected with computer
software. Under the existing state of affairs,
thousands of organizations that have acquired a
computer are left 'alone with it' and are compelled
to work out the software for their jobs virtually
from scratch. Moreover, information exchanges have
not been organized. Consequently, work is inevitably
duplicated. Additional difficulties in this respect
are caused by the fact that the computers we turn
out are not provided with a set of program compilers
[ Semen ikh in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 16




To accelerate the commissioning of automated
management systems, a shift to the designing of
computer centers and automated management systems
and the writing of standardized programs for them
is under way.
...The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers has adopted
the proposal of the State Committee for Science and
Technology and the Ministry of Instrument Making,
Means of Automation and Control Systems on organizing
a special association to write programs for Ryad-
type computers on a centralized basis and according
to customers' orders, and to provide the personnel
of automated management systems with the necessary
assistance in putting these programs into effect.
...The creation of a uniform system of inter-
acting computer centers in the country, equipped with
up-to-date computers, will make it possible to com-
pile optimized national-economic plans for any
required number of indices.
This state network will be based on territorial
and group time-sharing computer centers [Zhimerin
Current Digest of the Soviet Press 6 November 1974
PP. 14-15]
.
. . .the same" is true of systems of time-sharing
computer centers, the form of computer use that
best meets the needs of the socialist system of a
planned economy. There are two approaches to the
utilization of computer technology and the develop-
ment of automated management systems — the decen-
tralized and the centralized. At present, the de-
centralized or departmental approach is dominant —
it reflects the desire of enterprises, organizations,
ministries and departments to possess and service
their own computers and to set up small computer
centers, as well as their negative attitude toward
specialization and its obvious advantages. The
proponents of this approach oppose the concentration
of computer technology and information, upholding
narrow departmental interests, they see the merits
of decentralization but not its short-comings.
...It is necessary to solve a number of other
organizational problems too, including. . .the broader
and more efficient utilization of foreign experience
and imported technology. The problems of improving
repair work, the training of cadres and the recruit-
ment of highly qualified specialists, including
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foreigners, for work on the creation and intro-
duction of automated management systems must
also be solved [Samborsky Current Digest of the
Soviet Press 6 November 19 74 pp~ 15-16]
.
In an unclassified report on advanced weapons fore-
casting published by the Defense Intelligence Agency Wood-
house draws the following conclusions regarding the future
of Soviet technology forecasting:
a. Since Premier Kosygin's official endorsement of
economic, scientific, and technological forecasting in
1965, forecasting has gained acceptance at the highest
levels of the Soviet government. Because of its lack of
acceptance and use in decision-making in the U.S., this will
almost certainly lead to major advances in technology
forecasting in the Soviet Union.
b. The prestige of forecasting and forecasters has
grown as technological forecasting became a major factor
in the preparation of the state economic Gosplan.
c. Although many Soviet forecasting techniques have
been borrowed from the West, V. M. Gluhkov, the "father"
of the Soviet computer industry, has recently introduced new
forecasting techniques which have gained immense influence
in both the scientific and political spheres.
d. Unless forecasting gains important and influential
adherents in U.S. government and industry, leadership in
technology forecasting will pass from the U.S. to the Soviet
Union during this decade [Woodhouse 1972 pp. 1-22].
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A two-way spin-off of the joint U.S. — U.S.S.R.
Apollo — Soyuz Test Project is increased knowledge of the
other's command and control systems by both sides. Already
the lack of advanced technology is evident throughout the
Soviet space program. Aviation Week and Space Technology
notes that the Soviet control center at Kahnin uses sub-
stantially less computer support in handling spacecraft data
than its American counterpart. Much Soviet data handling is
done by hand, with considerable personnel needed for such
activities. Also, telemetry from the Soyuz is substantially
less than is common from U.S. spacecraft, because the Soviets
do not monitor their simpler systems to such a high degree
["Soviet Control System Limited" Aviation Week and Space
Technology 7 October 1974 pp. 12-13] . The implied result
is that the U.S. may be giving more information than it is
gaining from this mutual scientific venture of friendship.
Late in October of 1973 Control Data and the Soviet
Union signed a ten-year agreement to cooperate in the design
and development of advanced computer technology. It was
the first long-term agreement in the computer field between
a U.S. firm and the Soviets and might eventually lead to
joint manufacturing operations [Britannica Book of the Year
1974 p. 203]. On the same day that the U.S.S.R. signed an
agreement with the American Coca-Cola Company (26 June 19 74)
,
another agreement was signed with Burroughs Corporation for
scientific and technical cooperation in the area of computer
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technology, including training and the development, program-
ming, production, and application of computers ["Agreements
with U.S. Firms" The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 24
July 1974 p. 28] . These examples represent a practical
application of the recommendations made by Samborsky above.
Other examples are:
a. Soviet officials have conducted negotiations with
IBM to install a computerized central control system as well
as satellite operations in each of six sub-divisions of the
world's largest truck factory under construction at Naver-
ezhyne Chelny, U.S.S.R. The Soviets are also negotiating
with Honeywell to install a multimillion-dollar automated
control system within the plant ["U.S. Computer Expected for
Soviet Factory" Monterey Peninsula Herald 3 December 1973
p. 10] .
b. A ten-year agreement with the U.S.S.R. and Great
Britain on the development of economic, scientific, techni-
cal, and industrial cooperation was signed on 6 May 1974.
British expertise in computer technology was one feature of
this agreement ["Agreement Signed" (from Izvestia, 8 May
1974) The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 5 June 1974
pp. 18-19] .
c. In 1972 Russia joined the Netherlands in a joint
business venture to adapt Dutch computer peripherals — disks,
visual display units, etc. — to the Russian Minsk-32 "Elorg"
computer. The Elorg computer is the equivalent of the IBM
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7000-series circa 1962 ["Soviet Union: Western Help for
Russian Computers" Business Week 24 June 1972 p. 43]
.
d. Time notes that the Soviets had bought about 100
Western computers by July of 1973, 21 of them from Britain's
International Computers Limited. Also, Control Data has
delivered the largest Western machine in the Soviet Union,
a Model 6200 now at the Dubna Research Institute, and is
negotiating to set up a time-sharing network in Russia.
Honeywell Bull, a French based subsidiary, has installed an
automated record-keeping system at the Gosbank in Leningrad
["Great Bleep Forward" Time 16 July 1973 pp. 52-53].
e. In December of 1973 Westinghouse Electric received
approval to construct a $10-million facility near Warsav; for
the production of semiconducter rectifiers and, more recently,
Teledyne Microelectronics received an export license to
build a hybrid microcircuit assembly facility for Cajavec,
a Yugoslav electronics company ["Teledyne Expands Micro-
circuit Market" Aviation Week and Space Technology 2 2 April
1974 p. 44] .
f. It was reported on 22 January 1974 that three loans
totaling nearly $40 million were signed in London to finance
a joint venture steel mill in Yugoslavia with U.S. technical
assistance. Three U.S. companies will supply machinery,
licenses, and consultation and will have a $2.2 million
equity in the plant [ Facts on File 26 January 1974 p. 56]
.
g. In late 1973 the Soviet Union signed a contract with
the C. E. Lummus Company and Monsanto Chemical Company for
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the purchase of a complete $100 million petrochemical plant
to be built at Severodonetsk, 475 miles south of Moscow.
The plant will use one of the most recent processes developed
by Monsanto which is in use at only one of its plants in
the United States ["Russ Buy Complete U.S. Plant" San Jose
Mercury 24 November 197 3 p. 21]
.
h. Dzhermen M. Gvishiani,. son-in-law of Premier Alexei
N. Kosygin and head of the Council of Ministers State
Committee on Science and Technology, stated in early 1974
that "Even without most-favored-nation treatment or credits
(which the U.S. Congress has since quashed — the author)
,
much will still be happening. Men and credits are not an
absolute." He also disclosed that at that time the Soviets
already had 19 agreements with American firms and that the
Russian policy was to remain "quiet" and wait for those
"who make decisions" in the United States to realize that
the Soviet Union was not benefiting in some unknown way
["Soviet Renew Bid for U.S. Know-how" Christian Science
Monitor 27 March 1974 p. 1].
Most of the above examples could only have been
approved within the American grand strategy framework of
detente under the Nixon Administration but not all of "those
who make decisions" are convinced of the Soviet Union's
benign intentions. Senator Henry M. Jackson (Dem. —Wash.),
Chairman of the Senate Government Operations Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations, has repeatedly expressed alarm
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over this strategy. Recently, when the Defense Department
strongly opposed a contract signed over a year ago, under
which Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation would build
a complete microcircuit facility in Poland, Senator Jackson
sponsored an admendment to the Fiscal 1975 Defense Department
authorization bill to give the Secretary of Defense increased
authority to block the export of advanced technology. With-
out mentioning Fairchild by name, he charged that "if this
production line is built, we will have transferred a large
part of our national integrated-circuit technology .. .we will
have removed the largest single problem the Soviet Bloc has
in the production of modern computers and enormously upgraded
the military potential of our adversaries" ["Avionics Export
Efforts Draw Scrutiny" Aviation Week and Space Technology
1 July 1974 pp. 16-17]. More recently, a spokesman for
Senator Jackson's committee said the panel expects to examine
the sensitive questions involved in the transfer of advanced
U.S. technology to the Soviet Union which can result from
proposed deals involving the Soviet Aeroflot airline and
the U.S. companies of Lockheed, Boeing, and McDonnell
Douglas ["Lockheed-Soviet Cooperation Studied" Monterey
Peninsula Herald 2 December 1974 p. 21]. Earlier the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, had
warned that the United States might be going too far in the
export of critical technology to the Soviet Union. Cited
specifically was Soviet liaison with McDonnell-Douglas and
144

Lockheed ["Exports of Technology to U.S.S.R. Questioned"
Christian Science Monitor 11 October 1974 p. 6] . Senator
Jackson has been joined by Representative Charles A. Vanik
(Dem. — Ohio) in pressing for tighter controls on the export
of American technology to the Soviet Union. Both congress-
men question the wisdom of selling sophisticated police and
criminology equipment to Russia. In Senator Jackson's
words: "Are we getting detente when we are going to sell...
to the Russians police equipment that will help the KGB to
hold the dissidents under even tighter control?" Representa-
tive Vanik' s position was: "A crime control device can
easily be converted into a weapon of oppression. It would
be tragic if oppression in the Soviet Union would result
from devices and equipment stamped: 'Made in America.'"
These comments were prompted by the participation of U.S.
companies in Moscow's "Krimtehnika 74" exhibition of 14-28
August 1974. An example was the firm of Voice Identification
Incorporated of Somerville, New Jersey, which manufactures
an advanced electronic voiceprint device widely used by law
enforcement agencies in the United States. This is the same
equipment that was used to verify ex-Soviet premier Nikita
S. Khrushchev on tapes that were later published as Khrushchev
Remembers ["Senator Says Soviets May Buy U.S. Police Devices"
Monterey Peninsula Herald 15 July 1974 p. 2]
.
Soviet Army and Navy leaders have not neglected the
military role of computers and "ASC" (Automated Systems of
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Control in Soviet parlance) as reflected by translations of
Soviet military writers in the winter 1975 Strategic Review .
Soviet Rear Admiral V. Babiy quotes both Marshall Grechko
("The question of the mastery of troop management on the
basis of new technical means, with scientific methods, takes
on a unique actuality") and Fleet Admiral Gorshkov ("However
technically perfect the fleet may be... the basis of naval
forces is always man — the master of all means of warfare")
in support of his arguments for increased use of ASC to
enhance the quality of combat decision-making with quantita-
tive analysis [Babiy "Specifics of Making Decisions with the
Use of ASC" Naval Collections journal January 19 74 as trans-
lated in Strategic Review winter 1975 pp. 116-121] . General-
Lieutenant Engineer V. Filippov and General-Major Engineer
S. Belotserkovskiy describe the Soviet Air Force Engineering
Academy's use of a "Mir" computer center in a manner that
could apply to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's IBM 360
located in the W. R. Church Computer Center were it not for
the usual references in Soviet official writing to statements
made by high party officials, in this case Brezhnev's admonish-
ments for scientific-technical progress as the pivot of Soviet
economic policy [Filippov and Belotserkovskiy "Computers and
Training" Red Star 18 June 1974 as translated in Strategic
Review winter 1975 pp. 124-127].
Appendix C is a listing of all known Soviet Unified
Systems (ES) Computers and their specifications.
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3. Chinese Computer Development and Foreign Technology
"Self-reliance" was one of the most overworked terms
in the lexicon of the Peking Review and other English-language
publications of Communist China during 1974. .With all due
respect to the very significant accomplishments of the Peking
regime, its actions speak louder than its words. In early
1974 the Communist Chinese Party's theoretical journal, Red
Flag , sharply attacked the notion that the key to the country's
rapid industrialization is the importation of foreign tech-
nology. The article caustically denigraded the "handful of
comrades" who "blindly worship foreign technology and equip-
ment" and show lack of confidence in Chinese working masses
["China's Cultural Switch" Christian Science Monitor 17
February 1974 p. 8]. Agence France-Presse service reported
that a August 1974 i'ssue of the Shanghai monthly Hsuehsi Yu
Pipan ("Studies and Criticisms") attacked Chinese who think
"The Moon is rounder abroad" and that "The Chinese are a
nation of incompetents." It noted that the withdrawal of
Soviet nuclear specialists did not stop the Chinese develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and that the construction of 10,000
ton ocean-going freighters by 100 percent Chinese in Shanghai
shipyards was a feat certain "authorities" believed to be
impossible ["Shanghai Monthly Rips 'Round Moon' Chinese"
Monterey Peninsula Herald 29 August 1974 p. 21]. Regardless
of this proud verbiage, China has continued to seek the
purchase of foreign technology and the exchange of scientific
experts as evidenced by the following:
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a. The Baker Oil Tools Corporation of Los Angeles
has sold several million dollars worth of pilot offshore
drilling equipment to the Chinese and is negotiating addi-
tional major sales of equipment ["China Decides to Accelerate
Its Production of Oil" Sunday Peninsula Herald 10 November
1974 p. 11B] .
b. In March of 1974 the West German consortium of
Schloemann Siemag-AG and Demag-AG, Duisburg, won a $2 00
million Chinese contract to commence construction of a $3.75
billion steel complex in Wuhan. This complex is expected to
add 25 percent to the Chinese rolled cold-strip steel capacity
when it is completed in 1977. Also, Nippon Steel has signed
a major $15 billion hot-steel rolling mill contract with
China ["Marathon Negotiations Net Chinese Contract for German
Steel Group" Christian Science Monitor 18 April 1974 p. 5D]
.
c. The Christian Science Monitor has also reported
that China has embarked on a major buying spree of foreign
technology commencing in 1972 which has included a French
petro-chemical complex costing about $264 million, American
Boeings, and British Trident jet airliners for a total of
$420 million, and oil-drilling equipment including rigs and
support vessels ["Peking Reemphasizes Industrial Self-reliance"
Christian Science Monitor 25 January 1974 p. 6].
d. The United Aircraft Corporation was given permis-
sion by the federal government early in 1974 to discuss the
possible sale of American helicopters to China. The
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Washington Star-News quoted an unidentified U.S. official as
saying that helicopter sales to China are "bound to increase
suspicions in Moscow that the U.S. is taking sides in the
Sino-Soviet dispute." ["China Copter Sales Eyed" San Jose
Mercury 16 January 1974 p. 9] .
e. The United States and the People's Republic of
China commenced exchanging scientific experts in September of
1974 as a result of an agreement between Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai reached in Peking
in November of 1973. China's groups of experts have included
agronomists, seismologists, and laser specialists ["U.S. and
China Exchanging Experts" Monterey Peninsula Herald 5
September 1974 p. 22].
The Chinese, just as the Russians, are extremely
tight on releasing information concerning military computer
technology. However, in July of 1972 a distinguished group
of American computer scientists were invited to visit the
People's Republic of China for three weeks and to tour
computer facilities and to discuss computer technology with
Chinese experts in Shanghai and Peking. These are some of
their observations:
a. They believed they saw a representative picture
of the most advanced non-military computer technology in
China.
b. Chinese computer scientists are very well read
and eager to learn the very latest research results, for
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example, they would repeatedly state "Don't tell us what you
have already published, tell us only what has not been
published."
c. China's universities seem to play a secondary
role in computer development. For example, Tsinghua in
Peking, China's most important technically oriented institu-
tion of higher learning was virtually closed during the
Cultural Revolution (1966 to 19-69) and enrollment in 1972
was only one-third of the level in 1966 of 12,000 students.
d. The Telecommunications Factory in Peking produces
one to two integrated circuit digital computers a week and
the Shanghai Radio Factory Number 13 produces about ten
computers per year.
e. The Chinese have been manufacturing integrated
circuits, at least in limited quantities, since 1968 —
reportedly the same year in which production of integrated
circuits began in the Soviet Union.
f. Computer circuits of the transister-transister
logic (TTL) family with rise times of 20 to 30 nanoseconds
are in use. Emitter-coupled logic (ECL) circuits, in ceramic
packages, with rise times of 3 to 4 nanoseconds are in pilot
production at the Shanghai Metallurgical Research Institute.
g. Connector technology is weak in laminated printed
circuit boards and possible bottlenecks could happen in
computer production capability because of it.
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h. China emphasizes central processor development
over input-output technology because of heavy emphasis on
computations in industry. Punched paper tape is used vice
punched cards. Output is on CRT's in smaller machines and
impact or electrostatic line printers with speeds of 10 lines
per second on larger machines. All printing is Arabic numbers
and Roman letters.
i. It would be a mistake to conclude that China is
"n" years behind the U.S. in computer technology. The
Chinese have demonstrated the ability to reach very high
levels of technology in a very short time and with little or
no help from outside China. Their state of technological
knowledge is expanding rapidly. "Much will depend on present
and future national priorities in China and on broadening the
base of interaction with the Western world." Apparently the
interaction cited above is well underway. On 5 October 1973,
a group of 14 computer experts from Mainland China commenced
a six-week tour of American computer facilities under the
auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, the Social
Research Council, and the American Academy of Learned
Societies. A few of the places visited included: Ames
Research Center, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM, Fairchild, and Stanford Reserach Institute
["China's Computer Experts See Ames" San Jose Mercury 7




j . Computers seemed to be used exclusively for
scientific and engineering calculations. Examples specifically
mentioned by the Chinese included lens design, weather predic-
tion, mechanical structure analysis (as in bridge or dam
building), and artificial insimination studies.
k. International Algol (Algorithmically oriented
language) is the main computer language used by the Chinese.
1. The Chinese show little interest in mini-
computers which have become so prevalent in the United States.
They are strongly oriented to produce what they call "super
computer" — very big and fast machines such as the Control
Data Corporation Star computer and the Burroughs B6 700
[Cheatham "Computers in China: A Travel Report" Science
12 October 1973 pp. 134-140]. The October 1974 issue of
China Reconstructs
,
page 23, does, however, picture a desk-
sized computer called the "Great Wall 2 03" which is claimed
to be 2.5 times as fast as foreign calculators of the same
size, have twice the storage capacity, and an expanded
computer language
.
: The Communist Chinese emphasis on research and
development and scientific modernization is underlined by
the spectacular growth in the total number of research
institutions since 1949 — from 100 to between 1,500 and
2,000 [Encyclopedia Americana volume 6 1973 p. 562]. For a
listing and the principal characteristics of some Chinese




Appendix D represents a side by side comparison of
Communist Chinese and Russian orders of battle taken from
the Military Balance 1974-1975 published by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Figure 8 shows
the chronological build-up of military forces in the Sino-
Soviet border areas from 1967 until 1973 and was taken from
the Strategic Survey 1973 , again published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies.
1 . Logistics
From the sheer size of the Soviet military build-up
along the Sino-Soviet border and in their Far Eastern fleet
it is evident that the Kremlin learned its lesson during
World War II and has no intention of repeating Stalin's error
of failing to mobilize in 1941 against Germany. However, the
failure of logistical support to both the Far Eastern military
and naval commands has been a historic weakness of Russia
and proved decisive in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Here
again Russia seems to have learned and has developed a high
degree of flexibility in logistical support for her Far
Eastern forces. Noteworthy are the opening of the Arctic Sea
supply and transit route, the work in progress to complete
the new Baikal-Amur railway, the fact that the opening of the
Suez canal will shorten the sea supply line to the Indian
Ocean from 11,000 miles (from Vladivostok) to only 2,000
miles (from Black Sea ports) , the stockpiling of military
supplies in Siberia, negotiations for additional "coaling
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1 July 19S7 1S63 5969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Notes: * Soviet Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern Military Districts and Outer Mongolia; Chinese
Sinkiang, Shenyang and Peking Military Regions (also Inner Mongolia - formerly a separate
Military Region, now part of the Peking Mil-cary Region) arc included in the totals.
From 1963 to 1966 the Soviet Union strength in the Far East was 17 divisions. There
was no data for China.
Soviet mechanized divisions have about 11,000 men.'armoured divisions about 9,000.
Chinese infantry divisions have between 12.000 and 14,000 men, armoured about 10,000.
Soviet armoured strength is 5-10 divisions; China may have as many as three armoured
divisions in the area.




stations" in India, Africa, Spain, and Portugal, and the
development of large, high-payload aircraft such as the
Antonov An-12 "Cub" which can operate on skis and Ar.tonov
An-22 "Cock" which has a specially designed landing gear for
off-runway operation (the 1967-68 issue cf Jane's All the
World's Aircraft notes that the main tire mounts retract into
fuselage fairings and that tire pressure can be adjusted both
in flight and on the ground to. suit the airfield surface; see
page 375) .
Notwithstanding these factors, the long trans-
Siberian railroad would probably be depended upon -c move the
bulk of men and material to the Far East in the event cf v;ar
and it is_ vulnerable to attack by Chinese aircraft, airborne
forces, missiles, and/or cc -mar. do-type raids. Thomas
Robinson holds that if the railway is severed in a military
conflict then Siberia would be effectively isolated and
placed at the mercy of an invader because it is not self-
sufficient [Robinson "Soviet Policy in lest Asia' I r'dlerr
in Communism November-December 1973 p. 38].
2 . Possible Battle Scenarios
China is relatively secure from attack from the south;
there has never been a major successful invasion through the
mountainous terrain of East cr Central Asia from the south
nor has there been any large-scale amphibious invasion along
the Chinese coast. China is vulnerable, however, to r.a-.-al
amphibious attack and invasion along her long eastern seaboard
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where most of her people and industry are located. Granted
that an invader would face formidable military obstacles
such as mountains, wide rivers, and a huge and defiant
population, nevertheless he might conclude that this is the
optimum area to attempt a rapid and decisive military victory.
As China's access to the open sea is impeded in the south
by the ring of South and Southeast Asian states and in the
east by the island chain which extends from the southern tip
of the Kamchatka Peninsula to the southern tip of the Malay
Peninsula, any seapower capable of maintaining control oS
the sea and air in the area is in a position to invade China.
John R. Dewenter believes that from the outset the Chinese
Communists have considered coastal defense their first
priority, originally due to the presence of hostile Nationalist
and American naval vessels but more recently as a result of
"Soviet revisionism's naval ring of encirclement against
China." [Dewenter "China Afloat" Foreign Affairs July 1972
pp. 746-747] . The Russian navy has a history of successful
use of gunboat diplomacy and seapower against China during
the past century. The Liaotung Peninsula was leased from
China partly as a result of a Russian cruiser's presence in
a Chinese port and gunboats were employed by the Russians
against the Chinese Nationalists on the Sungari in 1929
[Holloway "The Red Navy's Role in the Sino-Soviet Split"




3. The Manchurian Model
Russia has had extensive military experience in
Manchuria in the last century with results ranging from
defeat in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, through the
1938-1939 frontier clashes, to victory in the 1945
Manchurian Campaign. It should be noted that the Soviet
invasion of Manchuria commenced on 9 August 194 5 three days
after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Under the
command of Marshal Vasilevskiy, the Soviet attack was
comprised of a three prong advance against a demoralized,
poorly armed, "shell" of a Kwantung Army which had been
depleted of its strength by manpower demands elsewhere (see
John Toland, The Rising Sun New York: Bantam Books, 1970,
pp. 833 passim)
.
In a rare statement a Soviet source
admitted that the Japanese Manchurian garrison had been
reduced in the latter half of 1943 and in 1944 [Gallagher
1963 p. 34]. Another important point to keep in mind
regarding the Soviet victory is that the battle lasted only
ten days before an unconditional surrender was made by the
Kwantung Army. A more lengthy campaign would have sorely
taxed Russia's ability to supply her army which was known to
be having logistical problems. Major Michael E. Ekman, U.S.
Army, has written a brilliant analysis of the Soviet Man-
churian Campaign and has noted that the present order of
battle in Manchuria between Russia and China is almost
exactly the same today in regard to force dispositions as
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it was in 1945 between Russia and China. He relates the
Soviet High Command's strategic plan then to call for three
simultaneous converging offensives aimed at Central Man-
churia:
...The Transbaikal Front was to strike east
from the Tamtsak salient on the Mongolian People's
Republic frontier in the west; the Second Far
Eastern Front was to attack along a broad front
from the north, cross the Amur River, and strike
south from the area southwest of Khabarovsk; and the
First Far Eastern Front was to attack westward from
the Primorye" [Ekman "The 1945 Soviet Manchurian
Campaign: A Model for Sino-Soviet War" Naval War
College Review July-August 1974 p. 83]
.
Ekman concludes that the Soviet High Command could use a
similar strategy based on a 7-10-day campaign designed to
neutralize the People's Liberation Army, destroy China's
nuclear capabilitw and to^ole Mao's recrime but would do
so only if they felt assured they could conclude the war
rapidly on their terms. Failure would mean protracted
guerrilla war and possibly the beginning of World War III.
4 . Strategic Balance Trends
A significant shift took place in the world military
balance of power between the United States, Russia, and
China during the first half of this decade. By almost any
yardstick a preponderance of military power has shifted
from the West to the Soviet and Chinese blocs. American
news coverage for several years was saturated by frontpage
stories of the events of "Watergate" which led to the resig-
nation of former President Nixon. Perhaps of more long-range
significance to the fate of the American republic are stories
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which were often pushed to the back pages. A few represen-
tative titles serve to illustrate the point: "U.S. Sea
Supremacy Lost, Zumwalt Says," Monterey Peninsula Herald , 30
June 1974, page 5A; "Nuclear Superiority Lost, Admiral Says"
(in this case, Vice Admiral Joseph P. Moorer, Commander of
the Eastern Sea Frontier) , Monterey Peninsula Herald , 16
May 1974, page 10; "Soviets Reach Parity with U.S. Nuclear
Subs," Christian Science Monitor , 13 March 1974, page 3D;
"Soviet Defense Boss Seeks Bigger Arsenal," San Jose Mercury
,
15 January 19 74, page 15; "Russ Arms Buildup Will Go On,"
San Jose Mercury , 24 February 1974, page 31; "Soviet Arms
Gains Surprise Washington: Four New ICBMs Tested — Three
of Them MIRV's," Christian Science Monitor , 15 March 1974,
page 5F; '• Russians Test Monster Missile," San Jose Mercury
,
1 September 1974, page 22; "Soviet Arms Parade Displays
Airborne Minitank with Parachute," San Jose Mercury , 8 Novem-
ber 1973, page 22; "Russia Reported Leading, China Building
Nuclear Capability," Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
2 September
1974, page 32; "Soviets Surpass U.S. in Surface-air Weaponry:
Lessons from Mideast War," Christian Science Monitor , 7 Decem-
ber 1973, page 1; "Big Build-up Seen in Chinese A-power,"
Christian Science Monitor
, 2 September 1974, page 8; "China
Accuses Soviets of A-Arms Expansion," Monterey Peninsula
Herald
, 8 April 1974, page 8; and "New China N-Test Activity
Reported," Monterey Peninsula Herald , 24 October 1974, page
11. It should be noted that only one of the above stories
was deemed newsworthy enough by the editor to make front page news
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The editor of Jane's Fighting Ships has reported that
the Soviet Union has more nuclear submarines than all the
NATO fleets combined and has a considerable lead in anti-
ship armament. He also cites China's rapid progress in
building destroyers and missile frigates which theoretically
give the Chinese their first fleet offensive capability
["Jane's Sees Red Fleet Growing as West Lags" Monterey
Peninsula Herald 29 August 1974, p. 10]. Admiral John
McCain, Jr., (USN — retired) notes that the Chinese navy has
the world's third largest fleet of 40 attack submarines and
a growing missile patrol boat force. He also warns that as
we reduce our forces in the western Pacific as a result of
the Nixon Doctrine we must place increasing reliance on air
and naval power with the army as a strategic reserve to main-
tain a credible presence in Asia [McCain "The Communist
Military Threat" Asian Outlook April 1974 p. 19] . Dewenter
notes that the Red Chinese navy is, or soon will be, the
third largest in terms of personnel and small high-speed
patrol craft [Dewenter "China Afloat" Foreign Affairs July
1972 p. 749]. The Communist Chinese Air Force was noted as
the world's third largest as early as 19 72 ["Communist China's
Air Force" NATO's Fifteen Nation s August-September 19 72 p.
72], China's capacity for nuclear attack has progressed to
where she has about 50 MRBM's, between 20-30 IRBM's, and a
delivery force of about 10 Tu-16 medium bombers and up to
400 Chinese-built F9 Fighter-bombers. U.S. Department of
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Defense officials noted in February of 1974 that Chinese
development of a 6,000 mile, three megaton ICBM has pro-
gressed steadily but slower than estimated. The most recent
estimates indicate that the Chinese ICBM will be combat
ready in 1976 or 1977 and that an additional two or three
years of testing and launch base construction will be re-
quired before China could deploy between 10 and 2 5 opera-
tionally-ready ICBM's ["Chinese Development of ICBM Against
U.S. Going Slowly" Monterey Peninsula Herald 6 February 1974
p. 26] . NATO analysts have noted that China has between
1,000 and 1,500 technicians on Zanzibar installing an exten-
sive network of missile telemetering equipment and that the
12,000-ton Chinese space and missile tracking ship "Hsian
Yang Hung" was already cruising the Indian Ocean in early
1974 ["Communist China's Capacity for Nuclear Attack,"
NATO's Fifteen Nations , April-May 1974 p. 82] . China con-
ducted an additional atmospheric nuclear explosion in the
intermediate range (200 kilotons to 1 megaton) on 17 June
1974 at the Lop Nor test site in Sinkiang Province and was
reported to be making preparations for a seventeenth blast
in October of 19 74 ["New China N-Test Activity Reported,"
Monterey Peninsula Herald 24 October 1974 p. 11].
The armed forces of both China and Russia are known
to be well-trained in nuclear, biological, and chemical
warfare defense. Additionally, China has spent an enormous
amount of time and energy in building air-conditioned,
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well-stocked, underground (25-40 feet deep) bomb shelters
throughout China since the border clashes of 1969 in
anticipation of a nuclear attack.
This section has highlighted significant strengths
and weaknesses in both Chinese and Russian power . One key
factor missing because of lack of data is the exact location
of military and naval units but, of course, this can change
rapidly and unexpectedly just as it did in the case of
Chinese troop movements prior to their entry into the Korean
War [see Whiting I960 pp. 116ff. and Marshall 1953 pp. 1-17].
However, the game "The East is Red: the Sino-Soviet War"
(New York: Simulations Publications Incorporated, 1974)
offers the players four scenarios varying in states of combat
readiness from "current" to "full" and in degree of mobiliza-
tion from one to thirty days. In an unusual "book review"
of. this game, Michael Markowitz states that the forces
deployed on the game board represent current Western intel-
ligence estimates of the available Soviet and Chinese forces
[Markowitz Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars April-August
1974 p. 76]. The game designer, James F. Dunnigan, notes in
the rules that the biggest unknown in his research for the
game is the expected combat performance of both armies neither
of which has been in combat for over twenty years. He also
reinforces the points made earlier in this section that while
the Soviet Union has the nuclear capability to obliterate
the entire industrial structure of China, the success of a
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Russian invasion of Manchuria would be predicated upon a
fast and decisive victory because they have accumulated not
more than four weeks of supplies.
F. FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET POWER
This final section of Chapter III represents the
author's interpretation of the above data. The conclusions
expressed are subject to change as more information on Sino-
Soviet relations is made available (for example, refer to




Although the Chinese Communist Party is the largest
and its top leadership the more stable during the past forty
years, changes in its ruling elite are bound to take place
during the next decade. The prospects for a violent or
smooth transition of Communist Party leadership will be
addressed in the next chapter. The fact that Russia has a
higher percentage of competent and experienced managers,
scientists, and technicians is not expected to change
significantly during the next decade in view of the disruptive
effects of the Cultural Revolution on China's educational
system and the fact that 85 percent of the labor force is
still required in agriculture to feed China. While Mao holds
that people are the most important things in the world, the
immense and growing population of China could prove a
strategic and political liability in the event of agricultural
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disaster or if cognitive dissonance in the population results
from unmet rising expectations among the Chinese people. In
comparison to China and most, if not all other countries
of the world, Russia has more territory than she requires.
China can be expected to continue to covet the Russian
territory which she believes to be rightfully hers. She will
periodically probe weak areas in Russian border integrity in
these areas but will not commit major military forces there.
Although Russia has never given up territory it has acquired,
it could make limited territorial concessions to placate the
second generation Chinese leaders who follow Mao with no
serious strategic loss. Russia will probably attempt to do
this during the next decade in order to restore viable linkages
of influence and limited cont.ro] in China. The varied terrain
of China poses a formidable obstacle to any invader and the
logistical difficulties it would cause could prove insur-
mountable in any sustained campaign. Both Russia and China
enjoy the advantages of vast natural resources. If explora-
tions now in progress succeed in discovering new sources of
raw material reserves, which seems probable, both could
possibly become self-sufficient in the long term with ominous
implications for the rest of the world. China now seems
embarked upon a program of rapid merchant marine and naval
expansion similar to that of the Russians in the early
sixties. Its effect cannot avoid increasing the national
power and prestige of the People's Republic. Russia, however,
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can be expected to retain her substantial lead in this area
for the forseeable future. China's increasing program of
foreign aid to less-developed countries requires additional
investigation. Unless it contains unknown and revolutionary
new techniques, it promises to be no more successful than
American and Russian aid programs. All evidence related to
the import of technology points to a clear-cut need by
Communist China and Russia for Western scientific and
managerial products and skills. While Russia is far ahead
in the technological race , China's rate of development is
increasing. The evidence presented suggests that Western
scientific and technical exchanges and cooperation with
Russia and China are being conducted with minimal control,
coordination, and supervision by the United States government
This could prove to be one of the weakest aspects and most-
dangerous spin-offs of detente, detrimental to the national
security of the United States in the long run unless it is
stopped or an effective supervisory agency is established.
Such an agency should be comprised of knowledgeable and
technically competent representatives from the Department
of State, Department - of Defense, and the American scientific
community. The weakest link in Soviet military power
vis a vis China is the trans-Siberian railroad. Its "life-
expectancy" in a Sino-Soviet war is deemed to be very short.
Though Russia could overwhelm Chinese naval and border forces
in sudden and coordinated attacks, the resilient power of the
People's Liberation Army, backed by millions of Chinese

survivors, would be intensified by hate and nationalistic
pride and could prove to be fatal to Soviet Russia in any
sustained war, especially if other hostile neighbors opened
a second or third front. To win a "military victory" against
China, Russia would be required to use force in the form of
not only conventional, but also nuclear, biological
(especially biological), and chemical warfare.
2 . Future Outlook
Granting that a military victory is possible, for
Russia to manage and bring under control the millions of
hostile surviving Chinese is highly dubious and would make
her susceptable to one of her historic phobias — a two-front
war with Europe and/or the United States in the form of
World War III. China can be expected to continue to raise
her rate of economic advance and her development of nuclear
and conventional weapons in order to influence less developed
nations and increase her own feeling of security from the
deterent power of her weapons. She will press her irredentist
claims for lost territory whenever she is in a military
position of superiority, especially among the islands ringing
the mainland. China is more vulnerable to a conventional
attack by Russian seapower than by the Red Army along her
land borders and cannot overcome this vulnerability in the
forseeable future.
Russia will maintain her forces in Siberia and continue
to build-up her Far Eastern fleet. She will attempt to regain
influence and control in China after Mao dies. Political
succession is the subject of the next chapter.
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IV . POLITICAL SUCCESSION AND THE SINO-SOVIET
TERRITORIAL CONFLICT
Political succession has been defined as the transfer of
sovereign power from a ruler or government to a successor
[Rush 1965 p. 1] . It has been described in the past as the
Achilles heel of totalitarian regimes but, as Adam B. Ulam
notes, comparatively smooth transitions were made after
Khruschev in 1964 and Lin Piao in 1971 without any apparent
effect on Russian Communist Chinese foreign policy [Ulam
1974 p. 760]. J. K. Holloway, Jr., observes that the deaths
of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in anything close to quick
succession could unbalance any Far Eastern power equation
but cautions that State interests often survive leaders'
deaths. He cites as examples Russia after Stalin and France
after DeGaulle and observes that armies stay in place, and
ideologies and national interests tend to change slowly
[Holloway "The Red Navy's Role in the Sino-Soviet Split"
Naval Institute Proceedings September 1973 p. 22]. There is
a common saying among sports fans (and naval strategists)
that "you can't tell the players without a program." This
section will attempt to identify the key players in any
succession crisis in Peking or the Kremlin with special





A. CHINESE ELITE POWER STRUCTURE MODELS
A glance at the list of references shows that several
China scholars have addressed themselves to the study of
elites in Communist China but a closer examination of the
biographical data shows that no single approach, or opera-
tional code has been accepted to elucidate expected future
behavior of these elites. Some of the most popular models
or approaches to the study of Chinese elites are concisely
summarized by Yung Wei as follows:
1. The "red vs. expert" mode which pictures the differ-
ences between the Maoists and the anti-Maoists in the
Cultural Revolution as a conflict between those who stress
revolutionary experience and those who favor pragmatic
technical knowledge as a basis for solving specific problems
of state.
2. The "palace coup" model which focuses upon the
political intrigues of top ruling cliques and how their
actions permeate down through the bureaucratic structures
to the entire populace.
3. The "regional vs. central government" model which
contrasts the power base of the political elites in Peking
with that of the provincial and regional leaders.
4. The "military-party-bureaucratic struggle" model
which rests on the group-conflict theory and explains the
cultural revolution in terms of a struggle for domination
among various professional groups.
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5. The "political personality" model which attempts to
explain Communist Chinese politics in terms of the personal-
ities of selected leaders. This model is divided into several
subgroups. The first uses the techniques of the investigative
reporter or intelligence analyst to analyze Chinese political
leaders by examining Communist newspapers, broadcasts, photo-
graphs, and reading between the lines to ascertain future
trends. The second subgroup uses biographical data to
determine "who did what to whom and where" but both these
approaches fail to answer the question "why?". The third
subgroup applies a psychocultural and psychoanalytical
approach to political personalities using the tools of
cultural anthropology and psychoanalysis. A caveat to this
approach is the failure of similar techniques to ascertain
accurate personality profiles of potential skyjackers. In
an attempt to provide new operational techniques, Yung
introduces two heuristic models designed to identify
important variables and their interrelationships. The first
"elite recruitment and political development" model specifies
seven sets of variables upon which data can be gathered and
linkages can be developed. These are the social, economic,
and political environment, personal background, political
ideology, path of recruitment, types of elites, types of
elite conflicts, and outcomes of elite conflicts. His second
model is entitled "elite dominance and political development"
and concentrates upon comparing the two elite groups in
Nationalist and Communist China by linking three sets of
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variables: time periods, types of political elites, and
types of chronological crises faced by each [Yung Wei "Elite
Conflicts in Chinese Politics: A Comparative Note" Studies
in Comparative Communism Spring/Summer 1974 'pp. 64-73].
The Asia 1975 Yearbook, published by the Far Eastern
Economic Review , states that the simplistic theory that
Chinese domestic politics are determined by the interactions
of two groups, the Maoists and the anti-Maoists, was proved
false by the events of 1974. It noted that the "three
pillars" of the political system (Party, Army, and Administra-
tion) have been differentiated into no less than six
discernable factions as the result of internal conflict and
controversy. The Review identifies these factions as:
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diplomatic machine who were not purged during the Cultural
Revolution, such as Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, Tung Pi-wu,
Nieh Hung-chen, Chi Peng-fei and Chia Kuan-hua
.
2. Party and administrative cadres who were purged during
the Cultural Revolution but later reinstated, probably led by
Teng Hsiao-ping.
3. The cultural revolutionary Left led by Chiang Ching,
Yao Wen-yuan , and possibly Chang Ghun-chiao.
4. An emerging Secret Police left-wing, whose members
have gained great influence since the Tenth Party Congress.
5. The regional military leaders who remain strong
notwithstanding their setback in late 1973.
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6. A new and highly professional central military elite
represented in the Politbureau by Yek Chien-ying and Su
Chen-hua and which gained strength with the rehabilitation
of Yang Cheng-wu
The Review concludes that compromises between these
factions are possible as Mao seems to be retreating into the
role of promoting the legality of the political system and
that alliances may have already formed to deal with long-
range development policies and generational, rather than
personal, succession [Asia 1975 Yearbook Far Eastern Economic
Review 1974 pp. 148-150]
.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies of
Georgetown University lists five additional succession models,
some of which are similar, but not identical, to those
already covered. They are:
1. The "palace politics" model which holds that Chinese
politics and succession revolve around the ambitions of
individual aspirants. Andrew Nathan is cited as a proponent
of this model. He describes Chinese politics as a pyramid,
the entire structure of which will crumble if the man at the
apex is removed. The Center cautions that this approach can
only result in abstract generalities concerning predictions
of future events in China because facts about personal inter-
relationships among China's ruling elite are virtually non-
existent to outside researchers.
2. The "bureaucratic politics" model which perceives
international politics as the interrelation of contending
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bureaucracies rather than individual states. Dr. William
Whitson, a critic of this approach, holds that Chinese
political factions coalesce around particular policy
prescriptions rather than bureaucratic lines in emergency
situations
.
3. The "geographic approach" model which notes that
individual Chinese remain loyal to the leaders in the 29
provinces or military regions, rather than to the Peking
regime. A variant of this concept of China as a confedera-
tion is the split between the North and South regions in
China. In addition to differences in diet and dialect,
Southern China is most concerned with amphibious invasion
by sea and air, especially by the U.S. or Japan, while
Northern China concentrates on the Soviet threat of an
invasion by land. Whitson believes that the current older
leaders from the southern Yangtze Valley will be replaced
during the next five years by recruits taken from Northern
China during World War II who have moved to positions just
below the High Command levels. The Center notes that China
is composed of five key regions with 8 percent of its
military and economic power concentrated in the North-east
(Manchuria and Peking) . Other regions are Wu Han, the
Szechuan region along the western part of the Yangtze River,
the Central-east area of Nanking and Shanghai, and Canton.
Four of the regions are commanded by the Second and Third
Field Army groups which are northerners.
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4. The "historical" model in which the five field
armies organized during the revolution, represents the
configuration of power today.
5. The "ideology" model which breaks Chinese politics
into the orthodox or conservative faction versus the Maoists
or radicals. Whitson cautions that while this model is the
most popular, it is an oversimplification because of the
constant shifting of Chinese political actors [Cline and
Rader, ed . "The Struggle for Power in Peking and Its Impact
on the Outside World" Center for Strategic and International
Studies Report 25 June 1974, pp. 1-6].
B. SINO-SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE ELITES
Figures 9 and 10 are taken from an excellent article
published in the Spring/Summer 1973 edition of Studies in
Comparative Communism entitled "A Comparison of the Current
Chinese and Soviet Central Committees" by Derek J. Waller
and Robert H. Donaldson. This section will cite some of
their findings to depict changes and trends in the political
elites of the two rival powers. Waller and Donaldson define
the Soviet and Chinese political elite as the Central
Committees of their communist parties and utilize biographical
and career data on the full members of the 1969 Chinese
Central Committee and the 19 71 Soviet Central Committee. In
Table 1 of Figure 9, entitled "Distribution of Soviet and
Chinese Central Committees by Rank," they note that while
Soviet incumbents remained relatively stable at 64%, new
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members of the Chinese Central Committee represented 81%
indicating a high turnover rate due in part to the impact of
the Cultural Revolution. Table 2 of Figure 9 examines a
comparison of the ages of the Russian and Chinese Central
Committee members and shows that while 4 2 percent of the
Soviet elite was born later than 1914 only 7 percent of the
Chinese elite fall into this category demonstrating that the
average age of the Chinese elite is older than that of the
Russians. Waller and Donaldson observe however, that while
the mean age of the Russian elite is increasing (from 51 in
1956 to 58 in 1971) the Chinese elite's mean age held steady
at 63 between 1965 and 1969 and probably dropped over the
Cultural Revolution period. Table 3 of Figure 9 depicts a
breakdown of the career patterns of the two elites. The most
striking contrast between them is the fact that the Soviet
elite is dominated by party careerists (45%) and the Chinese
elite is dominated by military careerists (44%) „ Another
significant difference is the larger contingent of workers
and peasants in the Chinese elite (21% as compared with 5%
for the Soviet elite) . This large percentage is noteworthy
as the workers and peasants were included in the Chinese
elite for the first time in 1969, possibly at the demand
of Mao. Table 4 of Figure 10 depicts the variable "current
occupation" which is defined as the sector where elite
members were employed at the time of their most recent
election as compared to a previous election. This shows a
trend toward diversification and specialization in the Soviet
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elite by slightly less representation of the party and more
by administrators and managers (the "other" category) . In
contrast, the Chinese elite shows a sharp decline in party
representation plus the "other" category of managerial
specialists while the military and labor sectors show
impressive gains. Table 5 of Figure 10 is a comparison of
the two elites based upon whether central committee incum-
bents work principally in Moscow or Peking, in regions, or
abroad. The figure demonstrates that the two elites are
similar in their geographical distribution but that the
Soviets have a larger percentage of their Central Committee
stationed abroad. What is not shown is the fact that in
1965, 81 percent of the Chinese elite was located in Peking.
The later percentage of 4 3 percent represents a move to
increase regional elite representation to prevent moves
toward regional autonomy. Waller and Donaldson conclude
that the current Soviet elite composition tends to prove the
hypothesis that an increasingly industrialized and complex
society demands replacement of "revolutionary veterans" by
"managerial modernizers" or the triumph of the "experts" over
the "reds" cited earlier. In contrast, the composition of
the Chinese elite seems to reject this model in favor of
filling vacancies with revolutionary generation colleagues
rather than younger managers (with the exception of Wang
Hung-wen who might be considered a token gesture toward
youthful representation). Also, the dramatic increase in
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3 3 21 21
7 10 12 33
21 31 28 61
28 59 . 32 93
22 81 6 99
20 101 • 1 100
• Total exceeds 100"', because of rounding of individual entries.
TABLE 3. CAREER PATTERNS OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL COMMITTEES
(Percentage)













[Source: Waller, D. J. and R. H. Donaldson "A
Comparison of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central
Committees" Studies in Comparative Communism Spring/
Summer 1973 pp. 56-587 Figure 9
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TABLE 4. CURRENT OCCUPATIONS OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL COMMITTEES
WITH COMPARISONS OF THE 1956 ELITES
(Percentage)
Current Occupation Soviet Chinese
1955 1971 1956 1969
(N = 133) (N = 241) (N = 96) (tf = 166)
State 38 40 33 32
Party 55 41 27 8
Military 5 8 24 34
Workers and peasants 5 21
Other 2 7 16 5
Total . 100 101 • 100 100
• Total exceeds 100% because of rounding of individual entries.
In both the Soviet and Chinese cases, persons coded in the workers-and-
peasants category normally are " leading " or " shock " workers. Far from being
typical manual laborers, they are usually persons who are being singled out
for special virtues or accomplishments in the field of production.
TABLE 5. LEVEL OF CURRENT OCCUPATION OF THE SOVIET ANT) CHINESE CENTRAL
COMMITTEES
(Percentage)




Total 100 101 *
• Total exceeds 100% because of rounding of individual entries.
[Source: Waller, D. J. and R. H. Donaldson "A
Comparison of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central
Committees" Studies in Comparative Communism Spring/




the numbers of career military men seems to reflect the need
to consolidate and strengthen the regime in the aftermath of
the cultural revolution [Waller and Donaldson "A Comparison
of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central Committees" Studies
in Comparative Communism Spring/Summer 1973 pp. 51-65].
Thus far this chapter has described and briefly explained
various techniques used by political analysts to study Sino-
Soviet elites. For a more detailed description the reader is
invited to consult the list of references, especially Robert
A. Scalapino's work, Elites in the People's Republic of China .
No attempt will be made here to develop or expand these models
as this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, any of
them would be a fitting subject for additional research. The
next section is designed to provide the reader with a limited
biographical profile of specific personalities among the
ruling elite of the People's Republic of China.
C. COMMUNIST CHINESE POLITICAL SUCCESSION CANDIDATES
No one outside China, nor perhaps inside China, knows who
will inherit the leadership of the regime when Mao Tse-tung
and Chou En-lai pass from the scene. Still the transition
to the post-Mao/Chou era is anticipated with great interest
by national policy-makers around the world because of the
possible effects it will have upon international politics
in general and super-power political relations in particular.
Among the important questions to be answered by this transi-
tion of power is whether it can be done smoothly so that
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China can maintain a moderate foreign policy or whether it
will lead to a violent struggle for power, social anarchy,
and possible economic collapse which would invite direct
intervention by the Soviet Union under the guise of the
Brezhnev Doctrine. Twice before in the cases of Liu Shao-chi
and Lin Piao the policy of publicly designating an heir to
Mao has failed and it is unlikely that this mistake will be
made again. The present situation seems to center around
Chou En-lai, only four years Mao's junior, managing a future
succession crisis by building some type of collective leader-
ship which can survive the death of Mao. As the events of
the cultural revolution and the alleged plot of Lin Piao show,
a historical model of intrigue, violence, and suspicion has
evolved among the top leadership which suggests that the
transition to a post-Maoist era might take place in an
environment of dangerous national instability. If this proves
to be the case, the Soviet troops can be expected to move into
China to "restore order" to a "brotherly" socialist state.
Mao has become somewhat of a "living Buddha" or god to
the mainland Chinese who are a society that venerates age
and experience. However, as Karry Harding, Jr. observes,
Mao's death will reduce the influence of his ideology in at
least two important ways. First, Chinese leaders will soon
discover the ambiguity of Mao's writings which can inter-
preted in innumerable ways. Without Mao to resolve disagree-
ments over interpretation, his ideology can be expected to
decay into a set of ritualized cliches to reinforce decisions
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already reached on pragmatic grounds. Secondly, it is
unlikely that any group of leaders will emerge that can
combine Mao's commitment to revolutionary values with his
ability to mobilize enough political support to see them
implemented. Harding concludes that Maoism will probably
become a perpetual counterculture in post Maoist China, able
to criticize trends toward increasing bureacracy and speciali-
zation in policy-making, but unable to halt them [Harding
1974 pp. 46-47] . The remaining part of this section will
identify key members of the Chinese Communist Party from
among whom some form of collective leadership is likely to
emerge when Mao and Chou leave the political stage.
1 . Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee, 81-years old. As biographical information
on Mao is interspersed throughout the thesis it will not be
repeated here other than to say he reportedly made his last
public appearance in August 197 3 and has not been seen by
foreign visitors to China since 16 January 1975 when he met
with Franz Josef Strauss, Chairman of West Germany's Christian
Social Union ["Mao Has Seen No Foreigners Since Jan. 16"
Monterey Peninsula Herald 6 March 1975 p. 13].
b. Chou En-lai, Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee and Premier, State Council, 76-years
old. Chou has served as a chief negotiator, administrator
and conciliator of the Chinese Communist movement for a half
a century. He is architect of China's moderate policy of
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detente at home and abroad. The Fourth National People's
Congress," China 1 s top legislative body reappointed Chou as
Premier on 17 January 1975 and this is generally recognized
as a victory of Chou's moderate policies over the opposition
of the radical hardline wing of the party led by Mao's wife,
Chiang Ching. Robert E. Elegant believes that Chou has
effectively destroyed the power base of Mao by masterminding
a bloodless coup which saw two of his close friends appointed
to key military positions: Teng Hsia-ping to Chief-of-Staf
f
of the People's Liberation Army and Yeh Chien-ying to Minister
of Defense [Elegant "Teng May Inherit China's Leadership"
Sunday Peninsula Herald 2 February 1975 p. 5B] . As previously
noted, Mao's last public appearance was made on 16 January
1975, the day before the above appointments were announced.
He was not present "at the congress or the plenary session of
the Central Committee and no explanation for his absence has
been given. It is possible that he was displeased with the
results of the Congress although he did succeed in having the
position of president (formerly occupied by the purged
traitor Lui Shao-chi and aspired to by Lin Piao) abolished
from the constitution. It is possible that his absence was
"arranged" by reason of his ill-health, age, infirmity, or
opposition to the course of events but it is equally possible
that he retired to meditate and produce a new series of
writings
.
c. Teng Hsiao-ping, First Vice Premier of the State
Council, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party Standing
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Committee of the Politburo, and Chief-of-staf f of the
People's Liberation Army, 75-year s old. As a result of the
Fourth National People's Congress, Teng has emerged in the
unique position of being the only man in the Chinese hierarchy
to simultaneously hold office in the three most powerful
organizations in China: the Communist Party, the People's
Liberation Army and the government. In the writer's opinion,
Teng is the one individual who might succeed Mao and/or Chou
if he has the ambition and can maintain a coalition of support
among contending political factions which seems unlikely.
d. Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of National
Defense, 75-years old. An old drinking companion of Chou who
is known to have nursed him through a critical illness in the
1920 's. Ching Ping and Dennis Bloodworth describe him as an
impressive strategist with a flair for guerilla warfare.
He was a senior instructor at the Whampoa Military Academy
under Chiang Kai-shek in 1924. He spent two years studying
tactics and warfare in Russia and Germany in the late 1920' s.
He is known to be an expert in subversion, infiltration,
propaganda, and the fostering of underground activities among
Overseas Chinese. He was largely credited with the kidnapping
of Chiang Kai-shek in 19 36 which resulted in a pragmatic
alliance between the Kuomintang and Communists against the
Japanese. He used his liaison position between the two uneasy
partners to effect the defection of sixteen Kuomintang
regiments to Mao. He is known to be bitterly opposed to
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Chiang Ch ' ing and her rebel movement because Red Guards
smashed the fingers of his son-in-law, a once gifted pianist.
He is a tall, robust, and serene man, quiet in manner,
fastidious in appearance, and known for his sometimes
unbridled behavior and love of comfort. In 1957 he once
described Soviet military achievements ' as the "priceless
assets of all countries in the Socialist camp" but has more
recently espoused the Maoist position that it is better for
the People's Liberation Army to be "red" than "expert."
[Ching Ping and Bloodworth 1973 pp. 162-165] .
e. Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier, State Counsil,
69-years old. Li succeeded Teng as Minister of Finance, a
field he has specialized in for twenty years. Although
criticized during the Cultural Revolution, he survived Red
Guard attacks due to the protection of Chou En-Lai. Ping
and Bloodworth devote more than a chapter of their book,
Heirs Apparent , to Li whom they nickname "the Money God."
Li commanded a guerilla force of 60,000 men against the
Japanese in 1941 and continued to lead troops against the
Kuomintang after the defeat of Japan. He is one of few
genuine proletarians in the Chinese elite having begun life
as a carpenter's apprentice and never having studied other
than a course he took in the Anti-Japanese Military and
Political University at Yenan. Still he is among the most
traveled of Chinese leaders and impresses foreign visitors
as an honest and thoughtful negotiator. Li and his colleagues
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in the Finance and Trade Office contrived to pay off all
of China's foreign debts and earned for China an international
reputation for being a trustworthy partner in banking or
trading transactions. He is a protege of Chou En-lai and
regarded as the financial key to China's drive for greatness
among nations in terms of her expanding trade and nuclear
programs [Ching Ping and Bloodworth 1973 pp. 39-47] .
f. Chang Chun-chiao, First Secretary of the Shanghai
Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Shanghai Provincial
Revolutionary Committee and full member of the Standing
Committee of the Politburo, 55-years old. Chang is a highly
gifted and relatively young Shanghainese who is in charge of
Party administration. Ping and Bloodworth identify him as
"the Brain" and as one of the key "extremists" of the Cultural
Revolution along with Yao-Wen-yuan and Chiang ch-ing. By
1972, Shanghai was a conspicuous exception to the rule that
the military ruled the new party committees in China's 29
provincial divisions [Ching Ping and Bloodworth 19 73 pp. 17-
26] . Leo Goodstadt cautions that even though the outside
world regards him as an advocate of the Party's extreme left
wing, a careful study of his speeches reveals a pragmatic
mind free of sterile cliches and that Chang has little
sympathy for any form of extremism. Also, he is known for
his dedication to both Mao and Chou [Goodstadt "The People's
Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December
1974 pp. 28-29] .
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g. Li Teh-sheng, Vice Chairman Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee and Commander of the Shen-yang
Military Region, 61-years old. .Li, as the country's senior
serving soldier, was out of sight for several weeks in early
1974 and was the target of an extensive wall-poster campaign.
He reappeared on the political scene in May of 1974. Trans-
ferred from the Peking Military Region in late 1974, his
present post commands the Manchurian provinces which is the
most strategic region of the nation threatened by Soviet
frontier garrisons, for example, China's largest steel plant
at Anshan and its major oilfield at Taching ["Chinese Puzzle:
Purge that Wasn't?" Christian Science Monitor 7 May 1974 p. 4]
h. Chen Hsi-lieu, Commander of the Peking Military
Region and full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, 61-years old. Chen's military background is
significant as he commanded the troops which faced the Soviet
border assaults in 1969. He is an artillery specialist,
an expert on missile warfare, and believed to have had some
Soviet military training. He is the chief military advisor
physically located in Peking [Goodstadt "The People's Short-
list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review , 20 December
1974, p. 30] .
i. Chi Teng-Kuei, First Political Commissar of the
Peking Military Region and full member of the Politburo of
the Chinese Communist Party, 60-years old. While formally
serving as Chen's political commissar, Chi has in practice
shed his army uniform and is one of the two figures in the
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top party elite who represent the interests of the provinces
in Peking. He has been described as close to Mao and is
presumed to have intimate knowledge of the problems of local
administrations in implementing central directives [Goodstadt
"The People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic
Review 20 December 1974 p. 30].
j. Hua Kuo-feng, First Secretary of the Hunan
Chinese Communist Party, Acting Chairman of the Hunan
Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and full member of the
Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 60-years old.
Another provincial expert, Hua is from Mao's home province
and was entrusted with the special responsibility for the
investigation of Lin Piao's plot against Mao. He has a
successful administrative record and has an excellent back-
ground in economic affairs [Goodstadt "The People's Short-
list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974
p. 30].
k. Wu Teh, Mayor of Peking, First Secretary of the
Peking Chinese Communist Party, and full member of the
Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 60-years old.
Wu is a third expert in local administration and has been
closely connected with ideological affairs [Goodstadt "The
People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review '
20 December 1974 p. 30].
1. Wei Kuo-ching, First Secretary of the Kwangsi
Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Kwangsi Provincial
Revolutionary Committee, and full member of the Politburo
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of the Chinese Communist Party (age unknown) . Wei is the
leader of China's 50 million non-Han minority people.
Because of this and the fact that Kwangsi is in the strategic
position just north of the Gulf of Tonkin, Wei survived even
though he has been accused of killing thousands of pro-Mao
Red Guards and of using arms destined for North Vietnam to
do so [Ching Ping and Bloodworth 1973 p. 119]
.
m. Yao Wen-yuan, Second Secretary of the Shanghai
Chinese Communist Party and full member of the Politburo
of the Chinese Communist Party, 44-years old. One of the two
younger generation full members of the Politburo, Yao has
been specially praised by Mao for his political orthodoxy
and courage. He is an intellectual who has ideological
control over the nation's main publications [Goodstadt "The
People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review
20 December 1974 p. 30].
n. Wang Hung-wen, Vice Chairman of the Chinese
Communist Party, 38 years old. Wang is the youngest member
of the Politburo who seems to serve as a motivational symbol
to other young Chinese to show that it is possible to rise
overnight from the ranks of peasants and workers to the top
elite structure in the nation [Goodstadt "The Peoples Short-
list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December
1974 p. 30] .
o. Chen Yung-Kuei, Secretary of the Shansi Chinese
Communist Party, full member of the Politburo of the Chinese
Communist Party, and designated Model Peasant, 60-years old.
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Chen is from the Tachai brigade which has been designated
by Mao as the model farming unit for China. Illiterate
until middle age, he now tours the country giving extremely
effective and down-to-earth speeches on the lessons of the
Tachi [Goodstadt "The People's Short-list for Power" Far
Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 p. 30]
.
p. Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, full member of the
Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 59-years old.
Madam Chiang is a highly controversial figure who regularly
dresses in unorthodox Western type suits instead of the
standard baggy tunic-and-trousers female uniform. She is
viewed by most China-watchers as a leader of the "radical"
wing of the party. She was demoted from the Standing
Committee of the Politburo in 19 7 3 and has thus lost some
of the influence she wielded during the height of the
Cultural Revolution. Her tenure seems tied to the longevity
of her husband.
Other members of the Politburo of less obvious
significance are Chu Te , Chairman of the National People's
Congress, Kang Sheng, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party; Tung Pi-wu, Acting Chairman
of the People's Republic of China; Hsu Shih-yu, Commander of
the Canton Military Region; Liu Po-ch'eng, Vice Chairman of
the National People's Congress, and Wang Tung-hsing, Director
of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party. Alternate members of the Politburo are
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Ni Chik-fu, Chairman of the Peking Trade Union Council,
Lai Fu-tung, First Secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese
Communist Party; Su Chen-hua, Deputy Commander of the
People's Liberation Army's Navy; and Wu Kuei-hsien, a woman
Model Worker and Secretary of the Shensi Chinese Communist
Party.
2 . China's Regional Military Commanders
Figure 11 shows a breakdown of the reshuffle of
nine senior military commanders that was announced in Peking
on 1 January 1974. It is significant to note that the
change represented an increase in political status for Pi
Tung-chum, Ting Sheng, Yang Tek-chih , Yang Yung, and Wang
Pi-cheng. The shift of military leaders has been widely
interpreted as a move by Mao and Chou to prevent local
military commanders from building a permanent power base
from which they could challenge the central party leadership
in Peking. Goodstadt sees the Soviet border threat as the
reason that the military commanders accepted the transfers
and believes that if the military later concludes that a
deliberate attempt has been made to destroy their personal
political standing, the reshuffle could backfire against
Chou and Mao [Goodstadt "Chou and Mao; Fingers on the Trigger"
Far Eastern Economic Review , 7 January 1975 pp. 10-12].
John Roderick sees the elite struggle in Peking as
revolving around the question of whether to increase the power
of the Communist Party in Peking or to give more leeway to
the provinces where military commanders exercise significant
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control. As evidence he cites the campaign against Confucius
and Lin Piao as an effort to rally greater national loyalty
to the top party leadership (Roderick "Centralism-Regionalism
Debate Continues in China" The Joplin Globe 2 January 1975,
p. 8B] .
D. SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION
As is the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union
is a closed society with little information available to the
West concerning the dynamics of its internal politics. It
is known that Soviet political leadership is selected by a
process known as co-option. By apparent design, the indi-
viduals in power have gained significant positions of leader-
ship in the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as in the
government at the levels of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet and the Council of Ministers. The result is an inter-
locking network between the political power structure and the
government. It is surmised that cliques representing specific
interests interact by the process of democratic centralism to
select those individuals with the greatest amount of per-
suasive power and political support from below. Recent
reports of Brezhnev's failing health have stirred speculation
as to who will replace him. For the author to join this
speculation is beyond the scope of this thesis, however,




E. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION
No one knows with certainty what the outcomes of
political succession in Peking and Moscow will be but the
writer will venture his opinion based upon his research and
the data cited above. Mao appears to have retired from
active political control in China with the reins transferred
to Chou. Chou can be expected to continue his policy of
detente with the United States and to seek increased trade
with the West, especially the importation of advanced
technology and food when required. The question of Taiwan
can be expected to remain on the back-burner of China's
priorities as long as detente with the United States is
evident and moves toward diplomatic exchange with Taiwan
are possible. Talks regarding the Sino-Soviet territorial
dispute will continue and a settlement could happen at any
time. However, such a settlement is not expected prior to
the demise of Mao and probably not before about 1980. The
results of the Tenth Party Congress and Fourth People's
Congress show that Chou and his "moderate" policies have
overcome much of the opposition of the radical and revolu-
tionary left. Also, there is a slightly less military power
in evidence in the central hierarchy although the potential
for a rise in popularity of the military's preference for
an "expert" over "red" People's Liberation Army is still in
evidence and can be expected to flourish in direct proportion
to any decrease in Sino-Soviet hostility. The inevitable
rise of more second generation, post-revolutionary leaders
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in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party during the
next decade will make a settlement of the Sino-Soviet
territorial dispute more likely with a consequent limited




V. UNITED STATES STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING
THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT
The preceding chapters have dealt substantially with a
historiographic development of the Sino-Soviet conflict
emphasizing significant events which have occurred since the
People's Republic of China became a sovereign state on
1 October 1949, Chinese national security interests, the
rate of growth of strategic power in the People's Republic
and political succession among communist political elites
in China and Russia. While drawing inferences from the
factual data already presented, this final chapter will make
a partial transition to the realm of speculation in an attempt
to identify salient factors which could lead to either a
Sino-Soviet rapprochement or conventional and/or nuclear war.
A. SINO-SOVIET DETENTE/RAPPROCHEMENT FACTORS
The historical seeds of conflict between Russia and China
have been outlined in some detail as have the more recent
sources of friction between these powerful communist giants.
Perhaps of equal significance to the American policy-maker
are the factors which might lead to better Sino-Soviet
relations in the future. Some of these factors are listed
below.
1 . Bilateral Meetings and Talks
The mere fact that both China and Russia have chosen
to maintain diplomatic relations lends credence to their hope
for better future relations. On 11 September 1969, Kosygin
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and Chou En-lai met at the Peking airport and were reported
to have agreed that negotiations should be held on disputed
territories during which the armed forces of each country
would be withdrawn from the disputed borders. The negotia-
tions began on 20 October 1969 and continued until July of
1973, when the leader of the Soviet delegation/ Leonid
Ilyichev, returned to Moscow to resume his duties as a Deputy
Foreign Minister, which were not connected with Sino-Soviet
relations. He returned to Peking in June of 19 74 apparently
to resume the border negotiations and to secure the release
of the three Russian border guards held by the Chinese since
the guards' helicopter landed in China in March of 1974 (see
chapter one) . The talks were reported to have been suspended
in July and Ilyichev again returned to Moscow ["China, Soviet
Union Again Suspend Talks" Christian Science Monitor 26 July
1974 p. 8]. The Soviet Union, however, confirmed in August
that the negotiations were pressing ahead despite earlier
speculation of a suspension ["Moscow-Peking Talks Push On"
Christian Science Monitor 19 August 1974 p. 8] . The first
indication of a possible thaw in the Sino-Soviet conflict
was the Chinese proposal of 7 November 1974 cited in chapter
one which suggested the signing of a non-aggression pact
without persisting in the previous demands of a withdrawal
of forces nor an admission by the Soviets that the border
treaties were unequal ["Putting a Feeler Across the Border"
Far Eastern Economic Review 22 November 1974 p. 14]. Soviet
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officials complained that Chinese leaders did not even reply
to their earlier offer of a non-aggression treaty made in
November of 1974 ["Soviets Again Ask China to Sign a Nonv/ar
Pact" Christian Science Monitor 26 November 1973 p. 12]
.
Brezhnev rejected the most recent Chinese proposal in late
November 1974 calling it "absolutely unacceptable" and
stating that the Soviet Union does not "make claims to any
foreign lands, so there are no 'disputed areas' to us in
this sense." ["China, Russia Border Talks to be Resumed"
Monterey Peninsula Herald 12 February 1975 p. 7]. Ilyichev
was reported to have returned to Peking on 12 February 19 75
to resume talks on Sino-Soviet border dispute according to
TASS ["China, Russia Border Talks to be Resumed" Monterey
Peninsula Herald 12 February 19 75] . It seems apparent that
Moscow sees no advantage to concluding a border agreement
with China until a new power group emerges in Peking. This
would allow the Soviets to use a border settlement as a tool
in forging closer Sino-Soviet relations in a post-Mao era.
Polemics notwithstanding, the climate for negotiations seems
better than at any time since the 1969 clashes as evidenced
by China's willingness to sign a non-aggression pact without
a withdrawal of forces or a Soviet admission that the original
treaties were unfair. Erik Pierre states that the Soviets
also have made a major concession: they have agreed that
international lav; is applicable in defining frontier lines in
shared rivers. Previously, the Russians had insisted that a
protocol attached to the 1860 Treaty of Peking defined frontier
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lines [Pierre "Putting a Feeler Across the Border" Far
Eastern Economic Review 22 November 1974 p. 14]. Neville
Maxwell of Oxford University agrees and concisely outlines
the salient elements of international lav/ pertaining to the
dispute in his brief article for the first issue of Modern
China [Maxwell "A Note on the Amur/Ussuri Sector of the
Sino-Soviet Boundaries" Modern China January 1975 pp. 116-126].
Maxwell notes that China reads the Treaty of Peking as
conforming to the thalweg (the central line of the main
channel) principle of international law to define the
boundaries. This principle gives the riparian states equal
navigation rights on the river and it is followed by the
Soviet Union in its relations with all neighbors with which
it shares river boundaries except China. According to Maxwell,
the Soviets claim the boundary line is along the Chinese bank
of the rivers and that they rest -this claim on maps exchanged
by Russian and Chinese boundary commissioners in June of 1861
which they claim became a supplement to the treaty. Maxwell
observes that this is why the Soviet government refers always
to "the treaty documents" and never to "the treaty" in
upholding its claims. He notes that the Soviet government has
been willing to accept the thalweg principle since formal
exchanges over boundary questions began in Peking in 1964 , but
only as a concession, requiring Chinese reciprocation in the
form of agreeing that "the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri
rivers" mentioned in the Treaty of Peking is defined by the
Kozakevicheva Channel (Fuyuan Stream) which connects the
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rivers some forty kilometers upstream from their main
confluence' at Khabarovsk (see Figure 12) . This the Chinese
government has adamantly refused to concede. In the writer's
opinion , the strategic value of the disputed Hei Xiazi
(see Figure 12 ) is minimal compared to the advantages of a
settlement of the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict. Also,
a Soviet concession on this point will signal the beginning
of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement which is a distinct possibility
during the next decade.
2 . Formal Agreements
Arthur Huck observes that China has never been the
center of a military alliance-system and that her one major
military alliance, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance, and Mutual Assistance of February 1950, has been
of questionable value to both sides [Huck 1970 pp. 68-69]
.
The Soviets maintain that the Treaty protected China from
attack by the United States during the Korean War and the
off-shore islands crisis of 1959 but as Whiting noted in
China Crosses the Yalu , Khrushchev's statement of support for
China came only after the crisis had reached its peak. More-
over, Soviet offers of military support to her allies always
seem to appear only after the high point of crisis and
uncertainty has passed. The Treaty will be valid until 1980
with the option for renewal at five-year intervals thereafter.
Huck notes that Chen Yi declared the Treaty worthless in 1963
and that its anniversary has not been observed in China since
1966. The temperature of Sino-Soviet relations can be gauged
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in 19 80 by whether the Treaty is renewed or not. In the
writer's opinion, the Soviet Union will make a maximum
effort to renew the Treaty and resolve the territorial
dispute by 1980.
Despite the polemics and deterioration in relations
between Russia and China since 1969, several significant
agreements have been made including trade and payment
agreements signed on 5 August 1971 and 13 June 1972. Under
these agreements trade between them was planned to increase
from $167,000,000 in 1971 to $288,000,000 in 1972 [Keesing's
Contemporary Archives 4-10 March 1974 p. 26390] . On 17 July
1973 TASS reported a protocol to the 1954 Sino-Soviet Civil
Aviation Agreement to permit Chinese civil flights to Moscow.
Previously., Chinese flights were limited to Irkutsk [Currenjt
Scene August 1973 p. 27]. Future Sino-Soviet agreements
should be watched as an indicator of growing trans-national
interdependence and integration.
3. Third-Party Threats
As Robert North observes, the post World War II
balance of power in Asia has been upset by the continuance
of the Sino-Soviet controversy, the spectacular growth of
Japanese economic and industrial strength, advances in Chinese
nuclear capabilities, and United States activities in Vietnam.
The outcome has resulted in major realignments among the
People's Republic, Russia, the United States, Japan, Taiwan,
Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, and other countries. North
expects the tendency toward shifting power relations to
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increasingly erode and override ideological attraction and
bonds in the future and that new cleavages and alliance
patterns may well emerge in the Pacific area as well as other
parts of the world [North 1974 p. 163]. It is possible that
such new alliance patterns might combine groups of countries
which would be perceived as a joint threat to Russia and
China, thus forcing rapprochement in the form of a new and
stronger Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. An indicator of
such a threat is the fact that Japan has announced a military
Five Year Plan which will cost about 16.6 billion dollars and
mean that Japan has the seventh largest defense budget after
the United States, Russia, China, West Germany, France, and
Britain [Muraoka "Japanese Security and the United States"
Adelphi Papers Number Ninety-five 1973 p, 4],
4 . Communist Ideology
While communist ideology is viewed as either a weapon
or as international camouflage for internal power struggles
and expansion by both a former Soviet intelligence officer
and an eminent American political theorist (see chapter 2)
,
it still serves as a vital linkage for mutual cooperation
between communist nation-states in their announced goals of
world conquest and the elimination of non-communist nations.
As Ebenstein noted, Russia and China do not disagree over
whether to bury the free peoples of the West, but only on
how to bury them — and over who will be in charge after the
funeral. Though "monolithic communism" seems relegated to
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history as "polycentric communism" and "third-world"
nationalism continue to grow, the concept continues to serve
as a framework of cooperation between Russia and China as
long as viable alternative systems exist. A major strike
against either Russia or China by any third force might
conceivably revive and strengthen their former alliance.
5
.
Economic and Industrial Development
If China's present rate of economic development and
industrial expansion (addressed in chapter three) is
sustained or increased it is probable that additional *
bilateral trade agreements, such as those cited above, will
be made in the future. Any significant increase in trade
will most likely be predicated upon China's shift from an
agrarian to a largely industrial-based economy. China's
decision to greatly expand her navy and merchant marine is
evidence that she intends to make this shift, probably during
the next decade. Increased Sino-Soviet economic trade and
cooperation in the future would be indicative of lessening
conflict and growing detente.
6 Cultural Exchanges
While cultural exchanges have dwindled between Moscow
and Peking, they have increased with non-communist nations
uner the aegis of detente. As an indication of mellowing
Sino-Soviet relations, any increase in cultural and scientific





Soviet military aid to China ended in the 1960's and
it is unlikely that it will be resumed in the foreseeable
future. Still limited Soviet military assistance might be
proposed as a gambit to improve Sino-Soviet relations
,
especially after the death of Mao tse-tung. Such an offer
would probably be greeted with open-arms by the "expert"
element within the Chinese military high command. Any future
transfer of Soviet military hardware or assistance may be
viewed as a clear signal of increasing Soviet influence in
Peking.
8. Relations with the United States
Peking has repeatedly emphasized Russia as its main
threat in the world today while Soviet actions are devoted
to overcoming the military superiority of the United States.
Charles Osgood argues that "as long as people in nations
perceive international relations in human terms — as witness
the language they use to talk about them — principles of
interpersonal relations should be applicable." He foresees
these principles as causing both Russia and China to develop
negative reactions toward efforts by the United States to
improve relations with both and states that it would be in
the best interests of the United States to decrease the level
of mutual threat perception between Russia and China [Hall
"Prediction: 'Nixon and the U.S. are Going to Become Gradually
Negative for Both Russia and China, and Simultaneously"
Psychology Today November 1973 p. 56] . Perhaps the most
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important fact for American policy-makers to keep in mind
during the aura of detente is that no communist leader,
whether Russian or Chinese, is interested in the long-term
survival of the United States. In the writer's opinion,
Russian and Chinese interest in detente with the West will
vaporize instantly when, and if, either can develop a clear
military and economic superiority to the United States.
9 . Post-Mao Leadership
In the writer's opinion, the Sino-Soviet territorial
dispute can be resolved rapidly by the Soviet Union if it so
chooses. Some of the restraints to such a resolution are
Russia's historical quest for warm-water ports (Vladivostok
is ice-free eight months out of the year), Russia's desire
for buffer states between her and any potential enemy, and
her traditional fear of a sustained two-front war. Although
Russia has a history of territorial expansion, over half of
her land area has not even been explored. On the other hand,
China's expanding population will demand additional arable
land at some point in the near future. The most advantageous
solution to such a dilemma seems to be for Russia to offer
limited territorial concessions to the Chinese ruling elite
after the death of Mao Tse-Tung. Such concessions could
serve to change Sino-Soviet hostility to increasing alliance
virtually overnight. The alternative is the possibility





The proximate cause of any future Sino-Soviet war
will probably be their dispute over territory. From a rational
cost-benefit standpoint, it seems unlikely that either Moscow
or Peking would commit its forces to such an action if any
reasonable alternative were available. However, various
Russian, Chinese, and Western writers are on record as stating
that war between Russia and China is inevitable. Among these
are the Russian writer Andrei Amalrik who believes that once
China has stockpiles of nuclear weapons it will increase its
border skirmishes with the USSR and finally escalate them
to war, probably between 1975 and 1980. He further states
that the USSR is unlikely to try to invade China because of
China's numerical superiority and is equally likely to reject
a preventive nuclear attack as too dangerous. Thus he be-
lieves Russia will respond to the Chinese initiative of
guerrilla war along the border with guerrilla warfare in a
long and exhausting war. He notes that a Soviet military
expert who had worked in China for several years, V. M.
Primakov, believes:
The Chinese soldier is superior to ours — hardy,
not inclined to grumble and brave. He has immense
mobility in the field. For a Chinese soldier to
march seventy kilometers in a day is simply a trifle
...Our infantrymen, who were quite amazed by the
Chinese infantry, came to the conclusion that it
is the best infantry in the world.
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and concludes that Russia is in the last decades of its
existence because the U.S. will not come to its aid in a
Sino-Soviet war, Germany will be reunited and support China,
and Russian nationalism will decline while non-Russian
nationalism will flourish during the war [Amalrik 1970
pp. 54 passim] . Chou En-lai also sees war as inevitable but
believes it will be between Russia and the United States
rather than China ["Peking Prediction" Christian Science
Monitor 21 January 1975 p. 6], Harrison E. Salisbury con-
tends that war between Russia and China is inevitable unless
the death of Mao allows reconciliation or the United States
makes every possible effort to help avoid it [Salisbury 1969
pp. 193-211] . Sir Robert Scott echoes this view by stating
"sooner or later, fighting between the two (that is, Russia
and China) is inevitable ... In this volatile and explosive
situation, with the certainty of Sino-Soviet tension and the
possibility of open rupture, entailing consequences that
cannot be foreseen, the aim of the West and especially of
the United States should be to seek to defuse the risks in
so far as that is possible" [Scott "China, Russia and the
United States A British View" Foreign Affairs January 1970
pp. 34 0-341] . Richard Lowenthal takes the more balanced view
that "given a measure of rationality of the leaderships on
both sides, the fact of a serious conflict of power interests
makes nuclear war between them no more inevitable than between
either of them and the United States. The continuation of
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limited and controlled conflict between Russia and China
thus remains a far more plausible prospect than its end
by either reunion or catastrophy [Lowenthal "Russia and
China: Controlled Conflict" Foreign Affairs April 1971
pp. 517-518]. It is the writer's view that nothing in
international politics is inevitable until it has happened.
As Huck observes, despite many brave words, China's policy
since Korea has been to pursue a low-risk strategy whenever
the danger of intervention by a more powerful opponent has
been high [Huck 1970 p. 46]. A recent quantitative study
by Andres Onate shows that, contrary to popular opinion,
quantitative data on foreign and domestic conflict behavior
of the People's Republic of China for the period between 1950
and 1970 indicates strong evidence that the key factor toward
understanding the relationship between foreign and domestic
conflict in China is not domestic conflict alone, but also
foreign conflict initiated by or directed toward China
[Onate "The Conflict Interactions of the People's Republic
of China, 1950-1970" The Journal of Conflict Resolution
December 1974 pp. 578-594], In an earlier study North has
observed that most of the 23 crises between 1949 and 1965
in which the Chinese Communists were directly involved were
defensive and concerned with border defense from Peking's




The nine instances wherein the People's Liberation
Army {PLA) has crossed customary borders in hostile
array during the past twenty-two years provide
prima facie evidence for the conventional image of
a potentially expansionist regime contained by
American commitments and force. However,, closer
examination of the use of military force by the
People's Republic reveals an entirely different
situation whereby the government in Peking, in
most cases, deployed the PLA in defensive reaction
against a perceived threat [Whiting "The Use of
Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic
of China" The Annals July 1972 p. 55].
In balance, the chances for a full-scale Sino-Soviet
war seem remote during the next decade. Still the casus
belli for many, if not most, of the wars of history has been
territorial disputes. Never before in history has so much
military power been concentrated face-to-face across a
common border without resulting in war. War between Russia
and China would quickly escalate to the unrestrained use
of atomic, biological, and chemical warfare. Russian and
particularly Chinese nuclear weapons are known to be "dirty"
and prevailing westerly winds would quickly spread poisonous
fallout to Korea, Japan, other Asian countries, and eventually
the United States. Such a war was the theme of Suite's novel,
On the Beach . Accordingly, it would be in the national inter-
est of the United States to maintain the best possible in-
telligence on developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute and
to be prepared to take rapid diplomatic and/or military






An interview with Mr. James Johnson of the National
Marine and Fishery Service indicates no recent history of
Sino-Soviet conflict at sea in Chinese coastal waters although
there is considerable friction between Russian and Japanese
and Korean fishermen in the same waters [James Johnson (an
interview) 21 August 1974]. As the Chinese naval, merchant,
and fishing fleets expand, the potential for conflict at
sea will grow. However, China's navy cannot provide a
significant challenge to Russia's Far Eastern Fleet in the
foreseeable future.
3. Political Control
As Ebenstein has observed, the underlying cause of
the Sino-Soviet conflict is a struggle for power, political
control, and international leadership of the communist move-
ment among the ruling elites of both Russia and China. Mao
believes himself to be the senior communist leader since the
death of Stalin but has been unable to sell this concept to
the leadership in the Kremlin. The conflict has proven
irreconcilable to date with little prospect for resolution
until a new group of political elites come into power both




The Soviet Union is on record as having virtually
endorsed the idea of two Chinas in an article in the Novosti
press information bulletin Number 44 of October 1973. The
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article was written by "G. Galina" which causes some obser-
vers to believe it was written by Brezhnev's daughter whose
first name is Galina and who works at Novosti. The article
states "the de facto existence of two Chinas has long been
and remains a reality" and that "The effects of the stepped-
up activity of Peking on the international plain... have been
largely upset by Taiwan's economic offensive. Within a
short time the Taiwan regime was able to restore or maintain
cooperation of commercial links with some hundred countries"
["Moscow Jabs at Peking with Taipei Praise" Christian Science
Monitor 10 December 1973 p. 1] . There has been speculation
that a 1969 visit to Taiwan by Soviet journalist Victor Louis
was an attempt to sway Taiwan into joining the Soviet-sponsored
Asian security pact and to improve relations between Russia
and Nationalist China at the expense of Peking. Louis,
whose real name is Vitali Yevgennevich Lui , is a celebrated
KGB agent of disinformation. Barron states that it was he
who wrote the dispatch for the London Evening News (he is
the only Soviet journalist allowed to act as a Moscow corres-
pondent of a Western newspaper) that indicated the Soviet
Union was considering a preemptive nuclear strike against
China. This resulted in the KGB goal of pressuring China
to resume border negotiations but had the untoward effect
of causing the alarmed Chinese to enter into secret talks
with the U.S. resulting in the visit of former President Nixon
[Barron 1974 pp. 196-179]. More recently, Louis turned over
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a thick manuscript on the Sino-Soviet border dispute to the
office of the leading British publisher in London. The book,
when published, may offer new insights into Moscow's inten-
tions in the Far East according to Paul Wohl , the Monitor's
Soviet analyst ["Action Called Possible on Sino-Soviet Issue"
Christian Science Monitor 26 February 1975 p. 4], Senator
Jackson told newsmen at Peking airport that the United States
"must move toward early recognition of the People's Republic"
and that "there can be solutions" permitting the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with Peking which would not be
incompatible with past U.S. pledges to Taiwan ["Jackson,
Officials Confer in Peking" Christian Science Monitor 3
July 1974 p. 2]
.
5. Indian Issue
Russia's policy regarding India seems twofold:
first to cultivate a friendly relationship built on Soviet
military and economic aid to ensure India will side with
Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict and, secondly, to estab-
lish Soviet naval bases on the Indian coast as well as mili-
tary and political influence throughout the country. For
a detailed analysis of the Sino-Indian border war see Neville





Ralph Cough holds that Japan is in a favorable posi-
tion to reap many benefits from the Sino-Soviet confrontation
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as long as it remains something less than a large-scale
military conflict. He notes that neither Russia or China
presses Japan to end its security treaty with the U.S.
because each prefers that Japan remain linked to the U.S.
rather than with its adversary in the dispute. He observes
that while China supports Japan's claim to the northern islands
held by the Soviet Union, Soviet support for the Japanese
claim to the Senkaku Islands over that of China could com-
plicate Japan's foreign policy objectives and make the
delicate balance of Japanese diplomacy difficult to maintain.
Japan seeks good relations with both Peking and Moscow to
develop new markets and sources of supply while meeting the
desire of Chinese and Soviets for access to Japanese goods
and technology. Clough concludes that Japan's conflicts of
interest are likely to become more severe, especially with
China as Japan undertakes to expand politically and economi-
cally with the developing nations of East Asia and that
Japan's attitude toward massive rearmament will depend on
how much confidence they have in the willingness of the U.S.
to continue its defense commitment [Clough 1975 pp. 70-90] .
Dean W. Given holds that Russia will not return to
Japan the island of Sakhalin or the chain of the Kuril Is-
lands granted to Russia in the Yalta agreement because of •
the strategic value of the Kurils and the economic value of
Sakhalin. He notes that Admiral Gorshkov has claimed that:
"legal arguments confirm the correctness of fixing the status
of the Sea of Okhotsh as both a closed and internal sea
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coming under the international law concept of historical
waters." He also observes that the Sea of Okhotsh is almost
two-thirds the size of the Mediterranean Sea and that it
provides more than one-tenth of the Soviet Union's annual
fishing catch. Up until 1970, the Soviets had seized more
than 1,200 Japanese fishing boats and jailed over 10,000
Japanese fishermen on charges of violating territorial
waters . Given predicts that the Soviet Union might one day
declare the Sea of Okhotsh closed to all foreign vessels,
except Japan with which it would negotiate a fishing treaty
[Given "The Sea of Okhotsh USSR's Great Lake?" Naval
Institute Proceedings September 1970 pp. 47-51].
7 . Mongolian Issue
Alan Sanders notes that the Mongolian People's
Republic, once part of the Chinese empire, is now Moscow's
staunchest ally against Peking partly because of the great
amounts of Soviet aid which has been forthcoming during the
past 10 years of exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations. He also
observes that the amount of Russian aid per capita of the
Mongolian population far exceeds that given to any other
developing country in the world and offers two possible rea-
sons for this. First, Mongolia votes for Soviet policies in
the UN and at Asian and African assemblies from which Moscow
is excluded. Secondly, the Soviet Union can maintain a large
physical presence on Mongolian soil closer to Peking than
anywhere on its own territory. He also notes that the Mongols
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have a historically ingrained dislike and distrust of the
Chinese and their policies towards Mongolia [Sanders "Mon-
golia: A Bypass to Communism" Far Eastern Economic Review
13 December 1974 pp. 33-36] . A related article states that
there are reports of frequent incursions into Mongolia by
Chinese troops in violation of the 1962 Sino-Mongolian Treaty
and that the number of Soviet troops in Mongolia was boosted
from two divisions to five divisions in 1974. It also men-
tioned an unconfirmed report of a major Sino-Soviet clash
on the Sino-Mongolian border in the spring of 19 74 ["Renewing
a Powerful Link with Moscow" Far Eastern Economic Review 13
December 1974 p. 35], A more recent report by the London
Daily Telegraph states that a series of five clashes took
place along the Mongolian-Chinese frontier at a point 2,000
miles west of the Ussuri River in November of 1974 in which
thirty men were killed or wounded. The same article reported
"More than half the 60 Russian divisions now deployed on the
Chinese frontier are in -Mongolia ["Some troops only 400 miles
from Peking" London Daily Telegraph 17 December 1974 p. 1L
as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report
Western Europe 17 December 1974 p. Wl] . Pravda promptly
accused the Daily Telegraph of propagating false anti-Soviet
material by stating "The London newspaper Daily Telegraph has
printed a report to the effect that 'in November Russian and
Chinese troops clashed along the Mongolian-Chinese border.
'
In an attempt to give an appearance of veracity to its
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falsification, the newspaper even quoted a number of 'vic-
tims 1 and — as it has done more than once in the past — cited
'communist sources' that supposedly reported this information
to the newspaper's correspondent..." [."'-Daily Telegraph' Lies
Again" Pravda 20 December 1974 p. 5 as translated in the
Current Digest of the Soviet Press 15 January 1975 p. 23]
.
C. UNITED STATES GRAND STRATEGY AND THE
SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT
In his excellent book devoted to the subject of grand
strategy, John M. Collins defines the term as "the art and
science of employing national power under all circumstances
to exert desired degrees and types of control over the oppo-
sition through threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy,
subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying
national security interests and objectives" [Collins 1973
p. 14] . Collins holds that grand strategy is the purview of
statesmen and that it controls military strategy, which is
only one of its elements. He believes that grand strategy
obviates the Clausewitz dictum that strategy simply is "the
use of engagements to attain the object of war" [von Clause-
witz 1950 p. 117] and that it cleaves closely to Liddell
Hart's conclusion that "the true aim is not so much to seek
battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that
if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continua-
tion by a battle is sure to achieve this" [Hart 1967 p. 351]
.
Collins acknowledges that Sun Tzu first conceived this idea.
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The Strategic Review quotes Sun Tzu (430-320 B.C.) as stating:
"In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to
take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and
destroy it is not so good. . .Hence , to fight and conquer in
all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence
consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting"
[ Strategic Review Spring 1974 ibc]
.
1 . Detente and the Sino-Soviet Territorial Conflict
If the passage cited earlier about the activities of
Soviet agent Victor Louis is valid, then warmer relations
between the United States and China resulted from and were
made possible by the sub-rosa threat of Soviet Union to impose
a settlement of the Sino-Soviet conflict by the means of
nuclear blackmail. The threat then failed because it caused
a fearful China to enter secret consultations with Kenry
Kissinger which resulted in the former President's visit to
China and a thaw in Sino-American relations. Whether detente
with either the Soviet Union or China can be sustained and
grow or whether it will wither and fail is unknown. What is
known is that the U.S. is in the advantageous position of
being able to influence policy in both Peking and Moscow so
long as it does not attempt the dangerous game of playing one
Communist power against the other. Implicit in an American
policy of detente with both Russia and China are both great
opportunities to improve international cooperation, stability,
and integration and great dangers of being susceptible to a
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sudden attack, uncontrolled war, and possible military defeat
if our diplomats "goof* or if our military readiness is per-
ceived by an adversary as comparatively weak or unresponsive.
In the different context of containment in 1947, George F.
Kennan reached a similar conclusion in his famous "X" article
which has relevance today:
To avoid destruction the United States need only
measure up to its own best traditions and prove
itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.
Surely, there was never a fairer test of
national quality than this. In the light of
these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of
Russian-American relations will find no cause
for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to
American society. He will rather experience a
certain gratitude to a Providence which, by
providing the American people with this impla-
cable challenge, has made their entire security
as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves
together and accepting the responsibilities of
moral and political leadership that history
plainly intended them to bear. [X (George F.
Kennan) "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" Foreign
Affairs July 1947 p. 582].
Detente with both Russia and China is the current
policy of the United States. It will remain so unless the
American body politic decides that its risks outweigh its
advantages. A selection of arguments for and against detente
follow. In response to a question by Bill Moyer, Secretary
of State Kissinger recently defined detente as follows:
The problem of detente is often put as if the
United States were making concessions to the Soviet
Union in order to achieve peace. Basically, the
problem of detente — the necessity of detente is
produced by the fact that nuclear war in this
period is going to involve a catastrophe for all
of humanity. When the decision of peace and war
involves the survival of tens of millions of
217

people, you're no longer playing power politics in
the traditional sense. And for this reason, every
American President in the postwar period, no matter
how different their background, no matter what their
party, has sooner or later been driven to making the
problem of peace the central preoccupation of his
foreign policy. This is the case also, obviously,
in this Administration. We would like to leave a
legacy of having made the world safer than when we
found it, as must every Administration. To conduct
confrontation politics when the stakes are going to
be determined by nuclear weapons is the height of
irresponsibility. This is what we mean by detente.
We have sought systematically to improve political
relations, to increase trade relations in order to
produce a maximum number of links between us and the
Soviet Union and to create a cooperative environment
to reduce the dangers of war ["A Conversation with
Henry Kissinger" Bill Mover's Journal on the Public
Broadcasting System 16 January 1975 8 P.M.].
Speaking on 14 November 1973 in Peking at a banquet given
in his honor, Dr. Kissinger said: "When President Nixon
CD.r?„c here less than two years ago on the journey that
resulted in the Shanghai communique he was the pioneer.
But the journey that was started by President Nixon has
since become a necessity for all Americans . And no matter
what happens in the United States in the future, friendship
with the People's Republic of China is one of the constant
factors of American foreign policy" [Kessing's Contemporary
Archieves 21-27 January 1974 p. 26316]. The statement seems
to bear out a prophecy made by Chou En-lai in an interview
by Edgar Snow in 19 60: "There is no conflict of basic inter-
ests between the peoples of China and the United States,
and friendship will eventually prevail" [Asia 1973 Handbook
Far Eastern Economic Review p. 123].
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Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has warned that •
the notion that detente permits the United States to disarm
is a widespread illusion and that detente will disappear if
the equilibrium of force is upset. He also states that
United States military force levels are based upon the ex-
ternal capabilities which we hope to balance and not upon
the diplomatic atmosphere ["Can Russia be Trusted" U.S. News
and World Report 13 May 1974 p. 38]
.
Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Command has observed:
...We do have a detente with both Russia and China,
and I welcome it and hope it endures, but the world
changes and we have to deal with uncertainty.
You also have to notice the extraordinary and
continuing Russian build-up,- the way in which force
and the threat of force has been used in recent years,
and our vulnerability both to attack on us and on
other countries who depend on us . The consequences,
if an aggressive power were seen to be dominant mili-
tarily in" the Pacific would be very unfortunate
(underlined by author)""^ ["U.S. Strategy for Staying
No. 1 Power in Asia" U.S. News and World Report 2 5
March 1974 pp. 42-43].
Senator Jackson is well known for his reservations
regarding detente with the Soviet Union as well as his pledge
to seek early establishment of diplomatic relations with
Peking ["Jackson, Officials Confer in Peking" Christian
Science Monitor 3 July 1974 p. 2],
A more severe critic of detente is George Meany,
President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations, in testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee quoted Theodore Draper as
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saying "It is time to stop using cold war as a scare term
and detente as a sedative term; in their relation to nuclear
war, they are not that different." Meany went on to say
that "Perhaps, as someone has quipped, detente is the cold
war pursued by other means — and sometimes by the same."
He concluded his testimony by stating "The inability to
face the world as it is, and to understand clearly the nature
of freedom's enemies everywhere, is really the greatest
threat to peace today. That threat is nowhere more clearly
posed than in the delusion we call detente" ["Labor and
'Detente'" AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News October 1974
pp. 3-8].
2 . Effects of the Strategic Arms Limitations Negotiations
The results of strategic arms limitations negotia-
tions (SALT) under the aegis of detente have been a cause
of concern to many Americans. Among these are Arthur G.B.
Metcalf, Chairman of the United States Strategic Institute,
who views the SALT I accords, negotiated in part secretly
by Kissinger, as counter to U.S. interests and who states:
11
. .
.whatever the argument for substituting paper for power
as the guarantee of peace, it is the lesson of history that
such a course does not reduce but multiplies the changes
for war" [Metcalf "SALT II — Some Principles" USSI Repor t
73-2 p. 14]
.
The editor of Aviation Week and Space Technology
notes numerous Soviet violations of the SALT treaty and
believes it is time to "ring the bell" on these violations
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and to develop a far tougher, more technically competent,
and more realistic stance for continuing arms negotiations
[Holtz "U.S. Negotiation Strategy" Strategic Review Winter
1975 p. 61]. Paul H. Nitze, a former member of the SALT
negotiating team echoes the comments of both Metcalf and
Holtz and adds that before the accords reached at Vladivostak
are ratified, the Senate should resolve ambiguities in mis-
sile throw-weight, the definition of what is a heavy bomber,
and straighten out the difficult problem of cruise missiles
["Nitze Delineates U.S. — Soviet Differences" Aviation Week
and Space Technology 24 February 1975 p. 63]
.
In 19 57 Dr. Kissinger made a statement reminiscent
of the sentiments of Alexander Solzhenitsyn quoted in Chap-
ter Two and Arthur Metcalf above: "Whenever peace — conceived
as the avoidance of war — has been the primary objective of
a power or a group of powers, the international system has
been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the inter-
national community" [Kissinger A World Restored 1957 as
quoted in Strategic Review Winter 1975 i.b.c.].
Isaac Don Levine ' s closing words in his book Eyewitness
to History express a theme that is interspersed throughout
this thesis:
Only a world of freemen can insure America's sure
defense and promote lasting peace on earth. Not
the money-changers on the international trading mart
nor the professional politicians trafficking in
peace slogans can deliver divided humanity, half free
and half in chains, from its agonized condition. That
is the message that the little band of martyred
prophets, from Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn
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to Andrei Skaharov, have been transmitting to us
from behind the Iron Curtain. The cries of these
eagles have for some years been echoing among the
conscience-inspired citizens of the West. But
they have so far found no response in the high quar-
ters where power over man is being wielded- by the
overlords of our age. Yet such a response cannot
be long delayed, bringing the statesmanship of
vision and courage that alone can guide humanity out
of the wilderness [Levine 1973 pp. 284-285].
3 . Naval Considerations in the Western Pacific
Admiral Gaylor sees the Pacific as the area of the
future because that is where the rate of change is the
greatest. He believes the consequence of allowing Russia
to become the dominant power there would be "
. .
.very unfor-
tunate. Security is not something we can give away to save
money and enjoy something else, because without security
there is nothing else. Mary an unfortunate nation has
learned that too late" ["U.S. Strategy for Staying No. 1
Power in Asia" U.S. News and World Report 2 5 March 1974
pp. 42-43]
.
As the United States lowers its military profile
in Asia, it is vital that a new defense line in the region
be established. In his farewell address to Congress on 19
April 1951, General MacArthur warned that: "...under no
circumstances must Formosa fall under communist control.
Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of
the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force
our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Ore-
gon, and Washington" [Collines 1973 p. 145] . More recently
Admiral John McCain has updated this concept by stating that
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if the Marianas are not kept under the immediate control of
the United - States "the next fallback position is Honolulu,
and that's a long way back." [Marianas Set to Join the U.S."
Christian Science Monitor 6 February 1975 p. 5]. A clear
military fact is that for the United States Navy to guarantee
control of the seas in the Western Pacific, it must rely on
a network of overseas bases in the area for staging and
operating purposes. Continued good relations with Japan
(especially), Australia, the Philippines, and Taiwan are
essential to U.S. security interests in the Pacific and a
maximum effort should be made to cement strong relations
with the people of the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall
islands to provide the fleet with the flexibility in the
form of operating bases and to provide the nation with a
forward line of defense in the Pacific.
D. CONCLUSION
This thesis has traced the Sino-Soviet territorial
conflict spectrum from its inception to the present. The
main hypothesis that Peking will increasingly emphasize
international negotiations with Moscow as the People's
Republic of China improves its nuclear capability, defensive
preparations, and logistical capabilities vis a vis the Soviet
Union has proven valid. Peking can be expected to use
diplomatic negotiations to settle the territorial conflict
during the next decade. A settlement is possible as early
as 19 80 given China's present rate of development in all
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aspects of national power and given that Mao Tse-tung either
dies or ceases to be an active participant in the ruling
elite of Communist China. The national interests of the
Soviet Union will also be served by a limited rapprochement
with China and Moscow can be expected to make some territorial
concessions to settle the dispute by 1980 in order to renew
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual
Assistance
.
The alternative hypothesis that the People's Republic
of China will use all means short of general war to regain
"lost territories" from the Soviet Union has proven invalid.
As of early 1975, the "moderate" faction of the Chinese
Communist Party headed by Chou En-lai is in firm control of
national policy and can be expected to pursue a low-risk
profile in dealing with the Soviet leadership for the return
of China's lost territories. Still, the possibility of a
Sino-Soviet war cannot be discounted because of the massive
defense preparations and military buildup by both sides.
Russia would not have mobilized such an extensive military
force along the Chinese border nor would China have built a
new and expensive "Underground China Wall" in the form of
extensive nuclear defense tunnels if no real threat of war
existed. Even if the Sino-Soviet conflict worsens in the
near future, the possibility for a negotiated settlement
still exists and such a settlement would be the cause of
greater communist unity, especially after the death of Mao.
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The United States would be wise to judge the conflict less
by what the Russians and Chinese say about each other and
more by the quality of their actions as these actions tend
to threaten or serve United States interests. The political
consequences of the concept of military parity under the
guise of detente could prove disastrous for the United States
The costs of national security and freedom have never been
cheap in the past and can be expected to increase in the
future. These costs, however, have purchased the avoidance
of world war since 194 5 and are worth the investment for
future international stability and for the survival of this
nation. If either Russia (now) or the People's Republic of
China (in the future) is allowed to develop a clear military
advantage vis a vis the United States, it can be expected to
use that advantage to back up its demands in any future
bilateral negotiations, especially if it believes that the
United States lacks the will to act. The United States
should remain aloof and neutral in the event of a Sino-Soviet
war. If drawn into such a war, however, it must be prepared
for a long and exhaustive world war.
This thesis has dealt with change — change in the Chinese
perception of the world and change in the rate of national
power growth in the People's Republic of China. If the
second generation ruling elite in China can sustain and
continue to increase the present rate of growth without
alienating large segments of the population, specifically
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the young, it is within the realm of possibility that China
could become the most powerful nation on earth by the 21st
century. Because of this possibility alone, it behooves the
United States to grant diplomatic recognition - to China and
to seek multiple interactions and linkages with the most
populous nation in the world. A corollary is that Congress
should reconsider recognizing Mongolia. Diplomatic recogni-
tion to both would tend to lessen international tension and
to provide much needed hard intelligence on the Sino-Soviet
conflict
.
Peking's most recent statements regarding Russia seem
reminiscent of the ancient Chinese ploy of playing one
barbarian against the other cited in Chapters I and II. By
stating that war between the United States and Russia is
inevitable, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
alliance should be strengthened, and that the United States
should keep some military forces in the Far East, Peking's
leaders seek to balance Russian and American power while they
continue to improve China's industrial base and military power.
Russian and Chinese uncertainty as to the American response
to a Sino-Soviet war tends to lessen the chances for war.
This observation is predicated upon the United States main-
taining a credible military presence in the Western Pacific
and in Europe. The present diplomatic stalemate between
Peking and Moscow can be expected to change soon after the
demise of Mao. The author views the ultimate goal of communism
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to be absolute political control. Because of this, other
long range 'goals, interests, and ambitions of China and
Russia will be difficult to reconcile, if not impossible.
In the near term of the next few decades, however, some form
of limited detente would serve the national interests of
both. Should a Sino-Soviet war occur for any reason, Soviet
military doctrine dictates the use of massive force and
firepower, the element of surprise, and short-decisive
campaigns. China is well equipped to thwart the later
strategy in general war making the risks to Russia outweigh
the possible gains for the foreseeable future. Russian
strategists are well aware of their traditionally vulnerable
logistical support capability in sustained war. The huge
Russian build-up on the Chinese frontier suggests they have
also learned the value of defensive mobilization from the
lesson of Hitler's invasion in 1941. Russia is in an
excellent position to apply pressure against China in the
form of a show of naval force off China's coast. In general
war, the Soviet fleet could eliminate the People's Liberation
Army's Navy rapidly; a direct application by Russian strate-
gists of the historical tradition of success of Russian
gunboat diplomacy against China. China is aware of this
weakness and has commenced building a modern fleet, but will
pose no bonified naval threat to Russia in the near future.
The results of Mao's Cultural Revolution will be measured
more accurately during the next decade, however, its effect
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may prove detrimental to China's rate of development in the
area of education. Industrial growth requires a base of
managerial and scientific expertise which China's present
educational system is unlikely to produce. It can be expected
to be one of the first changes made by the ruling elite after
Mao's death. Mao's last public appearance was in January of
1975. Other evidence presented in this thesis suggests that
it may have been his last. In any case, it is believed his
dogma will be of decreasing importance to China's pragmatic
new leaders. Hopefully, international trade between the
Free World and Communist nations can improve international
cooperation, stability, and integration. However, to allow
the unrestrained export of superior Western strategic goods
and technology is irresponsible and detrimental to the national
security of the United States. The American people are by
nature optimistic, but it would be wise to temper that
optimism with a healthy amount of skepticism regarding detente
with either Russia or China. It is essential that this nation
maintain a strong and responsive Department of Defense.
Should detente fail, the Department of Defense cannot guarantee
to salvage the situation from a position of military inferi-
ority. As for the United States Navy, the words spoken by
Admiral King thirty years ago have special application to the
dangerous waters of the Western Pacific today: "Gentleman,
while I cannot guarantee victory if we maintain control of
the sea, I can absolutely guarantee defeat if we lose that
control!" [from a sign in a classroom of the Naval Reserve






The trend toward a high degree of strident polemics
,
hostile propaganda, and bitter recriminations which began
with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February of 19 56,
has continued to the present with little chance of future
abatement until the present "new tsars" and/or "sons of
heaven" are replaced by death, serious illness, or loss of
power and party control. The sheer amount of verbiage in
this cold war of words along with the incessant recantation
of the same recurrent themes taxes the most patient student
of Chinese and Soviet affairs and precludes its inclusion
in this thesis. Moreover, the important ideological themes
have been well-documented, repeatedly quoted at length, and
laboriously analyzed in the majority of the works on the
Sino-Soviet conflict contained in the list of references to
this thesis. Therefore, this appendix will briefly sample
some of the most recent polemics contained in Chinese and
Soviet books and periodicals in an attempt to provide the
reader with the opportunity of making his own side-by-side
comparison to discern emerging new themes in national policy
1. On the Sino-Soviet Territorial Conflict
a. Chinese View
The heads of some self-styled 'successors to
Marxism-Leninism' in the 20th century are stuffed with the
old-line colonialists' dream of territorial expansion.
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In its article 'For the Honour of the Mother-
land, ' the journal Ogonyok published by the Brezhnev clique
has glibly talked about the so-called 'important geographi-
cal discovery' of 80 to 90 years ago by a group of colonialist
'explorers' led by tsarist officer M. Prezhevalsky while
gathering information in the western part of China. What
did they discover? According to the article , Lop Nor in
China's Sinkiang was 'discovered by him (Prezhevalsky) as
early as 1876' and the Yellow River sources of Oring Nor
and Tsaring Nor also were allegedly 'first explored' in
1884 by this 'exploring team,' and the leader of the team
named one of the lakes the 'Russians Lake' and the other
the 'exploring team lake' by right of being the first
explorer .
'
...In 1704, the Chinese Government set officials
to make another survey of the river's sources. In the book
Ho Yuan Chi (The Record of the Yellow River Sources) written
on the basis of the survey, the names of the two lakes were
recorded as 'Oring' and 'Tsaring. 1 These geographical enti-
ties had been recorded in Chinese history books 1,000 to
2,000 years before the title of the Russian emperors, the
tsar, appeared.
...In a 1969 government statement, the Brezhnev
clique alleged that prior to the Ching Dynasty, 'in the west,
the Chinese border had not extended beyond Kansu and Szechuan
Provinces.' Now, they claim that many places in western
China were 'discovered' by their predecessors, the old tsars,
and talk glibly about so-called 'rights of the first investi-
gators.' The evil intentions contained in these statements
by the Brezhnev clique are clear to all and need no explanation
. . .But so obsessed with world hegemony are Brezh-
nev and company that they are raving the same and dreaming
the same fond dream of occupying the territories of other
countries as the old-line colonialists did. We would like
to tell the Soviet revisionist gentlemen in all seriousness:
The old road of colonialism is a blind alley, you'd better
stop raving! [ Peking Review 29 November 1974 pp. 15-16]
.
b. Russian View
Territorial claims founded on the thesis of
'detached territories' occupy a prominent place in the Mao
group's chauvinistic plans. The fanning of passions and
the creation of tension round territorial issues are part
of the Chinese leadership's foreign policy. The Mao group is
using the territorial question to aggravate relations be-
tween countries and stir up nationalistic feelings among
the Chinese people. Peking propaganda and the Chinese lead-
ers constantly remind the Chinese and other peoples of the
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Chinese frontiers that once ran across the territories of
many neighbouring countries. At this point it would be
appropriate to note that these 'reminders' of China's present
leaders are extremely reminiscent of the statements by the
reactionaries of old China.
A textbook on modern history with a map of China
of the period before the Opium Wars was published in China
in 19 54. The authors showed China as including Burma, Vietnam,
Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkirn and other
territories. They called these lands 'state territory of
China' that were 'wrested' from her.
At the time it seemed that the published maps
were the result of some oversight. But developments demon-
strated that the appearance of maps with 'detached terri-
tories' was not accidental. In the early 1960s the Maoists
began going to all lengths in extolling the Chinese emperors
and their policy of aggrandizement. The historical journal
Lishih Yenchiu paid a tribute to Genghis Khan for restoring
'our multinational state to its size under the Han and Tang
dynasties' and to the Emperor Kang-hsi for creating an empire
with frontiers 'up to the Pacific in the East, the South Sea
Islands in the South, the spurs of the Himalayas in the West
and Siberia in the North'.*
*Lishih Yenchiu, No. 3, 1961; No. 3, ]9 62
[Maoism Unmasked 1972 pp. 218-219].
2 . On Expansionism
a. Chinese View
Referring to the expansionist policy of tsarist
Russia, the revolutionary teacher of the proletariat Marx
pointed out: ' Its methods, its tactics, its manoeuvres may
change, but the Polar Star of its policy — world domination —
is a fixed star . ' Is there any difference between the Soviet
social- imperialists and the old tsars in their bid for world
domination? No. One can say they are tweedledum and tweedle-
dee, entirely at one with each other.
. . .The Soviet revisionists have not only tried
by might and main to lay their hands on what the old tsars
attempted to grab. In regard to expansionist ambitions,
they have far outstripped their predecessors. Apart from
attempts to control the Middle East, the Brezhnev clique sets
its mind on gaining a foothold in Africa, Latin America and
Oceania. Apart from expansion on the land, it seeks 'unlimited
control on the seas.' It is locked in a fierce global





.Another important method of tsarist Russia in
carrying out aggression was to send spies abroad and recruit
agents to engineer subversive and sabotage activities. Marx
and Engels pointed out in their time that Russia had
recruited a large number of highly-paid agents, that Russian
diplomatic organs always had agents of various kinds at their
disposal and that the history of the Balkan Peninsula in the
last hundred years provided sufficient examples to show what
the official circles in Russia could do to remove with poison,
daggers, etc. those in their way. The Soviet revisionists
outdo the old tsars in this regard. Press reports say Soviet
spying activities have spread to some 90 countries and half
of the Soviet revisionist diplomats abroad are engaged in
espionage activities. The Soviet revisionists have also
'bought over traitors whom they put in use.' Well known too
are their despicable acts of plotting coup d'etats and
carrying out subversion in other countries through spies and
agents [Peking Review 30 August 1974 pp. 16-17]
.
b. Russian View
The actions of the Maoists have shown the world
that the policy of adventures and expansion which they are~
~
turning into the pivot of China's international policy as a
whole is seriously menacing world peace and, above all, the
security of the peoples of Asia .
In order to disguise this policy and give it bhe
appearance of a 'struggle for the restoration of historical
justice 1 the Maoists hysterically allege that the present
frontier between the Soviet Union and China had been deline-
ated on the basis of unequal treaties. This frontier, as
the whole world knows , took shape many generations ago and
follows natural boundaries demarcating the territories of
the Soviet Union and China. It was established on the basis
of a series of treaties., whose territorial provisions remain
in full force to this day. In evaluating Peking propaganda's
outcry over the so-called territorial issue, a Statement
issued by the Soviet Government on March 29, 1969 stressed
that the purpose of this outcry 'is to sow among the Chinese
people hate and hostility for our country and the Soviet
people .
*
If one analyzes the 'arguments' which the Peking
leaders are advancing in substantiation of their 'right' to
foreign territory, one will see that the only motive is the
desire to restore to China almost the entire territory of the
Celestial Empire. Anybody conversant with history knows that
the Chinese emperors, particularly of the Yuan (1280-1368)
and Ching (1644-1911) dynasties, pursued a policy of conquest
in the north, south, west and east, seeking to subject neigh-
boring peoples and territories. The claims to territories
which the Chinese emperors seized or tried to seize centuries

ago demonstrate that the Chinese leaders are evidently
aspiring to the doubtful honour of being regarded as the
heirs of the former dynasties.
...It is quite evident that the expansionist
claims of the Maoists are absurd and untenable from both the
historical and international legal points of view.




It is the custom for the Soviet revisionist clique
to play the 'disarmament 1 game at the annual session of the
United Nations General Assembly.
...In 1971, it proposed at the United Nations the
convocation of a world disarmament conference and since then
has peddled this at every U.N. General Assembly session.
However, the clique has never reduced its military force by a
single military vessel, a single tank or a single missile.
On the contrary, it has accelerated the tempo of its arms
expansion from sea to land and from conventional to nuclear
arms. Out of the need for foreign expansion, it has greatly
enlarged its navy. Today the strength of Soviet revisionist
armoured units in Europe is one-third more than in 19 72.
...In 1973, the Soviet revisionists proposed in
the United Nations that all permanent member states of the
Security Council cut their military expenditures by 10 per
cent to assist the developing countries. This was a double
fraud. The fact is that the more they propose military
expenditure, cuts, the higher their military budget goes. In
recent years, the Soviet Union's military spending has been
increased 5 per cent annually, according to Western news
agency reports. The Soviet revisionists' talk about
'assistance' is simply a cock and bull story for they are even
unwilling to cancel the debts owed them by some developing
countries for munitions used in the struggle against aggression
How can they 'assist' the developing countries with money





.The talks on a reduction of armed forces and
armaments in Central Europe aroused the undisguised animosity
of the Chinese leaders. At first they opposed the very idea
of talks on that question. But their 'advice' had no effect.
Now they are trying to discredit the proposals of the social-





.In distorting the essence of the proposals of
the socialist countries, Chinese propaganda alleges that a
reduction' of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe
will be prejudicial to the Western countries on the specious
grounds that their 'defence potential is inadequate*. At
the 2 8th UN General Assembly the head of the Chinese delega-
tion declared that the 'real problem' facing countries is
'not disarmament but the strengthening of their independent
defence potential'.* Such statements by Chinese leaders can
be understood only as attempts at urging West European
countries to step up the arms race.
. .
.Peking is endeavouring to conceal the un-
principled character of its policy by stepping up its anti-
Soviet campaign, in particular, by spreading the fabrication
about the 'threat to China from the North'. The 'Soviet
threat' theme is invariably brought up in all the talks of
the Chinese leaders with representatives of Western countries
and is depicted by them as China's central problem today.
In January 1974 the Turkish News Agency reported that the
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Ying used this pretext
when he said Peking had to 'prepare for war ' [ International
Affairs April 1974 pp. 26-27].
4 . On Foreign Aid
a. Chinese View
...China has established economic and technical
co-operation relations with more than 50 countries, providing
them with aid to the best of her ability. The magnitude of
her foreign aid has registered a marked increase since the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Supporting each other
politically and economically, China and the friendly countries
of the Third World have thus promoted their respective
independent development and constantly enhanced their
friendship.
...In providing economic and technical aid to
other countries, China abides by the eight principles made
known by Premier Chou En-lai in late 1963 and early 1964
during his visit to Africa; these principles epitomize the
basic policies of China's foreign aid in the spirit of
internationalism.
...Eight Principles of China's Foreign Aid
1. The Chinese Government always bases itself
on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing
aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind
of unilateral alms but as something mutual.
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2. In providing aid to other countries, the
Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the
recipient 'countries, and never attaches any conditions or
asks for any privileges
.
3. China provides economic aid in the form
of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time
limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the
burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
4. In providing aid to other countries, the
purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the
recipient countries dependent on China but to help them
embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and
independent economic development.
5. The Chinese Government tries its best to
help the recipient countries build projects which require less
investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recip-
ient governments may increase their income and accumulate
capital.
6. The Chinese Government provides the best-
quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at
international market prices. If the equipment and material
provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed
specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes
to replace them.
7. In giving any particular technical assis-
tance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel
of the recipient country fully master such technique.
8. The experts dispatched by China to help
in construction in the recipient countries will have the same
standard of living as the experts of the recipient countries.
The Chinese experts are not allowed to make special demands
or enjoy any special amenities.
...China's aid to foreign countries is either
gratis or loans on favourable terms, a form of co-operation
between friends... As a socialist country, China neither
exports capital nor practices usury. Before 1964 most of her
loans to foreign countries were interest-free, with the rest
of them at low interest. All her loans to foreign countries
extended after that year have been interest-free.
...China's economic development is still at a
rather low level and her material strength is not equal





. The Peking leaders have widely advertised their
economic assistance to developing countries. However, a
closer look shows that Chinese assistance fails to promote
the establishment of a powerful industrial base or to resolve
the cardinal problems of their economic progress. This is so,
because it orients the 'Third World 1 countries' on the primary
development of light industry and agriculture. This, in
effect, dooms these countries to continued economic dependence
on the developed capitalist states, and to continued and even
increased lagging behind with the advance of the scientific
and technical revolution. That is why the Maoists' attempts
to disrupt the ties of the developing countries with the
USSR and other socialist states and to pressure the 'Third
World' to set up closed economic groups, where the law would
be laid down by Peking, are especially dangerous.
The Maoisits have worked diligently to present
their economic ties with the developing countries as being
exceptionally advantageous to the latter. Actually, this
is a far cry from the truth. China's foreign-exchange
receipts from trade with the 'Third World' countries — over
$1,000 million in 1972 — are well in excess of its aid
commitments to these countries.
It should be noted that Peking would like to
establish a kind of division of labour with the developed
capitalist states fo-r the exploitation of the 'Third World'
countries. In a conversation with Japan's Minister of Foreign
Trade and Industry, Nakasone, in January 1973, Chou En-lai
declared: 'Let's help Southeast Asia: China in the sphere
of agriculture and the light industry, and Japan in the sphere
of the heavy industry.'* There is no need to specify the
kind of aid this involves.
*Asahi, January 22, 1973 [ International Affairs




. . .The outrages committed by the Soviet revisionist
clique during the year are too numerous to list. A few salient
examples are enough to bring to light its obnoxious features
and sordid behaviour; they at the same time speak for the
daily awakening of the world's people and their in-depth
struggle against hegemony.
...1. Soviet revisionism was in desperate
straits and isolation as its acts of clinging to hegemony
and making troubles at international conferences were
scathingly denounced by many third world countries.
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...2. As Soviet revisionism steps up
contention with U.S. imperialism for hegemony in Europe and
as its tactics of 'making a feint to the east while attacking
in the west' become more evident, more and more European
countries are heightening their vigilance against it.
...3. Soviet revisionism exploits Soviet
Jewish emigration in pursuit of its own interests and thus
undermines the Arab people's struggle. This has further
exposed the ugly features of social-imperialism.
...4. In the Cyprus event, Soviet revisionism
added fuel to the fire, seeking to fish in troubled waters.
Its sinister designs were all too clear.
...5. Soviet revisionism continues to create
turmoil, maintains tension in the South Asian subcontinent
and steps up contention in the Indian Ocean with U.S.
imperialism. .
...6. Soviet revisionism has not only seized
Japanese territories with no intention of returning them but
has posed repeated military threats against that country,
arousing the Japanese people's indignation and protest.
...7. Soviet revisionism has made huge
profits by speculating in the international market, doing
many things detrimental to the interests of the third world
countries
.
...8. Soviet revisionism's cloak-and-dagger
activities in all parts of the world which repeatedly were
exposed and saw its spies expelled have aroused close
attention and vigilance in many countries.
. . .The outward bluster and swaggering posture
of the Breshnev clique cannot conceal its essential weakness
of being beset with internal and external problems. As the
contention between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism
further intensifies, the storm of the struggle against
hegemonism launched by the people of all lands will rage still
more fiercely. It is a certainty that social-imperialism
will suffer heavier defeats than the old-time expansionists
[Peking Review 31 January 1975 pp. 16-18]
.
b. Russian View
The 10th C.P.C. Congress accelerated the Maoist
policy of all-embracing militarization. Preparations for war
are being carried out under the cover of propaganda furor
about the fictitious threat of a ' sudden attack ' by the
U.S.S.R. on China. On the other hand, in talks with
237

representatives of NATO countries the Maoists assert that
the U.S.S.R. is creating the semblance of a threat in the East
but is actually preparing for a sudden strike in the West.
Chinese mass propaganda singles out as the
greatest of the country's achievements the fact that the
C.P.R. 'has manufactured an atom bomb, a hydrogen bomb and
an artificial earth satellite.* But it is totally silent
about the fact that militarization is draining China's
limited resources: In 1973 direct military expenditures
took up more than 4 0% of budget appropriations and a vast
amount of human labor. The Peking leadership justifies this
by citing the Soviet 'threat.'
...At present, Mao Tse-tung and a small group of
political and military leaders chosen by him wield absolute
power. However, it should be emphasized the (sic) Mao's
inner circle is not monolithic; various groups within it are
struggling for power. The main groups in Peking's ruling
clique are the 'leftists' or extremists — active proponents
of the 'cultural revolution' — and so-called pragmatists,
who sometimes advance 'leftist' positions for tactical
reasons. The military is also an independent power [The




Recently, the Brezhnev renegade clique has talked
a lot of nonsense on Sino-Soviet relations. It alleges that
China is against relaxation of world tension and unwilling to
improve Sino-Soviet relations, etc. These words are directed
to the Soviet people and the people of other countries in a
vain attempt to alienate their friendly feelings for the
Chinese people and disguise the true features of the new
Czar. These words are above all meant for the monopoly
capitalists in the hope of getting more money in reward for
services in opposing China and communism. This was an old
trick of Hitler's, only Brezhnev is playing it more clumsily.
If you are so anxious to relax world tension, why don't you
show your good faith by doing a thing or two — for instance,
withdraw your armed forces from Czechoslovakia or the
People's Republic of Mongolia and return the four northern
islands to Japan? China has not occupied any foreign
countries' territory. Must China give away all the territory
north of the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists in order
to show that we favour relaxation of world tension and are
willing to improve Sino-Soviet relations? The Chinese people
are not to be deceived or cowed. The Sino-Soviet controversy
on matters of principle should not hinder the normalization
of relations between the two states on the basis of the Five
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Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Sino-Soviet boundary
question should be settled peacefully through negotiations
free from" any threat. ' We will not attack unless we are
attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-
attack' — this is our consistent principle. And we mean what
we say [The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of
China (Documents) 1973 pp. 26-27].
b. Russian View
...As is known , the Nazis put forth the winning
of 'Lebensraum' as one of their main chauvinist slogans.
They categorically refused to recognize the principle of the
inviolability of existing borders. 'Nature does not
recognize political boundaries,' Hitler stated. 'It gives
life to human beings on our planet and then quietly observes
the free play of forces. ' The National Socialists made
their goal the transformation of the 'Third Reich' into a
state equal to the Roman Empire and, in order to 'return
to the nation territory that had been wrested from it,
'
unleashed a predatory war. Since the time of the war against
Japan, Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly declared that it is neces-
sary to reunite with China territory that allegedly belonged
to China or was under its suzerainty during the era of the
'great Han, Tang, Ming and Ching empires.' The thought
automatically arises that he has decided to create a fifth
empire. Since the 19 60s. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai have
emphasized that they consider it their task to 'restore
Chinese territory to the dimensions it had under the Ching
Empire of the Manchus before the Opium Wars,' i.e., as of the
middle of the 19th century. Indeed, it was not without
reason that even Liu Shao-chi, when asked in the mid-1950s"
'Could Mao Tse-tung be called an emperor?' answered: 'He
could, only he would be called a "Red Emperor." ' Now the
word 'Red' is probably superfluous. ...
In an interview with a delegation of Japanese
Socialists in June, 1964, Mao stated: 'The Soviet Union
occupies too much space. ***The Soviet Union's area is
22,000,000 square kilometers, but its population is only
200,000,000 .***The region east of Lake Baikal became Russian
territory approximately 100 years ago, and since then
Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka and other areas have been
territories of the Soviet Union. We have still not presented
them with a bill for this.' It was as if he said this as
Goebbels and Rosenberg dictated the words.
Following the recipe of the National Socialists,
the Maoists have stated their claims to territories that
have historically belonged to Japan, Vietnam, Burma, the
Philippines and other states. China has published geographic
maps on which China's boundaries, which have been set by a
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number of international treaties, are marked 'undetermined.'
These areas include parts of the borders with India, Burma
and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, as well as the
Soviet-Chinese border along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and
in the Pamirs area [The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
4 September 1974 pp. 2-3].
7. On the State of the World
a. Chinese View
. . .The numerous Third World countries have
become the main force in the revolutionary struggle against
the two hegemonic powers. More and more people have seen
through the so-called 'detente' played up by the superpowers.
All the basic contradictions in the world are further
sharpening, particularly the contradiction between the two
superpowers on the one hand and the people of all countries
on the other and the contradiction between the two super-
powers themselves.
. .
.Overestimation of the strength of the super-
powers does not square with the fact. In the final analysis,
it is not the one or two superpowers but the people of the
world in their thousands of millions who determine the destiny
of the world.
... China^ consistently supports the liberation
struggles of all oppressed nations and oppressed peoples and
considers this to be her bounden internationalist duty.
. .
.We hold that the colonial peoples can win
national liberation only by relying mainly on their own
efforts to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against colonialism.
...Armed struggle is fundamental, but negotiations
are not excluded. Sometimes, going to negotiations is tit-
for-tat; and sometimes, not going to negotiations is also tit-
for-tat. Even in negotiations one must base himself on
fighting. In the course of negotiations, the fundamental
interests of the people must be protected. The armed forces
of the people must be strengthened, and not weakened.
. .
.There can be no settlement of the Middle East
question, so long as the lost Arab territories are not re-
covered and Palestinian national rights not restored. What-
ever manoeuvres they may engage in, the two superpowers will
never succeed in their attempt to sacrifice the Palestinian
national rights and undermine the militant unity of the
Palestinian and other Arab peoples.
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...In May India exploded a nuclear device
allegedly for peaceful purposes. In June the Indian Govern-
ment imposed on the people of Sikkim the so-called 'Government
of Sikkim bill, 1 which it had concocted single-handed (sic).
And/ more recently, the Indian Parliament adopted a constitu-
tional amendment, making Sikkim a so-called 'associate state'
of India. To put it bluntly, this is the annexation of
Sikkim. It is another naked act of expansionism perpetrated
by the Indian Government after dismembering Pakistan by
armed force.
. . .The Soviet Union is unscrupulous in its efforts
to interfere in, subvert, divide and control the South Asian
countries. It is conspiring to engineer another dismemberment
of Pakistan. It dreams of opening a corridor to the Indian
Ocean to serve its interests in its contention with the other
superpower for hegemony in the South Asian subcontinent and
the Indian Ocean.
. . .The proposal put forward by Pakistan for the
establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia is
entirely reasonable. China gives it her firm support.
...The Chinese Government has solemnly declared
on many occasions that at no time and in no circumstances will
China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It consistently
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or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
countries or nuclear-free zones.
...the two superpowers are fiercely contending
with each other on a global scale. And their arms expansion
and war preparations serve their policy of hegemonism.
...the superpowers, when faced with increasingly acute
economic troubles, inevitably turn to the further militariza-
tion of the national economy as the way out. In this regard,
the present situation resembles that of the 30s in many ways
[ Peking Review 11 October 1974 pp. 9-14],
b. Russian View
The 10th Congress and subsequent occurrences have
exposed still more Maoist foreign policy's direct opposition
to world socialism, as well as the Maoists' attempts to form
blocs with imperialist forces and their opposition to detente.
Peking's foreign policy is aimed at achieving the complete
supremacy of Maoism within the country and the transformation
of China into a state dictating its will to the peoples of
the world. To accomplish this, the Maoist leadership seeks
to play on the contradictions between the two world systems,
to effect closer ties with states varying widely in their





The congress advanced the concept of 'necessary
compromises by revolutionary countries (i.e., China — Ed.
)
with imperialist states.' It is clear that the Peking
leadership regards anti-Sovietism as the basis of such
compromises. Under the slogan of opposition to the hegemony
of 'superpowers,' the 10th Congress switched from a policy
of anti-imperialism to one of anti-Sovietism, . from a
'struggle on two fronts' (against the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.)
to a concentrated struggle against the Soviet Union.
The 10th Congress documents depict the U.S.A. as
a decrepit opponent that is vastly less dangerous than
'enemy number one' — the Soviet Union. The Maoists now
consider the U.S.A. to be a potential partner with whom
'necessary compromises' can be made to combat the 'main-
adversary ' — the socialist commonwealth.
...After the 10th Congress, the Maoists advanced
a new 'theory' of the alignment of forces in the world — the
'concept of three worlds.' The 'first world' is the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A., the two 'superpowers'; the 'second world' is
the developed countries; the 'third world' is the developing
countries. The distribution of states among these 'worlds'
is made without regard to their social structures and without
any calss (sic) approach or realistic appraisal of the
present international situation.
Peking's actions in the international arena are
designed to weaken world socialism, the main force in the
struggle for social progress and international security, by
undermining the unity of the socialist countries, discrediting
their policies and focusing attacks on the Council for
Economic Aid and the Warsaw Treat [The Current Digest o f the
Soviet Press 23 October 1974 pp. 8-11]
.
=
8 . On Mongolia
a. Chinese Viev;
While often begging for loans from the West to
make up for their capital shortage, the Soviet revisionists
have strengthened control and plunder of Mongolia and some
other countries by making investments in and lending money
to them. Statistics show that in the decade since the
Brezhnev clique came to power in 1964, the Soviet revisionists
have given Mongolia loans worth 1,365 million rubles (some
•
1,810 million U.S. dollars) . In other words, each Mongolian
owes a debt of more than 1,600 rubles to the Soviet Union and
consequently Mongolia has become one of the countries with the
world's heaviest per capita debt.
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...The Soviet revisionists' plunder and exploita-
tion are the root cause of Mongolia's economic backwardness
today
.
The neo-colonialist acts by the Soviet revi-
sionists enable people to see more clearly their ugly
features — socialists in words but imperialists in deeds
[ Peking Review 6 December 1974 pp. 14-15].
b. Russian View
. .
.The Maoists also attempt to use border and
territorial questions to inflame nationalistic passions.
Having made territorial claims against the Soviet Union and
shown annexationist designs against the Mongolian People's
Republic, the Chinese leaders are also provoking border
disputes between other countries.
. . .The Maoist leadership is in practice pursuing
a tougher foreign-policy course, laced with extremism, that
opposes the ideas of collective security and disarmament, but
it is also trying to avoid armed clashes with large states,
while showing no compunctions about using force against weak
adversaries
.
Peking's foreign policy is particularly dangerous
to contiguous states, especially in times of domestic
political crises in China. The C.P.R. creates constant
tension in the areas closest to it by demonstrations of armed
strength along its borders, nuclear tests in the atmosphere,
the use of force to solve territorial disputes, and inter-
vention in the internal affairs of its neighbors [The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 23 October 1974 p. 11].
9 . On Maritime Law
a. Chinese View
The Soviet Government recently raised in collusion
with the reactionary Sato government of Japan the absurdity
that the Straits of Malacca should be 'internationalized'.
This attempt aimed at interfering in the affairs of the
straits and encroaching upon the sovereignty of the states
on both sides of the straits, has met with opposition from
the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia. . .
.
...Of late, quite a number of Soviet warships
entered into the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca
and carried out furtive activities there, thus severely
threatening the security of various countries in that area.
At present, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism
is colluding with the Japanese reactionaries who claim that
'the Straits of Malacca is the lifeline of Japan' to peddle
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the 'internationalization' of the straits. This has further
laid bare its ambitions for expansion and aggression...
[ International Negotiation: Chinese Comment on Soviet
Foreign Policy 1972 pp. 5-6] .
b. Russian View
...Long before the U.N. Conference on the Law of
the Sea was convened, Maoist propagandists, the Hsinhua News
Agency in particular, launched a far-reaching campaign
against existing standards of international maritime law* and
criticized the universally recognized international legal
concept of the 'open sea,' declaring it 'reactionary.'
Peking's diplomatic representatives and Maoist propaganda
have come out in favor of revising the existing system of
laws governing ocean space and of re-examining boundaries.
They are trying to score a political victory in 'third world'
countries and are opposing sensible solutions to the pressing
problems of maritime law. Cloaked in 'revolutionary'
phraseology, the Maoists are openly supporting attempts by
certain countries to seize vast expanses of the open sea and
declare sovereignty over them. Peking's representatives at
the Conference on the Law of the Sea are trying to disrupt
efforts to settle the pressing problems of maritime law.
They have made slanderous accusations against the Soviet
Union, asserting that the latter is trying to make the
conference adopt decisions en maritime law that will benefit,
only the Soviet Union [ The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
18 September 1974 pp. 15]
.
10. On Sino-Soviet Border Security
a. Chinese View
...To put it plainly, the 'borders' and 'security'
alleged by the Soviet Government mean that wherever it
attempts to commit aggression and expansion will become its
'borders' and where its 'security' is threatened. The Soviet
Government has consistently carried out expansion and
aggression abroad in accordance with this gangster theory.
There are many examples of this. Under the pretext of
'defending the security of the socialist community,' the
Soviet Government once flagrantly sent several hundred
thousand troops to occupy Czechoslovakia by force. Raising
the banner of defending 'Soviet territory' and 'Soviet borders,
the Soviet Government launched armed aggression against the
Chinese territory of Chenpao Island, and repeatedly created
incidents of armed provocation along the border. In order to
introduce its warships into the Mediterranean Sea and commit
expansion in this region, the Soviet Government wasted no time
in extending its 'borders' to that area and shamelessly
declared that 'since the USSR is a major power in the Black
Sea, she is also a major power in the Mediterranean Sea.'
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In order to expand in all parts of the world,
the Soviet Government has even gone so far as to advocate
cosmopolitanism and shouted that the USSR is a 'major world
power'; so long as 'it involves our security or that of our
friends,' the Soviet Government 'will not remain passive,'
no matter hov; distant the 'geographic location' may be.
This is out-and-out theory of aggression and expansion of
social-imperialism which has nothing to do with 'border
security. ' [ International Negotiation: Chinese Comment on
Soviet Foreign Policy 19 72 p . 3 ]
.
b. Russian View
. . .One of the main allegations made at the Tenth
Congress of the CPC was 'the threat of a surprise attack'
on China by the Soviet Union. Some facts should be recalled
in this connection.
For many years now the Chinese leaders have been
making much noise about the 'threat from the north', by
referring to the 'concentration of Soviet troops along the
Soviet-Chinese border'. Yet, it was the Chinese leadership
who, in the early sixties, ordered troops and people's
volunteer units to be deployed along the whole frontier with
the USSR. Since then, local inhabitants from among the
national minorities have been resettled to the hinterland
of China, military settlements have been established along
the border, and the construction of strategic roads,
communications lines and airfields has been conducted on a
wide scale. The Chinese leaders have deliberately made the
northern frontier — one of friendship and brotherhood of the
two great peoples in the past — an area in which they staged
thousands of small and big provocations and 'even armed
conflicts. This is how matters stand in reality. And after
all that Peking is shouting about the 'threat from the
north '
I
Imperialist propagandists and anti-Communists of
various hues have readily caught up Peking's inventions,
spreading rumours about the imminent 'preventive nuclear
strike by the USSR against China" [Where is Peking Heading"





A. 1949-1953: SOVIET DOMINANCE AND CHINESE SUBMISSION
I. Identical Interests
1. Against re-emergence of a strong Japan.
2. For bloc unity under Soviet leadership.
3. For mutual increases in power and industrialization.
4. Against American take-over of North Korea.
5. Defense against attack from the United States.
6. For expansion by peaceful and violent means of communist
influence throughout the world.
7. Against thermonuclear war with the United States.
8. For end of the colonial era and conversion of newly
independent countries to socialism.




1. Against United States 1. Against United States
influence in Europe. influence in Taiwan.
2. Control of regimes abroad, 2. Control of land abroad,
especially East Europe. especially Taiwan and Vietnam,
3. Protection from attack from the rear (Sino-Soviet border)
so as not to be engaged on too many fronts simultaneously.
4. Control over Chinese 4. For large amounts of




1. Direct control of China,
especially Sinkiang and
Manchuria.






1. Freedom from such control,
i.e., territorial and
political integrity.
2. Keep Korea out of Russian
hands
.
3. Reincorporation of Mongolia




4. Giving China as little
aid as possible to keep her
under control and satisfied.
5. Continuation of voice in
the management of Chinese
Eastern Railroad
6. A Soviet Far Eastern warm
water port on Chinese
territory
.
7. Emplanting regimes abroad
whose domestic institutions,
political philosophy, and
societal organization are as
similar as possible to Soviet
Union's own.
4. Obtaining as much aid as
possible from Soviet Union
with as little control as
possible
.
5. Reimposition of exclusive
Chinese control over the
Chinese Eastern Railroad.
6. Removal of Soviet naval
base at Dairen with end of
Korean War
7. Emplanting regimes abroad
whose domestic institutions,
political philosophy, and
societal organization are as
similar as possible to China's
own. [Robinson 1966 pp. 7-8]
B. 196 0-1964 (NOVEMBER) : OPEN POLEMICS AND
BEGINNINGS OF DIRECT OPPOSITION
I . Identical Interests
1. Against a strong Japan allied with the United States.
2. Against American take-over of North Korea and North
Vietnam.
3. Defense against attack from United States.
4. For Chinese presentation in world councils, especially
the United Nations.
5. Against thermonuclear war with the United States.
6. Against 'neocolonialism' and for conversion of newly
independent countries to socialism.
7. Overcoming Western strategic superiority (Soviet Union:





1. Protection from attack from the rear (Sino-Soviet border




1. Desire to settle outstand-
ing conflicts with United
States
1. Desire to see United





2. Peace as the chief
environment for transition
to socialism.
3. Against even small,
indirect wars with United
States (e.g. Vietnam) for fear
of nuclear escalation.
4. Opposition to transfer
of any territory to China.
5. No support to violent
'national liberation




War or peace as alterna-
tive environments for transi-
tion to socialism.
3. Not against small, local-




4 Recovery of certain
Siberian and Soviet Far
Eastern provinces as Chinese
irredenta.
5. Support for violent
'national liberation
movements' even if United
States is involved.
6. Difference on how to overcome United States strategic
superiority.




9. Against domination of
North Korea by China.
10. Against domination of
North Vietnam.
11. Reassertion of Soviet
ideological primacy as a claim
to be the legitimate center of
the world communist movement.




13. Unwillingness to con-









as similar as possible to
Soviet Union's own.
15. Support of India as a
block to China.
7. For industrialization and




Mongolia as a Chinese province
9. Against domination of




North Vietnam by Soviet Union.
11. Imposition of Chinese
(especially Mao's) ideological
primacy as a claim to be the
legitimate center of the world
communist movement.
12. Insistence on necessity
of Chinese presence at world
conferences before any issues
can be settled.
13. Use of Soviet power to
forward Chinese irredenta
interests in Taiwan.




as similar as possible to
China's own.
15. Discrediting India as a
worthy rival for 'third'





16. Emerging interest in
'welfare 1 of brother Central
Asian nationalities across
Chinese border.
17. For expansion by peaceful




16. Protection of Sinkiang
from Soviet penetration.
17. For expansion by peaceful
and violent means of communist
influence throughout the world,
especially the 'third' world





Below is a listing of all known Soviet Unified Systems
(ES) Computers and their specifications. The data was taken
from the final issue of the Soviet Cybernetics Review (May/
June, 19 74) published by the RAND Corporation. Additional
information on all known Soviet peripheral equipment such
as processors, core units, card readers, etc., is also
contained in the 58 pages of that issue.
A. 1010 Computer built in Hungary. The ES-1010 is the
smallest system in the ES family. The prototype was suc-
cessfully tested in 1972 according to a report in December
of that year. Series production began in the same year at
the Videotron Factory in Hungary. It was reported that the
operating system, OS-10, was available simultaneously with
production. It is a small, modular, microprogrammed system,
with a hierarchical interrupt system. It is intended for
limited-size scientific and technical calculations for
processing accumulated measurement data; for small process
control systems; for teaching systems; and in "hardened"
environments. It can also be used as an "intellectual"
terminal. The Hungarians have mounted an ES-1010 in a mobile
van, which can be used to bring computational capabilities
to schools and to perform computations anywhere that on-site
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capabilities of this sort are needed. Specifications are:
10,000 opns/sec; MTBF (continuous round-the-clock operations):
1000 hrs; Minimum floor space: 12 sq m.
B. 1020 Computer built in USSR and Bulgaria. The ES-
1020 has been described both as a small and as a medium
productivity computer. It is intended for scientific and
technical, economics, management, and special tasks; for
small control systems; and for teaching systems. A proto-
type unit underwent successful tests in 1971. An October
19 73 report stated that production "will be" started in the
Soviet Union and Bulgaria. However, it was known in July
1972 that 1020 units were in production under assembly-line
conditions in Brest (Belorussian SSR) at the Brest Electro-
mechanical Plant. The first known and verified installation
of a 1020 was at the Institute of Cybernetics, Ukrainian
SSR Academy of Sciences, in Kiev during the first half of
1973. In May 1973, it was reported that "several dozen" units
were in operation in the USSR, and the Minsk Ordzhonikidze
Plant was accepting orders for delivery in 90 days. A 1020
was delivered to the Tesla enterprise in Czechoslovakia in
December 1972, and was operational by the following February.
The 1020 was officially announced in Minsk in January 1972,
at which time it was said that the first units had already
been delivered to purchasers. The most reliable information




Control in the 1020 is broadly based on microprogramming
techniques, and it features a flexible logical interrupt
and branching system. The 1020 can be incorporated into
multimachine systems , in addition to operation in an autono-
mous mode and as part of a users 1 network. Specifications
are: 20,000 opns/sec; Core capacity: 256 Kbytes maximum in
4 blocks; MTBF: 1000 hrs; Minimum floor space: 100 sq m;
Maximum mass of inseparable elements and nodes: 500 kg;
Maximum of 1 multiplexor and 2 selector channels; Maximum
channel throughput: 0.7 Mbytes/sec.
C. 1021 Computer built by the Czechs. The ES-1021 sys-
tem, also called the ES-1020A, is a specialized medium pro-
ductivity unit oriented towards single-processor and single-
program operations. It is to be used for economics, scien-
tific and technical, and data-processing problems, Its in-
struction set is oriented towards small management systems.
The 1021 was developed at the Czech Research Institute of
Mathematical Machines. The chief designer was Jiri Podzimek.
A prototype was successfully tested in 1972, according to a
December 19 72 report. The 1021 is not known to be in pro-
duction, nor have any installed units been reported. Speci-
fications are: 40,000 opns/sec; MTBF: 1000 hrs; Minimum
floor space: 50 sq m; Operating systems: MOS (small operating
system)
.
D. 1030 Computer built in USSR and Poland. The ES-1030
is one of the middle-of-the-line members of the ES series,
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intended principally for scientific and technical, planning
and economics, and data processing computations. There are
both Soviet and Polish versions of the system, although re-
ports continue to be received of problems with getting the
Polish unit into production. The Soviet 1030 was designed
in Erevan, Armenia, at the Erevan Scientific Research Insti-
tute of Mathematical Machines. It was approved for produc-
tion in April 19 72. The Polish version is to be produced
by the MERA Association, which anticipated having several
units ready for testing in 1972. In May 1973, it was re-
ported that "several dozen" 1030 machines were in operation
in the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia anticipates delivery of
several 1030 units in 1975, and plans to standardize on the
1030 for commercial and trade computations. The Czech
machines are to be purchased from Poland. The 1030 utilizes
the full set of 14 3 ES instructions, and can operate in
multiprocessor systems, and also in dual-processor systems
wherein the total core store of both machines is commonly
accessible. The 1030 uses DOS, the disc operating system,
although sources have varied as to whether or not the OS
operating system can also be used. Specifications: 100,000
opns/sec; Minimum floor space: 110 sq m; MTBF: 1000 hrs.
E. 104 Computer built in the German Democratic Republic
The 1040 is the largest ES computer to be manufactured ex-
clusively outside the Soviet Union; its design, development,
and production were assigned to East Germany. It was
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reportedly in production in 1973. One unit was scheduled
for installation in a Czech chemicals plant (together with a
1020) during 1973, with a second unit on order, for delivery
to Czechoslovakia in 1974. The Novosibirsk Science City
in the USSR was expecting two 1040' s in 1973. The 1040 is
at the high end of the medium productivity ES systems, and
uses both the DOS and OS operating systems. It is manu-
factured by the East German Robotron enterprise. Specifica-
tions: 300,000 opns/sec; MTBF : 300 hrs ; Minimum floor
space: 100 sq m.
F. 1050 Computer built in the USSR. The ES-1050 is the
largest member of the series developed so far. It is manu-
factured at the Penza Calculating Machines Plant in the
Urals, and is described as equivalent to an IBM 360/65. The
1050 displayed in Moscow bore the serial number 1. It is
intended for scientific and technical computations, economic
work, for use in large computer centers, in large-scale data
processing systems, and in multimachine complexes. It is a
highly productive machine, operating with both the DOS and
OS operating systems. One American observer notes that it
has 14-pin package circuits with four gates per chip mounted
on 6-layer boards. Delay times for ECL gates are 6 nanosec.
The unit displayed used the same disc units as were observed
in Novosibirsk on the Besm-6. Production of five units was
projected in 1973. A 1050 was delivered to the Institute
of Cybernetics, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, in Kiev
during the summer of 1973; at the time it was seen there by
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foreign guests, it was not yet operational. Projections
for the current five-year plan (through 1375) anticipated
10 units a year for export, although fewer than that would
be available in 19 73. The cost of the minimum configuration
was given at 3.5 million rubles, including basic software
but not applications programs. Specifications: 1.5 million
opns/sec (arithmetic); 500,000 logical opns/sec; MTBF : 500
hrs ; Minimum floor space: 2 00 sq m; Maximum channel
throughput: 8 Mbytes/sec.
G. 1060 Computer built in the USSR. The 1060 is the largest
of the ES systems, although information on it is vague since
it has not yet been announced. Original projections called
for an operating speed of 3 million opns/sec. Some sources,
both Russian and Polish, have indicated privately that the
actual speed will be around 1.5 million opns/sec. The 1060
is being developed in the Soviet Union and will be produced
there exclusively. It is to be equipped with card reading
equipment operating at speeds of 500 and 2000 cards/min,
with a 2 50-card/min output punch. The unit will occupy a
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I. THE SOVIET UNION
Population: 252,530,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 2 years; Navy and
Border Guards, 2-3 years.
Total armed forces: 3,52 5,000.
Estimated GNP 1973: 441 billion roubles. 1





(A) Navy: 720 SLBM in 70- submarines. -
9 SSBN (D-class) , each with 12 SS-N-8 missiles.
33 SSBN (Y-class) , each with 16 SS-N-6 missiles.
8 SSBN (H-class) each with 3 SS-N-5 missiles.
11 diesel submarines (G-11-class) , each with 3 SS-N-5
Serb missiles.
4
9 diesel (G-1-class) each with 3 SS-N-4 Sark missiles.
See the Readers' Notes on pp. vi-vii for the method of
estimating GNP and the problems of conversion to dollars. The
1973 official exchange rate was $1 = 0.72 roubles. An
American study gave $1 = 0.59 as a suitable 19 70 GNP conver-
sion rate, compared with the then ruling official exchange
rate of $1 = 0.9.
2This dollar estimate is only a valuation of the Soviet
defense effort at US prices measured in dollars. The method
of arriving at the figure is described in The Military
Balance 1973-1974
, pp. 8-9.
3 •Characteristics of nuclear delivery vehicles and notes
on numbers and types under construction and test are given in
Table I on pp. 73-7.
4 . •These 60 launchers are not considered strategic missiles




(B) Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) : 350,000.
ICBM: 1,575
209 SS-7 Saddler and SS-8 Sasin.
288 SS-9 Scarp.
.1,018 SS-11 (including about 100 IRBM/MRBM)
.
60 SS-13 Savage.
IRBM and MRBM: about 600.
100 SS-5 Skean IRBM.
500 SS-4 Sandal MRBM.
The majority are sited near the western border of the USSR,
the remainder east of the Urals.
(C) Air Force
Long Range Air Force (LRAF) : 840 combat aircraft.
100 Tu-95 Bear and 40 Mya-4- Bison.
Tankers: 50 Mya-4 Bison.
Medium range bombers: 70
500 Tu-16 Badger and 200 Tu-22 Blinder.
DEFENSIVE
Air Defence Forces (PVO-Strany) 500,000: early-warning and _
control system, fighter-interceptor squadrons and SAM units.
Aircraft: about 2,650.
Interceptors: include about 650 MIG-17 and MIG-19
,
750 Su-9, 1,250 Yak-28P Firebar, Tu-28P Fiddler,
Su-11, Su-15 Flagon A and MIG-25 Foxbat
AEW aircraft: 10 modified Tu-114 Moss.
Anti-ballistic Missiles (ABM)
:
64 Galosh long-range missile launchers are deployed in four
sites around Moscow, each with Try Add engagement radars
(another radar of this type is under construction) . Target
acquisition and tracking is by a phased-array Dog House radar,
and early warning is given by phased-array Hen House radar on
the Soviet borders. The range of Galosh is believed to be
over 200 miles, and its warheads are nuclear, presumably in
the megaton range.
5The SRF, a separate service, have their own manpower.
About 75 per cent is based on the European USSR, with
most of the remainder in the Far East; in addition there are
staging and dispersal points in the Arctic.





SAM: 9,800 launchers at about 1,650 sites.
SA-2 Guideline: about 4,500; Fan Song radar: high-
explosive warhead; slant range (launcher to target)
about 2 5 miles; effective between 1,000 and 80,000
feet.
SA-3 Goa: Two-stage, low-level missile; slant range
about 15 miles.
SA-4 Ganef: Twin-mounted (on tracked carrier), air-
transportable, long-range missile with solid fuel
boosters and ram-jet sustainer.
SA-5 Griffon: Two-stage, boosted high-level missile;
slant range about 50 miles, with a limited capability
against missiles.
SA-6 Gainful: Triple-mounted (on tracked carrier), low-





SSM: (nuclear capable): about 1,000 launchers (units are
organic to formations) , including:
(1) FROG-1-7, range 10-45 miles.
(2) Scud A, range 50 miles.
(3) Scud B, range 185 miles.
(4) Scaleboard, range 500 miles.





JS2/3, T-10, T-10M hy, T-62 and T-54/55 med . PT-76 amphibious
recce It tks (most Soviet tanks are equipped for amphibious
crossing by deep wading)
.
AFV: BTR-50P, -60, -152; BMP APC ; BRDM scout car, and BMD
airborne AFV.
Artillery:
100mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and 203mm field and SP guns and
how; 122mm multiple RL; 140mm RL; ASU-57 and ASU-85 SP
and 8 5mm and 100mm ATk guns; Sagger, Snapper, Swatter
ATGW.
Anti-Aircraf t Artillery:
14.5mm, 23mm, 57mm towed guns and ZSU-57-2 57mm twin-barrelled
and ZSU-23-4 23mm four-barrelled tracked SP guns; 85mm,
100mm and 130mm guns.
DEPLOYMENT AND STRENGTH:
Central and Eastern Europe: 31 divs; 20 divs (10 tank) in
East Germany; 2 tank divs in Poland; 4 divs (2 tank) in
Hungary; and 5 divs (2 tank) in Czechoslovakia; 9,025
medium tanks.
p
Excluding Air Defence Forces
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European USSR: 63 divs (about 22 tank)
.
Central USSR: 5 divs (1 tank)
.
Southern USSR: 2 3 divs (3 tank)
.




Soviet divisions have three degrees of combat readiness:
Category 1, between three-quarters and full strength, with
complete equipment; Category 2, between half and three-
quarters strength with complete fighting vehicles;
Category 3, about one-third strength, possibly with
complete fighting vehicles (though some may be obsoles-
cent) . The 31 divs in Eastern Europe are Category 1, as
are a small number of those in the European USSR and the
Far East and a few in the Southern USSR. The remaining
divisions in European USSR,. Southern USSR and the Far East
are probably evenly divided between Categories 2 and 3.
The divisions in Central USSR are likely to be in
Category 3. At full strength, tk divs have 325 med tks
;
mech divs 2 55.
Outside the Warsaw Pact area:
Afghanistan 150, Algeria 600, Cuba 1,000, Egypt 500, Iraq 600,
North Vietnam 1,000, Somali Republic 1,000, Syria
2-3,000, People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen 200,
Navy: 4 75,000 (incl Naval Air Force, 75,000; Naval Infantry,
17,000, and Coast Artillery and Rocket Troops, 10,000);
2 21 major surface combat ships, 24 5 attack and cruise
missile submarines, 70 nuclear, 175 diesel.
Submarines
:
Attack: 30 nuclear (10 N- , 15 V- , 3 E-I-, 1 U-l A-class)
;
140 diesel (50 F- , 10 R- , 20 Z- , 59 W- , 1 T-class)
.
Cruise missile: 40 nuclear (1 P- , 10 C- , 29 E-class)
;
25 diesel (15 J- , 10 W-class) , with SS-N-3 and
SS-N-7.
Coastal: 10 diesel (5 B~ , 5 Q~class)
.
Surface ships:
2 Moskva-class ASW helicopter cruisers, each with 2 twin SAM
and about 2 Ka-2 5 hel.
3 Kara-class ASW cruisers with SSM and SAM.
4 Kresta-class ASW cruisers with SSM and SAM.
6 Kresta II-class ASW cruisers with SSM and SAM.
4 Kynda-class cruisers with SSM and SAM.
13 Sverdlov-class cruisers (3 with SAM, 2 with hel) , and
1 older cruiser.
6 Krivak-class destroyers with SSM and SAM.
6 Kanin-class ASW destroyers with SAM.
3 Krupny-class destroyers with SSM.
19 Kashin-class ASW destroyers with SAM.
8 modified Kotlin-class destroyers with SAM.
36 Kotlin- and Skory-class destroyers.
110 other ocean-going escorts.




130 Osa- and Komar-class FPB with Styx SSM.
300 patrol and torpedo boats.





(1 40,000-ton Kuril-class aircraft carrier, apparently
designed to operate with a combined total of perhaps
25 S/VTOL ac and 36 hel, may be in service in late 1975.
A second is building.)
In addition to the above there are 50 intelligence collection
vessels (AGI) and a number of trawlers used for electronic
intelligence.
A proportion of the destroyers and smaller vessels may not be
fully manned.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: about 715 combat aircraft.
(Most shore-based near the north-west and Black Sea coasts
,
organized generally into 3 regiments of 3 sqns each at
each base.)
280 Tu-16 Badger with one Kipper or two Kelt ASM.
55 Tu-22 Blinder strike and reconnaissance ac
.
20 11-2 8 Beagle torpedo-equipped light bombers.
50 Tu-95 Bear long-range naval reconnaissance ac.
150 Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance and tanker ac
100 Be-2 Mail ASW amphibians.
60 11-38 May ASW aircraft,




Organized in brigades and assigned to fleets. Equipped
with standard infantry weapons, T-54/55 med tks , PT-76
It tks and BTR-60P/PB APC
.
COASTAL ARTILLERY AND ROCKET TROOPS
Heavy coastal guns and SS-N-3 Shaddock SSM to protect
approaches to naval bases and major ports. Coasts are
covered by a coast watch radar and visual reporting system,
DEPLOYMENT (average strengths only)
Northern Fleet: 160 submarines, about 80 of them nuclear;
56 major surface combat ships.
Baltic Fleet: 30 submarines, 50 major surface combat ships.
Black Sea Fleet: 20 submarines, 60 major surface combat
ships
.
Pacific Fleet: 100 submarines, about 40 of them nuclear;
55 major surface combat ships.
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9Air Force: 400,000; about 5,350 combat aircraft.
Long Range Air Force (see p. 8) .
Tactical Air Force: about 4,500 aircraft, incl Yak-28,
11-28, 800 MIG-17, 500 Su-7, 300 MIG-23 Flogger , more than
1,350 MIG-21; Su-20, improved Fitter B, Fencer A.
Air Transport Force: about 1,700 aircraft; 870 11-14,
An- 8, An-24, some 800 An- 12 and 11-18 tpts and 30 An-22
hy tpts.
2,500 hel (about 500 Mi-1, Mi-2; Mi-4, 1,000 Mi-6, Mi-8,
Mi-10; Mi-12 and Mi-24)
.
DEPLOYMENT:
About half the Tactical Air Force is oriented towards Western
Europe and a quarter towards China. Some 1,2 50 aircraft
are actually deployed in Eastern Europe. There is a
Tu-22 sqn in Iraq.
RESERVES: about 3,000,000 (500,000 with recent training
earmarked for divisional reinforcements)
.
Para-Military Forces: 310,000
180,000 KGB border troops; 130,000 MVD security troops. The
border troops are equipped with tks , AFV, ac and ships:
MVD have tks and AFV. There is a part-time military
training organization (DOSAAF) which takes part in such
recreational activities as athletics, shooting and para-
chuting. It appists in pre—military training given in
schools, colleges and workers' centres to those of 15 and
over. The membership is perhaps 9 million but the number
of effectives is likely to be much smaller.





Military service: Army, 2-4 years; Air Force, 3-5 years;
Navy, 4-6 years.
Total regular forces: 3,000,000.









6 airborne divisions (under Air Force)
.
20 artillery divisions.
41 railway and construction engineer divisions.
Soviet JS-2 hy, T-34 and T-54, Chinese-produced T-59 med,
T-60 (PT-76 type) amphibious and T-62 It tks ; APC:
130mm and 152mm guns; SU-76, SU-100 and JSU-122 SP ARTY;
RL up to 140mm; 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm AA guns.
DEPLOYMENT
:
China is divided into 11 Military Regions (MR) , in turn
divided into Military Districts (MD) with usually two
or three Districts to a Region. Divisions are grouped
into some 36 Armies, generally of three infantry divisions,
three artillery regiments and, in some cases, three
armoured regiments. One Army appears to be assigned to
each MD but some formations are centrally controlled.
The geographical distribution of the divisions (excluding




North and North-East China (Shenyang and Peking MR )
:
50 divisions.
East and South-East China (Tsinan, Nanking and Foochow MR):
2 5 divisions. -. -
South-Central China (Canton and Wuhan MR): 20 divisions.




Mid-West China (Lanchow MR): 15 divisions.
West and South-West China (Sinkiang, Chengtu and Kunming MR )
:
26 divisions.
Navy: 230,000 (including Naval Air Force and 28,000 Marines).
1 G-class submarine (with ballistic missile tubes) .13
50 fleet submarines (26 Soviet R- , 21 W-class).14
6 SSM destroyers with Styx (more building)
.
1 ex-Soviet Gordy-class destroyer.
10 destroyer escorts (some with SSM)
.
15 patrol escorts.
20 submarine chasers (Soviet Kronstadt-type)
.
100 Osa- and Komar-type FPB with Styx SSM (more building)
.
27 minesweepers (20 Soviet T-43 type)
.
46 landing ships (ex-US)
.
230 MTB and Hydrofoils (less than 100 tons)
.
315 MGB (Shanghai-, Swatow- , Whampoa-types)
22 5 armed motor junks and motor launches.
180 supply and miscellaneous vessels.
DEPLOYMENT
:
North Sea Fleet: about 150 vessels; deployed from the mouth
of the Yalu river to Lienyunkang; major bases at Tsingtao
and Lushun.
East Sea Fleet: about 500 vessels; deployed from Lienyunkang
to Chaoan Wan; major bases at Shanghai and Chou Shan.
South Sea Fleet: about 200 vessels; deployed from Chaoan Wan
to the North Vietnamese frontier; major bases at Huangpu
and Chanchiang.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: 30,00 0; over 600 shore-based combat aircraft,
including about 100 11-2 8 torpedo-carrying and some Tu-2
light bombers and some 500 fighters, incl MIG-17 and
MIG-19/F-6 and some F-9; Be-6 Madge MR aircraft, Mi-4
Hound helicopters. Naval fighters are integrated into
the air defence system.
Air Force: 220,000 (including strategic forces and 85,000
air defence personnel); about 3,800 combat aircraft.
At least 50 Tu-16 and a few Tu-4 medium bombers.
At least 200 11-28 and 100 Tu-2 light bombers.
Some MIG-15, about 1,700 MIG-17, at least 1,300 MIG-19, about
50 MIG-21 and up to 400 F-9 fighters.
12 2-3 divs of border troops also in each of these MR.
13 .China is not known to have any missiles for this boat.
Including older training vessels.
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About 400 transport aircraft and 300 helicopters, including
200 An-2, 11-14 and 11-18 transports and Mi-4 and
10 SA-321JA Super Frelon helicopters. (These could be
supplemented by about 400 aircarft of the Civil Air
Bureau.
)
There is an air defence system, capable of providing a
limited point defence of key urban and industrial areas,
military installations and advanced weapons complexes.
Some 3,000 naval and Air Force fighters are assigned to
the AD role together with several hundred CSA-1 (SA-2)
SAM and antiaircraft artillery.
Para-Military Forces:
About 300,000 security and border troops (including 20
infantry- type divisions and' 4 independent regiments)
are stationed in the frontier areas. In addition to a
public security force, there is a civilian militia with
an effective element of probably not more than 5 million
organized into divisions and regiments; some of its urban
elements have some heavy AA weapons. There are civilian
production and construction corps in a number of Military
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